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 ‘The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how 
little they really know about what they imagine they can design.’ 
 Friedrich Hayek 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Can institution evolve in a closed economic system? Classical development theories 
emphasized the pervasive influence of factor endowment and accumulated stock of 
capital and technology on the development of economies (Domar 1970; Lewis 1956). In 
effect, reducing financial constraints, promoting research and development, and 
disseminating technology were seen as the crucial development strategies. But since 
recently, development is being viewed as a far more fundamental transformation of 
society (World Bank 2003; Stiglitz 1995) including a change in attitudes, culture, and an 
abandonment of many traditional ways of thinking (Stiglitz 1995). Institutions not only 
summarize attitudinal, cultural and traditional behaviors, but future behavioral patterns 
can be shaped by, among others, institutional change. 
In the past four decades, partly by drawing upon the experience of the Asian green 
revolutions (Dorward et al. 2009) and partly based on the existing realities, Sub-Sahara 
African (SSA) countries have experimented with different development approaches and 
have implemented various programs to curb the pressing poverty and to step into a 
sustainable development path. These countries desperately tried different approaches 
such as export promotion, import substitutions, collectivization, liberalization (through 
Structural Adjustment Program), integrated rural development, poverty reduction 
strategy (Burke et al. 2007), and recently growth and transformation plans, to mention 
few. Despite these attempts, the performance of Sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries, 
when compared to developing countries in Asia, was generally disappointing 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005; Haber et al. 2003; Osuji et al. 1998; Chaudhry 
1993; 1994).  
Generally, economists, including critics of neoliberalism, recognize the crucial roles of a 
well-functioning market for economic development. The major difference lies on how to 
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get well-functioning markets in developing countries. Neoclassical economics contend 
that institutions play frictional roles in the development of the market. Even if there exist 
market failures, neoclassical economist takes these as short-term phenomena. When 
markets are set free, the competitive pressure in the long-run is believed to lead to 
efficient markets. The above explanation implicitly assumes that the market exists. For 
some economic activities, the market may not exist at all. But even if markets exist, 
setting them to operate freely in itself requires political commitment. Furthermore, even if 
markets are set free, nothing guarantees the automatic development of efficient 
markets. Institutional economists argue that the socio-cultural, political, physical milieu 
matter for markets to emerge. Yet, even if markets emerge and are set free, they may 
not always converge into efficient markets. The neoclassical assumption of the 
spontaneous emergence of efficient markets is based on the implicit assumption of 
costless transactions (Williamson 2010). In a real world with positive transaction costs, 
the emergence and efficiency of beneficial exchanges will depend on the efficiency of 
institutions in reducing transaction costs. Transaction costs not only can be so high as to 
block beneficial exchanges, they can also confine transactions within certain 
social/geographic entities. 
1.2 Personalized transactions  
Nowadays the role of institutions in determining the development of well-functioning 
markets is recognized. Institutions by structuring behavioral patterns organize economic 
exchanges in different forms (North 1990). North (1990) identifies three forms of 
exchanges: personalized exchange, impersonalized exchange without third party 
enforcement (i.e. through kinship ties, bonding, exchange hostages, or merchant codes 
of conduct) and impersonalized exchanges with third party enforcements. While the last 
form of exchange requires an effective judicial system and other supporting institutions, 
the other two can be achieved through a combination of self-enforcement and other 
bilateral arrangements, as can be evidenced from historical accounts (Greif 1998).  
Third party enforcement is considered as an important institution in allowing complex 
and large-scale exchanges. Unlike the guild system in Medieval Europe (Greif 1989), 
institutions that facilitate impersonalized transactions without third party enforcement 
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have not emerged in SSA countries. On the other hand, even if judicial system was 
introduced in these countries, it has not evolved to handle complex exchanges. Thus, 
transactions through third party enforcements remain limited to a few large transactions 
such as the purchase of real estate, rental of a building, contractual agreements 
involving a large sum of money. But in some cases, even if strong legal institutions that 
treat everyone the same exist, they may still impose high transaction costs on almost 
everyone. For instance, the socialist-orientated institutional arrangements of the past 
regime imposed numerous bureaucratic administrative rules that limit participation of 
private economic agents, private acquisition of land and other properties, private wealth 
creation and accumulation, the free mobility of factors of production including labor and 
more importantly imposed tax rules on trade that are prohibitive and extractive. Thus, 
the presence of rules that treat everyone the same may not alone expand economic 
opportunities. The incentive compatibility of the institutions and their capacity of 
economizing information and enforcement costs also matter for efficient performances of 
institutions. However efficient a newly introduced institutional arrangement can be in its 
own right, its performance will eventually depend on the suitability of the broader 
environment. The socio-economic, political and physical environment needs to be 
conducive to allowing the specific institutional arrangements to exploit their potential. 
The broader environment should be such that that incentivize productive activities rather 
than distributive ones; wealth creations rather than wealth sharing; fair competitions 
rather than collusions; that allow freer mobility of resources rather than restricting them 
and more importantly that protects property rights. We postulate that the broader 
environment in a context where transactions are limited to personalized transactions will 
be different from the context where impersonalized transactions are prevalent. 
We conceptualized impersonalized transactions in line with Wallis (2011). He refers 
impersonalized transactions when two transacting parties interact in a way that does not 
depend on their personal identity which requires a situation that treats parties the same. 
The main idea about impersonalized relationships is the irrelevance of the personal 
identity of the transacting parties for the transactions. Such transaction requires an 
institutional environment that not only allows agents to freely choose a transacting party, 
but that also treats transaction parties the same. It is not about the knowledge of 
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transacting parties about each other personal identity, but about the blindness of the 
institutional environment to the personal identity of the transacting parties. This not only 
requires impartial, unbiased and fair legal system, but it also needs social norms that are 
founded on what Plateau (2000) called ‘generalized morality’. The basic point is 
personal identity-related attributes of agents should have no role in determining the 
matching of transacting parties. Such ideal impersonalized transaction can only arise in 
a world of complete information.  
In reality, institutions impose some degree of discriminations between members of 
different social groups. This arises when different social groups use rules and norms that 
are specific to group members. Such discriminatory rules impose what can be called 
identity tax on those transacting parties who are outside the social group. Practically, 
impersonalized exchanges may still prevail even in the presence of some form of implicit 
or explicit discriminatory treatments in as long as the potential gains from the exchange 
outweighs the transaction costs that are associated with the identity taxes. Personalized 
transaction becomes pervasive when these transaction costs are so high as to block 
impersonalized exchanges. In such condition, transactions will be fully confined to the 
social group upon which the identity is constructed upon. For instance, transactions will 
be confined to an ethnic group if the rules and norms impose high identity-taxes on 
parties outside the group. In such context, transactions will be segregated along ethnic 
groups. But even then, impersonalized transactions can arise depending on the scale of 
the social boundary. When the social boundary is confined to a small group such as 
village/community or extended family, then transactions will be personalized. When this 
becomes the rule of the game everywhere, the resulting institutional environment will 
leave all agents with no other options but to transact only with the narrow social group. 
North (1990) noted that the history of the world is dominated by personalized 
transactions. But while some countries evolved toward impersonalized transactions with 
third-party enforcements, transactions in SSA countries remained predominantly 
personalized. Granovetter (1985) considers personalized transactions as a general 
phenomenon that occurs in any society irrespective of the stage of market 
developments. But this observation seems to suffer from the fallacy of continuum in that 
while in market-based economies many transactions can be made without having 
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personal connections, this is not the case in non-market societies such as SSA 
countries.  
There are two viewpoints about personalized transactions. The neoclassical economic 
theory views personalized transactions as a strategic response of actors to market 
failures (caused by high information and enforcement problems). In such cases, 
individuals attempt to bundle different transactions in personalized and reciprocal long-
term relationships. Others, especially social capital theorists, view the personalized 
relationship by itself as a valuable asset, just like any other physical and human capital, 
that help individuals to promote mutual economic interests. While the first assume self-
interested individuals, the second assume other-regarding (specifically those members 
of certain groups) and less self-regarding individuals which are (naturally) distinct from 
self-interested actors. It constructs a different human being whose behavioral patterns 
are different from those conceptualized in homo-economicus. The two importantly differ 
in their view on the observed outcomes. While neoclassical theory implicitly assumes 
outcomes of personalized transactions as sub-optimal, social capital theories take 
personalized transactions as practically superior to impractical outcomes assumed by 
efficient markets. They pragmatically take the observed arrangement as efficient 
arrangements. While the first predict personalized transactions to disappear as efficient 
impersonalized transactions emerge, the second considers it as an arrangement that 
would even exist in the presence of such alternative. These views also suggest different 
institutional interventions. While the first suggest liberalization measures that help for the 
personalized transaction to gradually decline, the second suggest a deliberate 
intervention that help to expand the existing personalized transactions. In terms of policy 
prescription, while neoclassical economics prescribe liberalization to remove all sorts of 
barriers that help local markets to become open and competitive, the later suggest 
policies that further localize the markets. In the specific case of the coffee supply chain, 
while neoclassical economists suggest policy intervention to make the local markets 
competitive and impersonalized, adepts of the social capital theory suggest the creation 
of a bridging capital (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Woolcock 1998) that expands the 
local network into the central market. 
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1.3 The cases under consideration 
Even institutional interventions through third party enforcement were not successful in 
the past. For example, the old central auction market for coffee was introduced in 
Ethiopia in 1955. The main purpose was to create impersonalized and competitive 
transactions in the central coffee market. Even after continued attempts for more than 
half a century to impersonalize coffee transactions, transactions are still de facto 
personalized as buyers (exporters) and seller (supplier/traders) just come to bidding 
floor merely to formalize the informal agreement they made at the back door. Since all 
parties know the rules of the game, no party offers a higher bid than offered by the 
implicitly known client. It was mainly in an attempt to fix this problem, that the 
government in 2008, abolishing the age-old central auction center, enacted a rule that 
enforced all transactions to be made at the newly established Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange (ECX). The main purpose was to create impersonalized and competitive 
transactions at the central coffee markets of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. However, 
although transactions at the ECX center are impersonalized, one cannot attribute the 
impersonalization to the efficiency of ECX. This is because transactions outside ECX are 
legally blocked. This will have important implications for the sustainability of the system. 
The main purpose of the introduction of ECX in Ethiopia was to provide an 
impersonalized, reliable and competitive trading environment for agricultural products in 
the country by providing assurance to quality, quantity, payment and delivery. Innovative 
approaches and technologies were adopted and huge investments were made to reduce 
transaction costs related to the trade of selected agricultural products such as coffee, 
wheat, maize, sesame, and beans. The introduction of a standardized and technology 
intensive commodity exchange system and of stringent and well-articulated rules, 
regulations and procedures made theoretically personalized transactions impossible. 
However, transactions in the local markets remained predominantly traditional and 
personalized. Not only rivals outside the locality are legally blocked, the local market is 
also geographically and socially segmented. The personalized transactions are confined 
to narrow social circle connected by family lineage, acquaintance, kinship and patron-
client relationships (Tadesse and Shively 2013; Meijerink et al. 2014). The restraint 
against potential rival traders outside the locality, the segmentation of the market along 
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social networks, the near-absence of credit, insurance and factor markets, the high 
inefficiency in other markets (especially input markets) coupled with the small size of 
individual transactions, farmers may not have other option than to embed their 
transactions in personalized transactions, however such arrangement may be inefficient.  
Theoretically, markets can perform better when transactions are impersonalized. But this 
can be valid when impersonalized transactions emerge as a natural selection of an 
evolutionary process. Deliberate interventions may not only be effective, their interaction 
with other institutions is not known. Specifically, we examine the impacts of the 
interventions on price transmissions between central and local markets. On the one 
hand, the introduction of ECX can help to assess the impacts of institutional 
interventions in improving the efficiency of central markets. The persistence of the 
traditional personalized transaction in the local markets, on the other hand, provide the 
opportunity to examine the interplay between formal and informal institutions. Since the 
ultimate goal of the institutional interventions is to improve the supply chain so as to 
benefit producer farmers, interest arises to evaluate the impacts of institutional 
interventions such as ECX on the performance of the supply chain as a whole and on 
producer prices. 
In addition to the introduction of ECX, a specific intervention was also introduced in the 
coffee market. Through the Ethiopian Coffee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative, the 
Ethiopian government attempted to differentiate the Ethiopian fine coffee from the 
commodity coffee. After a lot of efforts, the Ethiopian government, with the help of 
Oxfam advocacy, succeeded to get trademark protection for three geographic origins 
Sidama, Harar and Yirgacheffe coffee in many importing countries. Given these coffee 
origins were identified by their geographic origins even before the formal trademark 
protection, the introduction of the initiative has the potential to improve the coffee prices 
in the world market. But the effectiveness of the trademarking depends on the 
effectiveness of existing arrangement in incentivizing reputations. GI protection is 
usually done by creating a governance structure that monitors and control geographic 
origin at all levels of the value chain. But to what extent GI protection will be effective 
when the product faces a market-oriented arrangements is unknown (Moschini et al. 
  
8 
 
2008). The reality now is that both trademarked and non-trademarked coffee are sold in 
markets where there are various independent actors in the chain. 
1.4 Problem statement 
Especially transactions in the local markets are not only personalized, they are also 
confined to a narrow social group (North 1993b; World Bank 2002; Fafchamps 2004; 
Dorward et al. 2009; Dorward and Omamo 2009). Family lineage, acquaintance, kinship 
and client membership determine the pairing of transacting parties (Geertz 1987; 
Tadesse & Shively 2013). The problem is not just the pervasiveness and persistence of 
personalized transactions, but also their confinement to narrow social and geographic 
entity. One critical limitation of such personalized transactions is thus the scale, scope, 
and complexity of economic activities will be limited. The situation is specifically bad in 
Ethiopia (Osborne 2005). Since the available legal institutions impose high transaction 
costs (Gabre-Madhin 2009; Easterly and Levine 1995), only those large-scale 
transactions made at the national level can justify the high transaction costs. As will be 
shown in this dissertation later, transactions in the rest of the markets are virtually 
personalized. 
While the negative economic effects of such personalization of transactions in limiting 
market opportunities are clear, the solution for the problem is not clear. In addition to the 
personalization of transactions, institutions that limit the prevalence of free markets are 
ample due to the socialist-orientated institutions of the past regime. Even if a quarter of 
the century had elapsed since the country made liberalization reforms, socialist-
orientated institutions are still pervasive. Given the effective time period under which the 
country stayed under socialist system was only about 15 years, it took more time to 
eliminate the institutions than to create them. Even if interventions are made to improve 
institutions that support the market, the success seems limited.  
After the liberalization reforms made in 1992, two institutional interventions are made to 
improve the upstream markets: ECX and trademarking. In both cases, the interventions 
are made at higher level markets with no meaningful interventions to improve 
transactions at the local markets. Given that transactions outside ECX are totally 
prohibited, the two interventions seems to be incompatible. While the economic rationale 
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for ECX interventions is to generally reduce information and enforcement problems 
through commoditization, the economic rationale of GI-protection is to reduce 
information asymmetry for consumers through branding. While both interventions 
attempt to reduce information asymmetry, the two uses opposite mechanism to achieve 
the purpose. Their effect on the market is also contradictory in that while GI-protection 
provides producers/processors market power, ECX attempt to create a competitive 
market. While the success of GI-protection depends on the efficiency of institutions in 
incentivizing actors for their reputation on certain quality attributes, the success ECX 
depends on the effectiveness of commoditization of the product. While GI-protection 
requires a traceable value chain, ECX's commoditization system eliminates traceability.  
While the efficiency of impersonalized transactions is widely contested, the efficiency of 
personalized markets is controversial. Whether the personalized transactions at the local 
market are institutional responses of agents to missing markets (credit and other 
markets) and to transaction costs and risks or not require understanding the motive 
behind the personalized transactions. This can be tested by observing the preference of 
sellers and buyers in an ideal institutional environment. If agents in the absence of these 
institutional constraints (missing markets and transaction costs) still prefer to embed 
their transactions within a social network, then we can conclude that the existing 
personalized transactions are efficient and no intervention is needed at the local 
markets. Instead, extending this personalized transaction into higher level markets may 
even help. Otherwise, we can conclude that the observed personalized transactions are 
a rational response of agents to the existing institutional constraints. We tested this 
through a choice experiment that examines the preference of producer farmers in an 
ideal institutional environment. In order to complement the result, we also examine the 
preference of buyers for personalized transactions vis-à-vis impersonalized markets. But 
the intervention by ECX gives us also another opportunity to evaluate the effects of 
impersonalized transaction on the performances of markets. Since transactions at the 
central markets were in reality personalized, comparing the performance of the central 
markets before and after ECX can indicate the effects of impersonalized transactions. 
But in addition to the question of the sources of personalized transactions, another issue 
is the interaction between personalized markets and impersonalized market. This can be 
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evaluated in terms of the efficiency of the supply chain in transmitting prices between the 
different market levels. 
The critical questions are thus: why personalized transactions are still pervasive and 
persistent? Why they remained confined to narrow social and geographic entity? Why 
did they fail to evolve? To what extent institutional interventions at higher levels of the 
market be effective in improving the performances of the coffee value chain? To what 
extent the institutional interventions - ECX and trademarking - are compatible? In this 
thesis, these questions will be addressed using the coffee market chain in Ethiopia as a 
case. 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
Given these question, the primary objectives of this study are: 
 To examine the historical origin of the persistence of personalized and less 
competitive markets in the country; 
 To identify the sources of personalized transactions at the local coffee markets; 
 To evaluate the impacts of ECX interventions on the performances of the value 
chain; and 
 To evaluate the impacts of trademarking intervention on the performance of the 
value chain. 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The broader aim of this study is to understand the effects of personalized transactions 
and institutional interventions on the performance of markets using coffee supply chain 
as a case. Chapter two develop a conceptual framework and reviews literature that 
guide the study in general. The conceptual framework is designed to examine the effects 
of historical trajectories in determining the relative dominance of personalized-
impersonalized transactions. It conceptualizes the historical trajectories as to affect the 
institutional environment that shapes the extent of personalized transactions by 
changing the broader socio-economic, physical and political environment. Based on the 
effect of the change in the broader environment induced by the historical trajectory, the 
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change in the environment can favor either personalized or impersonalized exchange. 
But the resulting change in the relative dominance of personalized or impersonalized 
transaction will also crucially determines the future path of the broader environment by 
changing the social landscape. Literature that generally guides the whole study is also 
reviewed under sub-Section two of this chapter. The review of literature focuses on 
transaction cost economics, institutions, and institutional changes. It reviews the process 
and driver of institutional changes. Chapter three analyses the effects of key historical 
trajectories that occurred in the country over the past one and half centuries on 
institutions. More specifically, this chapter examines the implications of the changes in 
the broader environment on the dominance and persistence of personalized transactions 
over the past periods and the factors underlying them. It then assesses the feedback of 
the relative dominance of personalized transactions vis-a-vis impersonalized 
transactions on the broader environment and institutional environments. This part 
attempts to draw the implications of these on the development and performances of 
markets. Before it assesses the impacts of institutional interventions on the 
performances of markets, Chapter four analyzes the behavioral origin of personalized 
transactions under. It investigates the sources of personalized transactions by analyzing 
the preference of transacting parties (traders and producer farmers) to embed their 
transactions in personalized relationships. The central question here is whether it is due 
to the free will of producer farmers to embed their transactions in personalized 
relationships or is because the institutional environment locked them into personalized 
transactions. The interest here is to understand the behavioral motives behind such 
personalized transactions in the local markets and to assess their effect on the 
performances of coffee value chain specifically on quality. In order to support the results 
of the choice experiment, Chapter five compares the results of the experiment with the 
observed and stated preference of farmers using survey data. The remaining parts will 
analyze the impacts of institutional interventions made to improve the performances of 
the value chain. Chapter six analyze the impacts of ECX by tracking its effect on price 
transmission across the various markets along the supply chain using time series data. 
Using threshold autoregressive and threshold error correction model, it measures the 
impacts of ECX intervention on the price transmissions. But in addition to ECX 
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interventions, we also examine the effects of other policy measures taken in the coffee 
markets, specifically the removal of price fixation and export taxes. In order to compare 
the results, Chapter seven examine the perceptions of traders and exporters (the two 
major actors in the central markets) on the impacts of ECX interventions using survey 
data. Finally, Chapter eight analyzes the impacts of another institutional intervention: 
trademarking of Ethiopian fine coffees. Using disaggregated time series data it 
compares the impacts of trademarking on the magnitude and stability of prices between 
trademarked (GI-protected) Ethiopian fine coffees (Yirgachefe, Sidama, and Harar 
coffee origins) and non-trademarked Ethiopian coffee origins (Jimma and Wellega). In 
order to capture effects of impersonalization of transactions associated with ECX on the 
trademarking, we control ECX interventions in the fixed-effect regression. 
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Chapter 2 Conceptual and theoretical framework 
The following sections develop conceptual framework and reviews literature surrounding 
institutions and institutional changes. 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
This section develops a conceptual framework that guides the remaining chapters of the 
thesis. 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the conceptual and theoretical framework that 
guided the study. It develops a conceptual framework by combining the conceptual 
suggested by Dorward and Omamo (2009) with the three-level schema suggested by 
Williamsons (1995) in a way they fit specific contexts governing the coffee markets in 
Ethiopia. Dorward and Omamo (2009) developed a framework that helps to analyze 
institutions and institutional changes in the specific context of African economies by 
drawing from two approaches of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Transaction 
Costs Economics (TCE). They developed their framework by incorporating the elements 
emphasized in the TCE framework into the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework developed by Ostrom et al. (1994) to accommodate wide ranges of economic 
activities. The study thus first modify the three-level schema suggested by Williamson 
(1995) to fit the specific context of the coffee markets in Ethiopia. Since hierarchies and 
other modes of governance structure that are commonly discussed in the organizational 
theories are nearly absent, we focus on two institutional arrangements: personalized and 
impersonalized transaction arrangements.  
We thus conceptualize Williamson’s (1995) three-level schema as the choice between 
these two institutional arrangements is influenced by the attributes of institutions from 
above and the interaction of the attributes of sellers and buyers from below. We thus 
replace the action domain in Dorward and Omamo (2009) framework with this modified 
version of the three-level schema to develop our model. We further extend this model to 
reflect the connection between the various market levels along the coffee value chain. 
The framework is used to understand the origin of the pervasive personalized 
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transactions governing almost every transactions in the country in general and the 
coffee markets in particular. We use this framework to analyze the historical elements 
that shaped the institutions in general and the coffee markets in particular in Ethiopia. It 
also uses the framework to analyze the preference of coffee farmers in the choice of 
buyer traders. Finally, the frameworks are used to analyze the effects of deliberate 
institutional changes made at different levels along the coffee supply chain. 
In addition, the chapter reviews literature that generally guides the overall study. Two 
fields of studies are reviewed in the broader areas of NIE: TCE literature pioneered by 
Williamson and historical analysis of institutions pioneered by North. Chapter 3 uses to 
explain the historical changes of institutions in Ethiopia both from evolutionary and 
revolutionary perspectives: how the historical trajectories induced by revolutionary 
changes affects the transaction domain and how the gradual changes in the transaction 
domain in turn gradually affects historical trajectories.  
2.1.2 Comparative analysis of institutions: across time and space 
Many suggest comparative institutional analysis in order to understand the evolution of 
markets (Aoki 2001; Greif 1998;  North 1990, 2005). In this analysis, the implication of 
non-economic factors; the historical, cultural, social, and political aspects of the 
particular society needs to be considered in the market game (Greif 1998). The attention 
goes to the factors underlying the development of efficient institutions that maximize the 
potential gains from economic exchanges, given other things (e.g. technology, 
transportation costs).  
Williamson (1995) provides a three-level schema that helps to analyze choices of 
governance structures. According to this framework, institutions of governance are 
affected by the institutional environment from above and the behavioral attributes of 
individuals from below. Changes in the institutional environment are treated as shifting 
parameters which affect the comparative costs between alternative governance 
structures. We adapted this framework in order to explain the choice between 
personalized and impersonalized transactions in the coffee markets in Ethiopia. But in 
order to see the effect of the broader socio-economic, political and physical environment 
on the specific transactions we also adopt the framework suggested by Dorward and 
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Omamo (2009). They provide a unified framework that helps to analyze a wide range of 
institutions in the African context. They synthesize their framework from two branches of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE): the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
approach developed by Ostrom et al. (1994) and the key elements emphasized in the 
field of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The IAD framework conceptualizes the 
exogenous variables (community attribute, physical/material conditions and rules in use) 
to determine action arena and the feedback of outcomes to the exogenous variables 
and action arena is mediated through patterns of interactions and evaluative criteria 
(Dorward and Omamo 2009). In the TCE economics, the institutional environment, 
characteristics of goods being exchanged and the characteristics of transacting parties 
determine the choice of institutional arrangement and outcomes (Williamson 1985; North 
1990). In the Dorward-Omamo (hereafter D-O) framework, the broader environment sets 
in and affects the action domains where institutions, activities, and actors interact each 
other to produce outcomes that would, in turn, affect the broader environment. This is 
consistent with the mainstream economic theoretical framework of treating the firm as an 
entity separately from the owner. But when the production decision unit is at the same 
time a consumption decision unit as in the case of small-holder households (Singh et al. 
1986), it is difficult to separate the activity from the actor. In order for this framework fit 
our specific purpose of analyzing the sources of personalized transactions and the 
impacts of institutional interventions, we use modified form of Williamson’s (1995) three-
level schema in the action domain. We thus conceptualize the action domain as the 
interaction of attributes among three entities: seller-farmers and their activities, buyer-
traders and their activities and local institutions. We then superimpose the modified 
three-level schema of Williamson into the D-O framework to obtain our framework 
(Figure 2.1).  
The broader environment is the result of the interactions of the physical, socio-economic 
and policy and governances. We conceptualize that given the broader environment, the 
choice of institutional arrangements between personalized and impersonalized 
transactions is determined by the attributes of institutions in the action domain and the 
attributes of transacting parties, mainly sellers and buyers. In our specific case, given 
the local institutional environment, transaction parties are assumed to choose between 
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two alternative arrangements: personalized and impersonalized transactions. The 
attributes of local institutional environment impose constraints on the choice of 
transacting parties and the outcomes of the transactions. Changes in the attributes of 
institutional environment will change the comparative costs of alternative institutional 
arrangements (Williamson 1995) and hence change the relative prevalence of the two 
institutional arrangements. Exogenous or spontaneous changes in the broader 
environment affect the action domain by changing mainly the local institutional 
environment with some effects on the attributes of sellers and buyers (the type of actors, 
their relative bargaining power, and even their behavioral patterns).  
Williamson (2000) takes informal institutions (traditions, customs, norms and codes of 
conducts) embedded in the social environment as given. How informal institutions arise 
and are maintained is less clear. But historical analyses (North’s 1990; 2005; Greif 1998) 
show considerable differences in the evolution of institutions. However informal 
institutions are generally considered as persistent and durable, there have been 
differences in the evolution of institutions across different societies. That means, the 
degree of persistence of informal institutions also differs from society to society. The 
embeddedness of the informal institutions in social environment implies that anything 
that disturbs the social environment directly disturbs the medium under which informal 
institutions are communicated and maintained. 
Changes in the broader environment shift the comparative costs of the two alternative 
institutional arrangements and hence the relative frequency of personalized and 
impersonalized transactions. But the prevalence of either personalized or 
impersonalized transactions across all the action domains in turn not only affects the 
levels of outcomes, but they crucially determine the nature of the broader environment. 
That is a broader environment that arises from a situation where personalized 
transactions are highly pervasive will be different from that where impersonalized 
transactions are also not uncommon. In the extreme ideal case, a broader environment 
that arises from the purely impersonalized transaction will be considerably different from 
the above two. The degree of personalization of transactions across the action domains 
thus determines the type of broader environment and its future dynamics. 
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We conceptualize that while personalized transactions perpetuate the existing social 
environments (and hence informal institutions), impersonalized transactions changes the 
social environment by bringing new player: players with a different culture, belief, 
preference, experience, ideology, capacity, etc. The resulting social environment 
becomes more complex than it was before. The result will be that old informal 
institutions tend to be less effective and less efficient. Agents in their attempt to minimize 
transaction costs gradually revise informal institutions. But the scope of such revision 
depends on the extent of change in the social environment. Depending on the degree of 
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change in the social environment, some transactions which were easily handled by 
informal institutions will now be hardly handled. The costs of transactions will thus 
increase. The increase in transaction costs could be high so as to block some 
transactions. The situation could push society either to rediscover the previous social 
environment or attempt to learn to live with it. If the society is forced to move forward, 
not only the informal institutions gradually evolve to continue to handle some 
transactions, but formal institutions become more necessary and feasible than ever 
before. 
We conjecture that the nature of the broader environment that arise from the purely 
personalized transactions will be characterized by closed and segregated (along with the 
attributes the personalization is embedded in) socio-economic and political units. But 
each unit in its attempt to preserve the closed structure the broader environment tends 
to be stagnant until the friction among the different groups eventually results in a 
sporadic revolutionary change. Such revolutionary change can arise either from 
exogenous changes or from cumulative outcomes of long-lasting internal frictions among 
the segregated units. But on the contrary, changes that are induced by the expansion of 
voluntary impersonalized transaction tend to be evolutionary instead of revolutionary. 
Thus, institutional interventions that encourage voluntary impersonalized transactions 
induce the social environment upon which the economic, political, cultural, and religious 
intercourses are embedded in to gradually change and hence informal institutions to 
evolve.  
The broader environment can change either as a result of the cumulative effect of 
changes in the degree of personalization in the action domains or as a result of 
exogenous shocks. Unlike other economies whose institutional changes are 
characterized by gradual evolutionary changes, the changes in the overall environment 
in Ethiopia were marked by historical trajectories - historical trajectories caused by 
revolutions that changed the political regimes often through military forces. Depending 
upon the type of change in the broader environment, the relative effectiveness of 
personalized and impersonalized transactions will change. It is this change that 
determines the future path of the change in the broader environment and institutional 
environments.  
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While “institutional environment” describes property rights, enforcement mechanisms, 
human behaviors, and power relations in an economy, institutional arrangements, 
describe the sets of rules and structures governing the allocation and exchange of 
resources through specific transactions (Dorward et al. 2009). Actors not only differ in 
their attributes, the local environment also imposes different constraints on different 
actors. Each party, given its own attributes and the attributes of its activities, will choose 
a mode of transaction that maximizes its own perceived gains. Multiple equilibria of 
transaction arrangements will exist when actors that differ in their attributes and level of 
constraints attempt to align transactions in transaction costs reducing way. They can 
either make impersonalized exchanges, embed their transactions in a long-term 
relationship or a hybrid of the two. The institutional environment, by providing incentives 
and constraints structures the actions of each party and by determining the feasible set 
of activities each can do, determines the distribution of different arrangements in the 
action domain. 
We use this framework to explain the history of institutional changes. In the relatively 
stable economies characterized by gradual changes in the institutions, interaction of 
various factors determines the evolutionary path. When the system is highly integrated 
within and with the outside world, shocks such as technological innovations, relative 
price changes, and new information can have significant effects on the evolutions of 
institutions. But in a non-market society, these shocks generally exert little force in 
changing the broader environment and hence institutions. Instead, the accumulated 
endogenous factors manifest themselves in the form of revolutionary changes. Such 
revolutions could induce institutional changes, but the direction of changes could 
depend on the effect of the revolutions in changing the underpinnings of economic 
institutions and markets. Thus we assess the effects historical trajectories that occurred 
in the past on institutions and institutional arrangements. Major historical trajectories in 
the country can be explained in terms of the change in political regimes that came 
through revolutionary movements. Particularly we focus their effect in promoting or 
discouraging personalized transactions and their implications on widening or narrowing 
markets and trade. We also assess the feedback of the change in the degree of 
personalization to the broader and local environments. 
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When every economic, social and political transaction are confined to the group, the 
social structure tends to be more collective than it would otherwise be when there is 
some degree of impersonalized transactions. We contend that degree of personalized 
transactions crucially determine the social landscape. In a situation where 
impersonalized are exceptions, social structure tend to be fragmented and segregated 
along numerous small groups. The life of the group tends to be then collective. 
Collectivist-individualist dimension remained the most important dimension in explaining 
cultural differences (Triandis 2001). Greif (1994) characterizes the social structure of 
collectivist societies as “segregated” along religious, ethnic, or familial group and 
cooperation across different groups is limited. Since the relation is based on fixed 
identity, it is difficult for individuals to shift from one group to another. Economic 
relationships are confined to such narrow group and cooperation across groups are 
limited. The situation in individualist society is the exact opposite of this. The dominance 
of collective life affects the culture of the group in a specific way. 
The complex interdependence of people in the group naturally results in a specific 
shared-belief and culture and institutions that support them. The resulting dominant 
shared believe will be that that undermine private property acquisition, wealth 
accumulation, competition, innovation and the like Instead, institutions that favor 
communal ownership and expropriation of properties; that promote wealth sharing and 
distributive activities; that fail to encourage, if not discourage, productive ones. Thus, not 
only institutions who treat everyone the same will be rare due to the segregated nature 
of the socio-political environment, the resulting share-belief will also undermine the 
development of market institutions. In sum, the resulting situation will be that that 
undermine economic opportunities and that limit markets and trades instead of 
expanding them. It will be dominated by a socialist-like ideology. 
The effects of the local environment in the shared-belief or cognitive model or just 
mental model is drawn from recent works (World Bank 2015; Schlüter 2009; North 2005; 
Kahneman’s 2002; 2003; Hodgson 1998). The idea is the socio-cultural environment 
provide subjects a specific mental model that cause subjects to interpret the 
environment they are in a particular way. Our hypothesize that the mental model that 
arise in dominantly and persistently personalized transactions would be different from 
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that that could arise in an environment where impersonalized transactions are prevalent. 
If experience is crucial in determining our worldview, the purely personalized transaction 
exposes individuals only to a narrow physical and social world. One can imagine the 
mental model one can have if the individual’s transactions in the labor, goods, financial 
and capital markets are confined to small social group living in a small geographic 
location. But in addition its effect in limiting exposures, the closed and communal social 
environment naturally gives subjects a specific mental model which are markedly 
different from a relatively open and less communal society. In the case of the former, 
subjects are likely to develop a mental model that view market and monetary 
exchanges, private property rights, wealth accumulation and competitive behavior as 
bad for the survival and prosperity of the group. As a result, norms and codes of 
conducts tend to undermine these activities.  
Not only the dominant mental model considerably differ, the speed of learning also differ 
between the two environments. This will have important implications for institutional 
change. The main problem in this respect is while humans find it relatively easy to revise 
the beliefs they have about the physical world, they find it difficult to revise their beliefs 
about the human world. 
Our hypothesis is that while impersonalized transaction provides better chance for 
learning by exposing subjects to a different social and physical world and hence a 
chance to revise their mental model, the personalized transaction limits the chance for 
learning by perpetuating the existing mental model. Instead, subjects in the case of the 
latter tend to conserve the mental model they inherited from past generations. 
Historical analysis could be made in two ways: comparison of institutions across time 
and across space or market levels. In this study, we use both frameworks to analyze the 
impacts of personalized transactions on institutional changes and performances of 
markets. 
2.1.2.1 Institutional analysis across time  
We assume historical trajectories induced by revolutionary changes in the political 
regime primarily affect the broader environment to change. Historical trajectories caused 
by regime change will have substantial effects on the overall social and economic 
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environment and more importantly the development of markets (Greif 2006). It can 
reconfigure the structure of economic, social, and political structure and relationships.  
As shown in Figure 2.1, the big arrow at the right-hand side shows the historical 
changes in the broader and local environment along time. Three major historical 
trajectories have occurred over the past one and half centuries in the country: namely, 
the formation of modern state at the end of 19th century, the socialist revolution in 1974 
and the ‘collapse’ of the socialist regime. We conceptualize that these historical 
trajectories create shock on the broader environment by substantially changing the 
relationship between socio-economic, political and physical environments. These 
changes will be transmitted to the action domain. However every element has a bearing 
in the functioning of a system, changes in some factors can have more implications on 
the action domain than others, depending on the specific context (Dorward et al. 2009). 
They will primarily change the relative bargaining power of actors, their feasible set of 
activities and strategies and in effect change the relative efficiency of alternative 
arrangements (North 2005; Aoki 2001).  
Based on their enforcement pattern, many divide institutions of exchanges into (Wallis 
2011; Greif 2004; North 1990) personalized exchange (bilateral- and self-enforcement) 
and impersonalized exchange (with or without third party enforcements). We use this 
theoretical framework to understand the forces driving the change in relative prevalence 
of personalized and impersonalized transactions at various levels of the markets. 
In our specific case, the changes in the environment change the relative efficiency and 
suitability of personalized and impersonalized transactions and the type of activities 
handled by them. The change in the local environment could either provide a chance to 
actors to experiment transactions with actors outside their social circle or it could 
incentivize them to restrict their transactions within their social circle. If the change 
incentivizes them to deal with actors outside their social circle, they experiment diverse 
strategies to reduce potential information and enforcement problems. This provides 
actors the opportunity to revise old beliefs about transacting parties from other groups, 
design new strategies and broaden their worldview. The feedback of the learning 
process gradually causes the local environment to change. This strategic response 
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could be decentralized or coordinated depending on the overall context. For instance, in 
the case of seller-farmers, this strategic reaction will be decentralized. But buyers 
especially both in the local and central markets can take explicitly (implicitly) coordinated 
actions. Thus, the relative frequency of personalized and impersonalized transactions 
will change in the action domain. This change will have a crucial bearing on the local 
institutional environment. But the cumulative effects of such small change at the 
numerous action domains will gradually change the broader environment by affecting 
mainly the social environment and even economic, political and physical environments. 
Since the degree of personalization is central our framework, the historical analysis 
focuses on how this changed over time. We do this by examining the effects of key 
historical trajectories that occurred over the past one and about half centuries on the 
broader environment.  
We attempt to trace the effects of these changes on the broader environments, 
institutional environments in general and the coffee markets in particular. Accordingly, 
we focus on technological and infrastructural factors, territorial structure, the social 
structure and the degree of closure, cultural diversity and cross-cultural interactions, 
ethnic composition, diversity of economic activities, level of domestic markets and their 
integration with foreign markets, degree of mobility of factors (labor and capital) and 
livelihood structure, composition of the public-private sector in the economy, property 
right structure (especially of land), foreign trade policies, political system of 
representation, centralization-decentralization of the governance structure, political 
ideology, and the strength of judicial system in enforcing property rights and contracts. 
We assume changes in these key environmental elements will have important 
implications on the relative prevalence of the two institutional arrangements: 
personalized and impersonalized transactions. The analysis helps us to identify the 
factors underlying the persistence of personalized transactions at various levels of the 
economy. But it also help us in understanding the implications of the relative dominance 
and persistence of the personalized transactions on the type of changes in the broader 
environment. It not only help us to trace the origin of the existing institutions, but it also 
helps to explain the deep sources of the revolutionary changes that occurred the past 
periods. It provides a cinematic picture of institutions of the country.  
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We use historical trajectories that substantially changed the environment (physical, 
socio-economic and policy and governance) of the country as a focal point in our 
analysis. Accordingly, we start by reviewing the context before state formation to 
understand the situation during state formation. We then examine the two main regime 
changes made: the communist revolution in 1974 and the recent regime change made 
by ethnic liberation fronts in 1991. But given this historical analysis, we also want to 
further assess the behavioral attributes behind the current prevalence of personalized 
transactions. Here we primarily focus on identifying attributes driving the choice of 
farmers in the action domain in order to get insight the reason behind the personalization 
of transactions in the local markets. We assess the implications of the local institutional 
environments in shaping the choice of farmers at the local markets. But in addition to the 
identification of the attributes and assessing the environments shaping the choices, we 
also further examine the implication of the choices on the broader environment.  
2.1.2.2 Institutional analysis across market levels  
The above framework helps to provide a general picture on the historical changes in the 
economy as a whole and institutions in particular. At a point in time, a product may face 
different institutions along the supply chain. Figure 1 can be replicated to show the links 
between different levels of the markets along a supply chain. Figure 2 is thus produced 
to replicating the whole link between broader environment and action domains to 
represent the different levels of the markets along the supply chain. Thus, the local 
coffee market represented by the bottom circle in Figure 2 represent the whole 
relationship between the broader environment in the local markets and institutions that 
specifically govern the coffee transactions and feedbacks on the broader environments. 
Similarly, the middle circle that represents the central markets shows the relationship 
between the broader environment at that level and the action domains that specifically 
govern the coffee transactions. The framework, by systematically modeling the 
relationship between the various levels of markets, helps us to analyze the potential 
impacts of institutional interventions made at different levels of the markets. Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 8 use this framework to analyze both the impacts institutional interventions on 
key parameters and the perception of actors about the institutional interventions.  
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As described in Figure 2.2, the study considered the following institutional interventions:  
1. Export markets – the trademarking initiative made around the year 2007 to 
differentiate selected Ethiopian coffee origins from commodity coffee; and the 
market reforms made to abolishing of coffee price fixation and export taxes made 
in the year 2004. 
Figure 2.2 Institutional interventions across time and spaces 
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 Real-time price transmission 
 Grading and standardizations 
 Rules and regulation 
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2. Central markets – the introduction of ECX in 2009 in the coffee markets. Key 
interventions such as the introduction of warehousing, real-time price 
transmissions, the introduction of grading and standardization system at the 
central markets, open-outcry auction system, and the introduction of stronger 
supportive rules and regulations, and the intensive use of information 
technologies. 
3. Local markets – the introduction of real-time price transmissions about central 
markets.  
Specifically, the impacts of these deliberate institutional interventions are measured in 
terms changes in asymmetry of price transmissions, in the relative price levels of 
different coffee origins, and the perception of market actors at each level of the three 
markets on the institutional interventions. In addition, the study also assesses the 
impacts of the interventions on the degree of personalization of transactions at each 
level of the markets. These analyses are made for the time period between 1997 and 
2015. 
The remaining chapters examine the impacts of institutional and policy interventions 
made to improve the performance of coffee supply chain. Chapter 7 evaluates the 
impacts of ECX intervention on the performance of the chain on price transmissions. To 
supplement the results of this analysis, in Chapter 8 examines the perception of 
exporters and traders – the two main players in the central markets – to further 
understand the impacts of ECX on the performance of the markets. Finally, Chapter 9 
evaluates the impacts of anther institutional change, introduction of trademarking, on 
prices of the different origin-designated Ethiopian coffees at different levels of the 
markets. We also examine the complementarity of the two interventions (ECX and 
trademarking) by assessing the effects of ECX on the performance of trademarking. 
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2.2 Review of literature 
This section reviews two set of theories in the NIE. The first part reviews theories of 
Transaction Cost Economics specifically in the context of developing countries 
agricultural sector. The second part reviews theories around institutions and institutional 
changes again with specific reference to developing countries context. It deals with both 
deliberate and spontaneous institutional changes.  
2.2.1 Transaction cost economics and institutions 
As analytical tool, the perfectly competitive market assumes a frictionless model to 
generate insight about the real economic world just as frictionless model in physics 
describes some important phenomena in the physical world (Varian, 1992). While a 
competitive market is an ideal market which is hardly found in reality, it serves as a 
counterfactual against which we can judge performances of observed markets. Such 
comparison may not be practically useful if the assumptions used to construct the 
counterfactual are considerably far from reality. This by itself doesn’t pose a serious 
problem if appropriate modifications are made to capture the departure of the real world 
from the world constructed by the simplified model (Simon 1955). It, however, poses a 
serious problem when the same stringent assumptions used to construct the ideal world 
is also used to explain real world phenomena. One of such problems is the issue of 
frictionless transactions or zero-cost transactions.   
The neoclassical theory postulates that economic agents make rational choices in that, 
given the information available to them, they make economic choice decisions in a self-
interest seeking way. The theory assumes that individuals know what is in their self-
interest and act accordingly (North 1994) which requires not only stable and well-
organized preferences but also the necessary computational skill (Simon 1955). The 
implications of these are that economic agents can agree to exchange without incurring 
additional cost for the agreement (Stigler 1992). 
Like other ‘heterodox’ economic theories, neo-institutional economics depart from 
competitive markets by primarily attacking the frictionless transactions implicitly 
assumed in the competitive markets. By taking a friction-fraught real-world economic 
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transaction, neo-institutional economists provide sophisticated explanations to real world 
economic phenomena: Williamson (1979) from organizations perspective and North 
(1994) from a historical perspective. In both cases, the starting point of neo-institutional 
economics is the abandonment of frictionless markets and the consideration of non-zero 
transaction costs as a cornerstone to the explanation of economic phenomena. 
Following the traditions of theoretical developments in economics, neo-institutional 
economists attack some of the assumptions neoclassical economic theory was founded 
on. One of these is the instrumental rationality that assumes that subjects possess the 
cognitive system that provides them with a true model about the real world and even if 
this model may be incorrect at the beginning, a correction process enables them to 
arrive at the true model (North 1991). Institutional economists on the other hand 
explicitly take cognitive and computation limitations as an inherent problem of subjects. 
As a result, their model may not highly depart from the true model, their model may not 
even converge to the true model due to information problems. Subjects are thus 
assumed to have a bounded rationality due to cognitive limitations and information 
problems. However subjects are intendedly rational, their realized decision is bounded 
rational due to cognitive bias (Kahneman 2003), computational limitations and 
information problems (Stiglitz 2002). But taking bounded rationality as a behavioral 
assumption and at the same time taking the observed arrangements as a rational 
response to transaction cost problem is inconsistent. Moreover, the implication of 
behavioral differences in the comparative analysis cannot be captured if bounded 
rationality is assumed as a general human behavior (Gregory 2011). 
The other modification is the inclusion of possible opportunism into self-interest. If 
institutions have the power to frame the capacities and behavior of agents in 
fundamental ways (Hodgson 2006), it follows then that such behavioral assumption 
ignores the possible effects institutions have in shaping the opportunistic behavior of 
individuals. Williamson (1995) defends that unless we recognize the danger of 
opportunism, we will not be able to minimize it. This may suggest for the decision maker 
to deal only with those who are expected to be trustworthy and avoid those who are 
expected to act opportunistically. But by reason of bounded rationality, the decision 
maker cannot identify a priori who is opportunistic or who is trustworthy. Moreover, even 
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if one can deviate from an agreement, we cannot know whether the action is motivated 
by ‘guile’ or self-interest, given the cognitive and computational limitation of the subject. 
Since opportunism has negative moral connotation inclusion of ‘guile’ into self-interest 
requires a moral standard to judge whether the observed behavior is motivated by self-
interest with or without guile. Williamson’s (1995) inclusion of ‘guile’ is based on his self-
supposition that the self-interest assumption held in the neoclassical economics as fair, 
guileless and frank. The problem arises from one’s attempt to attach moral judgment on 
self-interest motive. In addition, once we accept opportunism as a possible behavioral 
deviation from ‘frank’ self-interest, there is no reason to deny altruism as a similar 
possible behavioral deviation.  
Due to the information and enforcement problems coupled with cognitive limitations, 
transactions and contracts will involve a lot of costs. Williamson, describes the ex-post 
and ex-ante contracting costs. Ex-ante costs include those incurred in drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding the contract. The ex-post costs can take several forms: 
maladaptation costs (costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment); haggling 
costs (costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct misalignments); the setup 
and running costs associated with the governance structures; bonding costs of effecting 
secure commitments and risk cost that arises from defection that may not be recovered 
after the court (Williamson 1985). A great deal of time, knowledge and other physical 
resources are utilized to reduce information and enforcement costs. The overall 
implications of these modifications on behavioral assumptions are that transactions 
involve positive costs. In fact, the neoclassical view that markets exist in an institutional 
vacuum is widely refuted by institutional economists. 
Viewing a competitive market just as one institutional arrangement, Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) explains how generic institutional arrangements come to existence to 
align transactions in a discriminating way (Williamson 1995). A governance structure is 
defined as the set of institutional arrangements within which a transaction is organized 
(McFetridge 1994). The prediction is based on the argument that each governance 
structure, that differs in costs and competence, aligns transactions, that differ in 
attributes, in a cost-minimizing way. In the absence of a reference against which we 
judge the performance of the observed governance structure, such teleological 
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argument can justify every observed mode of governance as an efficient strategic 
response of actors given the overall institutional environment. However the efficiency of 
institutions can be judged by the magnitude of transaction costs, the comparison 
becomes difficult if there is no reference as which is the most efficient one. Those 
institutions that assume a frictionless competitive market can be considered as efficient. 
But unlike neoclassical economics that takes the competitive markets as an ideal 
reference against which to judge other markets, institutional economics prefer to take a 
pragmatic approach. In effect, institutional economist suggests a comparative analysis 
between alternative arrangements. This can take various forms: between the observed 
and other feasible alternative arrangements or between observed alternative 
arrangements (across time and space). Given that institutional analysis involves an 
understanding of the complex interactions various factors such as economic, social, 
legal, political, organizational and technological factors, not only the comparison become 
methodologically difficult, but the external validity of the results will be limited. As North 
(1991) noted market exchange, franchising, or vertical integration are conceived as 
efficient solutions to the complex problems confronting entrepreneurs under various 
competitive conditions. Unlike the neoclassical economist’s tradition of using a formal 
model of competitive market as an ideal standard for a socially efficient outcome, 
transaction cost economics rely heavily on comparative analysis between feasible 
alternative arrangements. However the hypothetical ideal can be used as a reference 
(Williamson 1995), such approach is operationally irrelevant (Williamson 1979). Such 
reasoning could comfort policymakers to rationalize the observed institutional 
arrangement as efficient and socially desirable. In the absence of a reference against 
which the observed transaction is judged, any mode of arrangement could be justified. 
However the frictionless market of the neoclassical economics can still be used as a 
reference, TCE doesn’t provide a formal approach on how to attain such outcomes.   
According to North (1994), the crucial connection between institutions, transaction costs, 
and the neoclassical economic theory was made by Ronald Coase (1960). According to 
Williamson, two articles have made important contributions in successfully refuting the 
zero transaction costs assumption of neoclassical economics: Coase (1960) in relation 
to externalities and Arrow’s (1996) in relation to vertical integration (cited in Williamson 
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2010). While these authors revealed the need to make provisions for positive transaction 
costs, they haven’t formalized positive cost transactions as a theory (Gibbons 2010). 
Williamson (2010) caution that full formalization of TCE is a work in progress. Though 
initially TCE economics was viewed as a heterodox mainstream economics, it begins to 
get momentum when economics started to become more pluralistic and along with the 
efforts made by many researchers to conceptualize the idea of “costly exchanges” 
(Coase 1992). 
The costs of exchange depend on institutions that embrace such as legal, political and 
social systems (Coase 1998). North (1993a), defines institutions as humanly devised 
formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g., norms 
of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct) that structure human 
interactions. In addition, it also includes organizations that make, modify, interpret, and 
enforce the rules (World Bank 2003). The rule system provided by informal and formal 
institutions and organizations defines the incentive structure of societies (North 1994). 
There are two sets of theories of institutions: institutions as rules and institutions as 
repositories of shared belief (Brousseau et al. 2011). Hodgson (2006), provides a wide 
definition of institutions as ‘systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interactions’.  
From an economic point of view, institutions determine transaction and production costs 
and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activities and therefore 
define the choice set (North 1990). Institutions, by providing subjects a decision model,  
by limiting their choice sets and constraints (North 2005), determine economic activities 
and their outcomes. The evolution of institutions thus shapes the direction of economic 
change towards growth, stagnation, or decline (North 1990). Thus, efficient institutions 
are key for development (North 1991; World Bank 2003; Fafchamps 2004; Haber et al. 
2003).  
While institutions in some society evolved to promote economic progress, institutions in 
most developing countries and particularly in SSA countries are largely weak and 
inefficient. The important aspect of institutions for development is understanding the 
factors underlying institutional changes and their evolutionary path. The historical 
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accounts of developed countries suggest that the development of efficient markets in 
developing countries requires conducive political, and institutional environments 
(Chaudhry 1994; Khan 2004) and hence this calls for stronger and more state 
interventions than envisaged by neoliberal consensus (Khan 2004). Yet history showed 
that not only the governments of those countries lack the political commitment to work 
for the market to flourish, government failures are especially high in these countries.  
2.2.2 Institutional change 
According to the early observation of Adam Smith, the absence of maritime navigation 
was the main reason for the near absence of long-distance commerce in Africa:  
“ There are in Africa none … great inlets …. to carry maritime commerce into 
the interior parts of that great continent: and the great rivers of Africa are at 
too great a distance from one another to give occasion to any considerable 
inland navigation” (1776, p. 40). 
Maritime transport had been the primary means of transport for long distance and bulky 
trades (since Africa had to trade bulky products). It can partly explain the near absence 
of trade in those early times. But it cannot explain the persistence of very weak long 
distance trade even after the invention of other efficient alternative means of 
transportations. More importantly, it cannot explain the near-absence of potentially 
beneficial exchanges that would have existed among communities in the region.  
The role of institutions for economic performance was even recognized long ago. For 
instance, the role of rule of law and good governances in economic exchange was 
recognized in the early writings of Adam Smith:  
‘Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish in any state which does not 
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of 
contracts is not supported by law, …’  (1776, p. 1227).  
Even Adam Smith underscores the role of institutions for promoting trade and 
commerce. According to him, once society begins to reap the gains from such trades, 
this will provide society the incentive to improve institutions undergirding this long 
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distance trade. The role of long-distance trade for the development of societies has long 
been recognized and well described by Adam Smith. Contrary to NIE, Smith (1776) 
conceive institutions as an outcome of trade and commerce. 
NIE provides detailed historical explanations on how societies in their attempt to capture 
the gains from trade improved institutions. Unlike the Early Modern Europe, the near 
absence of such long distance trades in African countries can explain why these 
countries fail to create ‘the fundamental underpinning of institutions that would make 
voluntary organizations viable and profitable’ (North 1991); but it does not provide the 
deeper incentive mechanisms that stagnated – i.e. the reasons for the near absence  of 
long distance trades (limited to slave trade – a ‘self-transporting being’ and some easily 
portable) in the past history of most SSA countries. It cannot explain the currently limited 
trade with the outside world and more importantly the limited markets within  a region 
where diverse opportunities and alternative means of transportations exist. It thus fails to 
provide a better explanation of the reasons that discouraged those societies from 
capturing potentially beneficial exchanges. However, evidence on how the evolutions of 
institutions in transaction cost reducing ways improved economic performances, are 
rare. 
The framework of North, on the other hand, explains the role of institutions in 
determining economic development path of countries by considering the trade, 
especially long-distance and cross-society, as endogenous whose level is determined by 
the strength of institutions underpinning economic exchanges. Such approach leaves 
out the possible feedback effects of such long-distance trades, especially long-distance 
trades across fundamentally different societies, in providing societies with the incentive 
to make cooperative efforts towards improving institutions undergirding the trades by 
increasing complexity of the trading environment and consequent high transaction costs. 
North (1990), by viewing institutions as a constraint that structure human interactions, 
uses path dependence as a key conceptual framework and analytical tool for 
understanding and explaining long-run economic and institutional changes. Historical 
analysis of institutions show how institutions, undergirding long distance trade, when 
evolved in transaction reducing way, gave rise to the current western developed 
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countries (North 2005, 1990; Greif 1989, 2006). North (1990) contends that institutional 
changes are generally incremental; not discontinuous. The reasons, according to him, 
are economies of scope, complementarities and network externality systematically affect 
changes to be consistent with the costs and benefits of the existing institutional 
framework. Even those institutional changes that were induced by political revolution or 
war can even be viewed as continuous due to the embeddedness of informal 
institutions. While formal institutions largely change following a revolution or war, this 
may not dramatically change the institutional environment owing to the durable nature of 
informal institutions. In this framework, informal institutions play important roles in 
explaining historical changes and in determining the direction of its future path.  
North (1990) argues that informal institutions, by connecting the past with the present 
and the future, play key roles in determining the direction of institutional changes. The 
past thus determines not only the present but also the future. Even if sometimes 
exogenous factors could trigger revolutionary changes, spontaneous and gradual 
changes in the institutional environments not only induce revolutionary changes but they 
also determine the type and timing of the revolutionary change. For instance, 
revolutionary changes arise due to the lack of institutions that mediate peaceful 
bargaining among conflicting parties (North 2005). Moreover, not only informal rules are 
much more durable than formal rules, they also determine the feasible set of formal 
rules and their degree of enforcement. The informal constraints embedded in the 
custom, tradition, and codes of conduct determine the effectiveness of alternative formal 
institutions and deliberate policies. That is the role informal institutions play in the overall 
institutional matrix, their complex interaction with formal institutions coupled with other 
aspects of the economy (such as technological level, physical environment, etc.) 
crucially determine the historical path of economies. The framework enables one to 
trace the origin of institutional changes from past institutions. The implication is that not 
only those deliberate institutional changes made under normal circumstances but even 
those changes that appear induced by events such as war and revolution can also be 
traced from past institutions. Accordingly, the socialist revolutions that swept many 
countries should have had their origins in the past institutions but the pre-existing 
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institutional matrix should also have shaped the type of institutional changes 
characterizing the socialist reforms. 
Hobbs (2003) argues that institutions evolve, in transaction costs reducing way, when an 
economy undergoes exogenous shock. Exogenous shocks of various kinds create new 
institutions and eliminate others and may also change some of the already existing 
ones. Changes in relative prices, technological innovations, the emergence of new 
market opportunities and new information (e.g. Aoki 2001; North 1990) can induce 
institutional changes. The idea that these factors induce institutional changes implicitly 
assumes that the society is well-integrated, in terms of market exchanges, with the 
outside world. But if the society is isolated from the outside world, changes in these 
variables may have little, if any, effects on institutional changes. Unless these changes 
motivated the outside world to encroach into the society, as in the case of colonization, 
these exogenous factors are not likely to disturb the social status quo and hence are not 
likely to induce institutional changes. 
It is difficult to imagine all formal institutions as entirely exogenous. The polity itself is not 
a machine that uses standard calculations. The polity, as any other group of actors, 
determines the feasible sets together with their perceived potential gains with a mental 
model. Unless those rules are purely imposed by external power, as in the case of 
colonial power, the formal institutions are partly the results of the shared belief and 
dominant ideology. Even if specific formal rules are imposed exogenously, the shared 
belief (or the dominant mental model) crucially determines the level of their 
enforcements. The enforceability and sustainability of those exogenously determined 
rules depend on the degree of their compatibility with the shared belief and the overall 
social-cultural environment. In effect, even if the rules may exist on paper, they may not 
be realized and hence may not be considered as institution (Hurwicz 1996). Even if all 
change in the rules may not be the results of free choice of society, the shared belief can 
selectively make some set of rules more attractive and easily enforceable than others.   
Posner (1973) insists on the central role of legal institutions in structuring social 
interactions and in resolving disputes that arise in the process and their effect on 
economic performances. Historical perspectives of institutional analysis (Greif 1998, 
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2006, North 1990) also show that efficient institutions mostly evolve with economic and 
technological progresses and political changes that moved toward the rule of law. The 
presence of an effective legal structure and court system to enforce contracts and 
property rights is the fundamental underpinning of institutions and their development 
depends on the development of political institutions (North 1990). While modern legal 
systems are crucial, their spontaneous emergence and their effectiveness seem to be 
contingent upon the socio-cultural environment. Emergence and changes in formal 
institutions are understood as an outcome of political bargaining between different 
groups, which involves strategic alliances, conflict, bargaining, and lobbying (Acemoglu 
and Johnson 2005; North 1990): frictions between those groups who want to maintain 
the status quo and those who want to change it. In this sense, the nature of the group, 
the power balance among them and the interest of each group can matter for the type of 
change. 
Setting aside the origin of legal institutions, most developing countries adopted modern 
legal codes from Western nations long ago. But their justice system remains ineffective 
and inefficient. Unlike past institutional changes observed in developed countries, 
institutions in most countries of SSA have not evolved incrementally. Instead, one of the 
distinguishing features of institutions in these countries is that the capacity of 
communities, governments, and markets to articulate and enforce consistent rules of the 
game is frequently quite limited (Nabli and Nugent 1989). World Bank (2002) takes 
incentive compatibility as an important criterion for the effectiveness and sustainability of 
a given institutional arrangement. Although the incentive compatibility of an institution is 
a necessary condition for its effectiveness and sustainability, it is not sufficient for the 
institutions to promote economic progress and social development. The type of 
incentives the institutions are compatible with matters as some institutions, instead of 
incentivizing productive activities, may incentivize corruption and counterproductive 
activities. It is when institutions incentivize such activities as productive efforts, 
innovations, wealth accumulation, and learning that they provide sufficient condition for 
development. Thus, while the incentive compatibility of institutions determines their 
effectiveness and durability, the type of activities they specifically incentive determines 
the direction of economic changes. 
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An alternative approach is to consider institutions as a set of shared-beliefs and analyze 
institutional evolution in terms of the dynamics of the shared-beliefs. In their attempt to 
endogenize institutional changes, (Aoki 2001; Greif 2006) by viewing  institutions as 
‘play of the game’ –strategies agents create over repeated interactions – provide a 
conceptual framework for understanding institutional change. In their framework, shared 
beliefs shape the behavioral pattern of agents (expectations and strategies), the mode of 
the game and its outcomes. Here experimentation and imitation can endogenously 
trigger institutional changes. But their scope in inducing institutional change depends on 
the level of competition which is also a function of private property rights, the structure of 
society and composition of economic and non-economic organizations. Alchian (1950) 
hypothesized that institutions evolve when the ubiquitous competition weeds out 
inefficient institutions. But for the surviving institutions to be efficient, the selection 
process must occur in an ideal competitiveness environment. Otherwise, firm’s that 
reduce transaction costs by capturing higher rents continue to survive.  
Informal institutions are considered as a slow-moving institution (Ronald 2004) because 
they are the result of unintentional and decentralized patterns of behaviors and process 
of learning. The speed of evolution of informal institutions thus depends on the dynamics 
of this decentralized behavior and the learning process. The evolution of informal 
institutions, therefore, is driven by the dynamics of the decentralized interpersonal 
relationships. In this line Brousseau et al. (2010) and Wallis (2011) attempt to explain 
the nature of and impetus for evolution from informal institutions (based on interpersonal 
relationships) to formal institutions (based on the impersonal guarantee of rights to all) in 
a (mostly) “institutions as rules” framework in which impersonal orders yield superior 
outcomes, while the evolutionary process can be trapped in inefficient equilibria. In this 
case, the mode and structure of interpersonal relationship play a central role in shaping 
the way beliefs are constructed and shared among subjects. Thus the evolutions of 
shared-beliefs are shaped by the dynamics of the interpersonal relationships. In a closed 
primitive society, the socio-cultural milieu is designed to maintain stability by conserving 
the long-standing culture and preserving the ascriptive relationships (Posner 1980). It 
will take centuries for shared beliefs to evolve. In the absence of something that disturbs 
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the socio-cultural milieu, society continues to perpetuate the long-standing shared-
beliefs.  
For understanding of institutional evolution, informal institutions seems to play more 
important role than formal institutions. The idea that informal institutions emerge 
spontaneously  and once emerged they tend to impermeable to deliberate interventions 
is well recognized (North 1990). In addition, scholars argue that formal institutions 
imposed from outside are less viable than endogenously emerged one. Then the key 
issue for understanding of institutional change must start from those factors that are 
driving society to abandon the long standing institutions in search of alternative one. 
Some views this as a process of selection just in similar way conceptualized in biological 
evolution (Alchian 1950). However this may be sound, it started on the process without 
giving the impetus driving the process. Even if society/state must select among feasible 
alternative, what stimulate the selections. In the case of biological evolution, it is the 
competition among organisms for survival behind the evolution. But when it comes to 
society, human being as a society has strong instruments to tame competition and its 
potential outcome which are behind biological evolution. Thus, social evolutions thus 
diverge from the path expected in a purely competitive evolutionary process. As a result 
human evolution is nonergodic (Brousseau et al. 2011).  
The very existence of a given community or tribe is obviously an evidence for its fitness, 
it cannot be evidence for the efficiency of its institutions. However imperfect, the 
performance of society must be judged relative to other society and relative to its past. 
How many society have become extinct due to its inability to evolve to overcome the 
adverse effects of avoidable hazards such as disease, flood, drought, etc. There is a 
clear difference between developed and developing nations in this respect. The 
resilience of society to natural and manmade calamities can be a minimum criteria to 
judge the efficiency of institutions. The mere existence of society is cannot be an 
evidence for its fitness in the present world where there are no various humanitarian 
aids and different non-market supports from the Western countries. The unidirectional 
influx of people in some society, in the form of migration, can also be an indicator of 
inefficiency of the institutions. 
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The role of informal institutions for institutional change seems clear. Informal institutions, 
which summarize the complex interaction of shared-belief, ideology, social structure and 
economic structure, play an important role in determining the type of economic and 
political institutions that arise and their performances. But what is less clear is the socio-
political conditions under which those informal institutions that specifically promote 
economic progress emerge. Understanding the complex relationships informal 
institutions have with other socio-economic and political spheres seems important. 
Historical accounts of institutional changes use long-distance trade as a starting point 
(North 1991; 1993, Greif 1998). In these studies, society in its attempt to capture the 
gains from trade improves institutions in a transaction cost reducing way. But such 
arguments implicitly assume that the society had already started long-distance trades 
and commerce. In a condition where there was no meaningful trade and commerce, the 
society may not have the incentive to improve institutions. Instead, it can perpetuate 
those institutions and organizations that foreclose trade and commerce as Eggertsson 
(2005, 1996) showed how restraints on free trades and commerce within and with the 
rest of the world crippled Iceland’s fishery industry for one thousand years. The critical 
issue is to understand the key factors underlying society's attitude and ideology toward 
trade and commerce. Even in the presence of marginal trade, the perceived gains may 
not be sufficient enough to induce institutional changes. Hence, the important issue 
under such circumstances is how to induce society to expand freer trade and commerce 
so that interest groups that pressurize the polity can emerge. This requires  a deeper 
understanding of social, economic, physical, political and institutional contexts that take 
such society away from the long-standing closed communal way of life and reciprocal-
based exchange system. Despite the existence of profitable opportunities, some society 
even discourages monetary exchanges within the community much less to encourage 
trade and commerce with culturally different and distant societies.  
The reason why institutions fail to evolve especially in SSA seems less clear. North 
(1990) noting the difficulty of understanding the reason, he indicates the missing 
appropriate political institutions as the primary cause. But the development of effective 
political institutions itself must be the long-term outcome of the society’s gains from 
expanded long-distance trade. TCE theory does not provide a clear explanation as to 
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why weak institutions persist in most developing countries. The TCE frameworks 
provided by both North and Williamson fail to account the unique institutional 
environments of developing countries (Saravia and Dietrich 2006). As North himself 
indicated, the reason why inefficient forms of exchanges, such as the ‘Suq’ continue  to 
exist in North Africa and the Middle East is not clear (North 1990). A variety of similar 
other forms of exchanges is still common in most SSA countries. Perhaps understanding 
the reason why such forms of traditional trade continue to exist can provide insights on 
reasons why institutions did not evolve in these countries.  
The dynamics of informal institutions in a society where the interpersonal relationship is 
confined within arm’s length network will not be the same as in a society where complex 
impersonalized relationships define the behavioral patterns of individuals. It is difficult to 
expect institutions that promote economic progress to evolve in a non-market closed 
tribal society. The reason is that most customary institutions and even deliberate policies 
may focus on preserving these relationships. As long as there is nothing that frees 
individuals from interpersonal relationships and the resulting informal institutions that 
induce behavioral conformity whose effect on freedom of choice, innovation, wealth 
accumulation, productivity and so on is largely negative. While institutional economists 
have gone far toward demonstrating the effects of other non-economic institutions on the 
levels and outcomes of economic activities, they are generally silent about potential 
‘feedback’ effects of the prevalence of open and competitive economic system on 
institutional changes. One of the problems of institutional analysis is that  the causal 
relationship runs only from institutions to markets, not the other way round. Instead of 
taking the scope of the market as a factor determining institutional change, institutional 
economics take markets themselves as institutions. The heavy attacks of institutional 
economists on the liberalization reforms made through Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) imply a one-way causal relationship that runs from institutions to markets (Poulton 
et al. 2006; Dorward et al. 2005a, 2005b; Easterly 2005). In addition, institutional 
economics emphasis on potential positive roles of informal institutions without seeing 
their adverse implications on the long-term development of markets (Jackson et al. 
2012; Karayiannis and Hatzis 2012; Baliamoune-Lutz 2011; Ahlerup et al. 2009; 
Grootaert 1998; Coleman 1988). Moreover, the increased discourse about localization 
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and revitalization of local tradition, culture, etc. undermines the potential feedback of 
markets in inducing changes in informal and formal institutions. The main issue is the 
persistence and pervasiveness of informal norm based personalized transactions 
undermine institutional transformations primarily by undermining markets exchange 
(Kranton 1996). If once the required institutions allowed markets, the market itself can 
provide society with strong incentives for the institution to change incrementally. The 
market endogenously induces institutional change by changing the preferences (Bowles 
1998) and more broadly the behavioral patterns of actors (Hodgson 1988). It can 
crucially determine the magnitude and direction of incremental change. In addition, 
institutional analysis is largely silent about the socio-cultural and ideological contexts 
that generally prevail in a non-market and closed societies and their feedbacks on 
market  
One possible reason for institutional stagnation in SSA could be that the limited gains 
from inefficient trade may provide little incentive and resources to improve institutions in 
a cost reducing way. For instance, the feedback effects of the smallness of transactions, 
for historical, political, physical and so on reasons, characterizing most of the current 
societies of SSA countries (Fafchamps and Minten 1999), provide the society little 
incentives to expand trade and, consequently, to improve institutions, including political 
institutions, in a transaction costs reducing way. But the potential of expanding the scale 
of economic activities could also be a function of the transaction costs and other critical 
elements such as the property rights on land. In a condition where property rights on 
land are either limited to possession/use rights or most lands are communal in African 
countries (Posner 1980; Ensminger 1997), the scale of economic activities could 
continue to be small.  
Institutional analysis must be comparative and historical (Aoki 2001; Williamson 1995; 
North 1991). We thus examine the overall environment under which the revolutions 
occurred and explain the roles informal constraints have played in determining the 
subsequent formal institutions and deliberate policies. To be specific, we focus on those 
elements that have a bearing particularly on agricultural markets and more specifically in 
the coffee supply chain. We explain the origin of the current institutional environment 
and economic and political setting and more specifically the existing pervasive 
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personalized transactions. Our main objective is to identify key elements driving the 
historical paths of institutional changes. We focus on the impacts of long-distance trades 
and, especially, that go beyond the boundaries of small geographic/social entities in 
shaping the behavior of individuals and on the evolution of market institutions. 
2.3. Description of the coffee markets and institutions in Ethiopia  
An exploratory study was made to understand the functioning of the whole value chain 
from local market to the export market. Informal discussion was made with various 
actors and supporting institutions. Accordingly, discussions with experts of ECX, ECEA, 
(a separate organization established in order to supervise ECX), marketing experts of 
district Agricultural Development Offices, exporters, traders and some community 
leaders. In addition, various websites were also consulted. The following sections thus 
describes the institutional contexts the various markets are operating and the 
relationships of the different markets along the supply chain.  
2.3.1 Description of the coffee market 
Coffee in Ethiopia is produced mainly by about 1.2 million small-scale farmers, who 
cultivate less than two hectares. The average productivity is about 670 kg per hectare. 
Coffee produced by the small-scale farmers is supplied to village assemblers, 
cooperatives or local coffee traders. The village assemblers (which sometimes serve as 
an agent of local traders) in their turn sell to local traders. While cooperatives can either 
directly export coffee or sell it at the central auction markets located in Addis Ababa or 
Dire Dawa,  the local coffee traders can sell only at the central auction markets.  
In 2008 Ethiopia tried to improve the functioning of the central auctions by establishing 
the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (hereafter ECX). This encompassed various 
regulatory, institutional, and organizational innovations (Gabre-Madhin 2009), including 
the introduction of new grades and standards, warehouse clearance and delivery and 
information dissemination systems. While coffee transactions at the central markets 
became modern, they remain poorly organized, traditional and personalized in the rest 
of the markets. Traders collect dried coffee cherries from thousands of farmers who 
supply very small quantities of dried or wet coffee cherries (often less than 50 kg at a 
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time) and transactions are made face-to-face and predominantly among known 
individuals. 
Quality assessments 
Quality assessments are made at each stage of the market chain, at the local market, at 
central markets and export markets. The quality assessment at the local level in the 
transactions between coffee selling farmers and local traders is subjective and 
unstandardized. Traders do this by asking the seller about the specific origin of the 
coffee and by making arbitrary visual inspections. Some traders draw a handful of coffee 
from the sack and hull the sun-dried or wet coffee cherries by crushing them between 
their fingers or their teeth. They do this to judge whether the cherries are well-dried or 
not, to visually inspect the body of the beans, to check the presence of foreign materials 
such as wanza1, and to judge other quality attributes. Yet the method of assessment at 
this level is quite subjective. In some conditions, traders simply buy the coffee without 
making any visual examination. The practice differs from trader to trader and the market 
context.  
The other quality assessment made at this stage is an assessment of the moisture 
content. This is done by local marketing experts in the Agricultural Development Offices. 
This is done when the coffee is ready for transporting to the ECX warehouses. Once it is 
processed, an amount of coffee with a net weight of 80kg will be packed in an labeled 
ECX sack. Then the expert measures moisture content by randomly drawing a sample 
from the loaded truck. If the moisture content doesn’t exceed 11.5% by weight, the 
expert provides approval by sealing the loaded truck. 
The other stage of quality assessment is made at ECX level. Here the grade level and 
brand type will be assessed using detailed standard criteria. This is described in detail  
in section 2.3.2. 
The final quality assessment is made at the two Coffee Quality Inspection and 
Assurance Centers (CQIAC) located in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. Here, unlike the 
10-level grading system, the CQIAC uses 6-label grading system that ranges from 
Grade 1 to Grade 5 and under-grade. The coffee which is below grade 5 will be 
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 A dry fruit of tree called cordia abysinica which resembles dried coffee cherries. 
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classified as under-grade and will be rejected. In addition, the origin of coffee, the net 
weight (60 kg), the name of the exporting company, date of certification and other 
information will be described in the labeling.  
The traditional nature of the transaction provides the opportunity for both buyers and 
sellers to commit various kinds of frauds. Experienced and better-informed traders can 
downgrade the quality of coffee or cheat on its weight. In addition, traders can use their 
economic and political power to constrain farmers’ free choice of traders and even 
manipulate contracts. But the traditional nature of the transactions also allows farmers to 
take some opportunistic actions. They can mix high-quality coffee origins with inferior 
coffee origins produced elsewhere. In order to gain from increased weight, they can also 
add foreign materials such as grains of cereals, stones, wanza, water and the like. This 
behavior is possible firstly because the actual quality of the dried coffee cherries which 
the farmers sell is only known after hulling and secondly since the amount of dried 
coffee bought from a single farmer is so small that traders hull the coffee collected from 
hundreds of farmers together making the task of tracing individual quality difficult even 
after processing. 
Possibly, anchoring their market transaction around personal relationships is seen as a  
response to the transaction risks and challenges which both farmers and traders face 
(for an overview of the local markets in Ethiopia refer to Gabre-Madhin 1999; Musebe et 
al., 2011; Tadesse and Shively 2013). Generally, it is believed that the basic social 
structure for the personalized transactions could be provided by the social networks of 
family, clan, ethnic, religious, and other social groups. But in addition to this, long-term 
transactions also lead to clientele relationships. The transaction context is such that a 
trader cannot operate without a well-established network. While it is generally less costly 
for an insider to establish such networks, it is almost impossible for an outsider to enter 
into the coffee trade.  
In practice in Ethiopia, traders organize their clienteles around the social structure of 
their village and clan. In this way, village and clan provide the social network and the 
clientele relationship provides the personalized relationships. 
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Traders must make continuous investments to maintain, strengthen and expand their 
networks. They do this by investing in influential individuals and local leaders. But they 
also invest in individuals, especially in those whose production volumes are higher. More 
importantly, they engage village assemblers. They invest time and efforts to gather 
information, coordinate penalties, enforce contracts, provide gifts to influential farmers, 
offer ‘interest-free’ production or consumption loans, participate in social events and 
mediate in conflicts. In sum, maintaining and building social capital is not costless 
(Grootaert 1998). But to minimize these costs, traders also cooperate to avoid 
competition, and to deter potential new entrants. 
2.3.2 Institutional changes in the coffee sector 
Coffee has been the single most important source of foreign exchange earnings in the 
Ethiopian economy contributing more than 50% to export earnings in the past. While this 
figure declined over recent years (from 53.9% in 2000/01 to 21.9% in 2013/14), coffee 
still contributes a lot to the country’s export earnings (NBE 2014).  
The export coffee virtually follows a single value chain: it moves from the local/village 
market to the auction/central markets to the export market and finally to the world 
markets. The main agents in the above chain are farmers, local traders, exporters, 
foreign importers and processors. Farmers sell dried or red coffee cherries to local 
traders also called suppliers (akrabis) in the village/local markets. Suppliers after 
collecting dried/red cherry coffee from hundreds of small-scale farmers, undertake 
pulping/hulling2, drying, sorting and packaging activities before they bring the product to 
the ECX warehouse. ECX grades, labels and certifies the product before it is offered for 
sale at the auction center. Exporters buy coffee at the auction center and transport it to 
their own warehouse. They undertake secondary processing: sorting and packaging 
before they bring it to CQIAC for grading, labelling and certification. Exporters then sell 
the certified coffee to foreign importers. 
The institutional context of coffee marketing and trading in Ethiopia can be divided into 
two major phases: the pre- and post-reform period of 1992. While the pre-reform period 
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 Pulping/wet-processing/washing is a process of removing the outer cover of red/wet cherry to produce parchment 
coffee and hulling is the process of removing the outer cover of dried cherry coffee. 
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is associated with a socialist economic system, the pre-reform period is associated with 
a ‘market-based’ economic system. The period after the reform can be further divided 
into two phases: the period before the introduction of ECX and after ECX.  
2.3.2.1 Before ECX 
Until 1992 the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporations (ECMC) monopolized the coffee 
market in Ethiopia, capturing about 86% of the volume in 1990/91 (Berhe 2010). 
Individual growers were obliged to supply assigned amounts of quota at a fixed price. 
But in 1992, following the liberalization reform, the ECMC was made to compete with 
private traders. In effect the participation of traders which was below 10% before 1992 
grew to more than 75% (González 2007). 
 
Several studies identified problems related to the old auction system that was run by the 
government (Renkow and Slade 2013; Kulkarni 2011). First, there were few exporters 
and there was suspicion of collusions among exporters. Second, the trader incurred a lot 
of transaction costs in order to sell coffee at the auction market. As there were no 
warehouse services, traders/suppliers had to transport the coffee to the compound of 
the auction center and leave the truck loaded until they found a buyer. Exporters 
(buyers), knowing the high costs trader face (car rental, guard, handling, etc.), have the 
incentive to cut prices during the auction. But the problem was bigger. When they 
agreed on a price, the exporter signed a check against delivery of the coffee at the 
exporter’s warehouse. The problem was that after the trader transported the coffee to 
the warehouse, the exporter often refused to sign the delivery confirmation based on 
quality and quantity terms (Kulkarni 2011). At that time, the trader, locked in a hold-up 
problem, would have to accept a discounted payment to get the delivery forms signed as 
trying to find another buyer would involve even more additional costs. Third, fraudulent 
actions such as payment failures, forgery, contract breach, adulteration, subjectivity of 
the quality assessments were the common problems of the old auction system (Gabre-
Madhin 2007). The legal and regulatory environments were too weak to discipline 
market actors. Finally, there were large numbers of brokers at various stages of the 
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value chain. The presence of a large number of brokers was by itself an indication of the 
inefficiency of the central auction market. 
Figure 2.3 Coffee market chain before ECX 
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship of actors in the coffee chain before the establishment 
of ECX. Farmers sell coffee to assemblers, consumers, local retailers, and primary 
cooperatives. One of the important features of this chain is that there are brokers that 
bring sellers and buyers together at every level of the chain. The transactions between 
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assemblers and whole sellers, whole sellers and exporters, cooperatives and exporters 
and whole sellers and traders were all made through the mediation of brokers. Here 
grading and labeling were made only at the end of the chain when the coffee is prepared 
for export. Since the central auction occurred before the coffee was graded and labeled, 
the broker draws a handful of coffee grain as a sample in order to find potential buyers. 
Even if the central auction was to create a marketplace where buyers and sellers 
transact in competitive ways without needing the brokers, the information and 
enforcement problem characterizing the market forced sellers and buyers to make 
personalized transactions with the mediation of brokers. 
After the Structural Adjustment Program but before the introduction of ECX two other 
changes occurred in the coffee market. First there was the abandonment of price fixation 
in July 2002 and secondly the trademarking of Ethiopian coffee in the international 
market in 2007 (Arslan and Reicher 2011; DePass 2011). The latter happened, following 
a dispute between Ethiopian government and Starbucks with the help of  lobbying and 
publicity by Oxfam and  major Ethiopian coffees (Harar, Sidama, and Yirgachefe) 
obtained their own trademarks. This was considered as a big success for improving the 
bargaining power of Ethiopian coffee exporters (Arslan and Reicher 2011). 
2.3.2.2 After ECX 
ECX was established in April 2008 to facilitate and coordinate exchanges of selected 
agricultural products including maize, wheat, and beans. Coffee was not the primary 
target of ECX at the beginning . But in July 2008, ECX succeeded in convincing the 
government to pass a law that not only replaced the old auction system with the ECX but 
also that prohibited trading outside ECX (FAO 2014)3. As a result since 2009, coffee 
became the primary commodity in the ECX auction system. 
Figure 2 represents the coffee market chain under the ECX system. Farmers, as usual, 
can sell coffee to consumers, suppliers (directly or through agents/assemblers), 
retailers, and cooperatives. But the export standard coffee has only two channels: 
suppliers or cooperatives. While suppliers can sell coffee only through ECX, 
cooperatives can sell either through ECX or can directly export to foreign buyers. But the 
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 In the old auction system, trading at the central markets outside the auction floor was permissible. 
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participation of cooperatives in direct export is still low. For instance, of the total volume 
of coffee 189,648.7 tons exported in 2014, only 6.3 percent of it was exported by 
cooperatives and the remaining 93.7 percent was exported by private exporters.  
The main goal of ECX was to reduce the high transaction costs and risks and collusive 
behavior of exporters that characterized the central coffee market (Gabre-Madhin 2007). 
Although government ownership of ECX is a concern (Renkow and Slade 2013), ECX 
has generally changed the way coffee was transacted at the central/auction markets. 
Among the many regulatory and legal changes made by ECX, the following are most 
important: 
First, ECX, in order to reduce the unnecessary number of  middlemen and shorten the 
market chain, rules out village assemblers (sebsabies), who in the past were the primary 
buyers of coffee from farmers. Under the ECX system, farmers are expected to sell 
coffee directly to local traders who are locally called akrabis. The intention was to reduce 
transaction costs by reducing intermediaries. Despite the new rule, in reality, we 
observed that assemblers are still functioning. Traders reported that instead of dealing 
with hundreds of farmers individually, they prefer to establish long-term relationships 
with assemblers. As shown in Figure 2.4, although the new system rules out 
assemblers, in practice they still operate; some as a legal agent of the supplier or in the 
disguise of a producer-farmer. We thus represent in the figure with a broken box to 
differentiate their role from their role before ECX. The reason may be that assemblers 
are likely to have better information about the behavioral patterns and the product quality 
of each farmer within their village than a trader living in town. They play a key role in 
reducing information and enforcement problems.  
One of the critical problems in the old auction system was that once traders transported 
their coffee to the central market, they incur a lot of transaction costs before finding a 
buyer. Traders are now only required to transport coffee to one of the 12 warehouses 
located in the towns of major coffee producing areas. As shown in the figure, suppliers 
after they made the necessary processing, they deliver their coffee to ECX warehouses. 
Traders can store it for a small storage fee for a maximum of one month4. This can 
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 The limit of maximum of 30 days was to discourage speculations. 
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reduce transaction costs and risks associated with the hold-up problems discussed 
above. It also avoids the potential costs appropriated by the diverse brokers that were 
operating at various levels between farmers and exporters. Under ECX, only a few 
agents are allowed to represent sellers at the auction floor with a pre-determined 
commission fee. 
ECX also established a grading and standardization system at the warehouse level. It 
introduced its own grading and standardization system that accommodates wide grade 
levels and product differentiations. The new coffee standard divides Ethiopian coffee into 
ten grade levels: from Grade 1, Grade 2, Grade 3, down to Grade 9 and UG or under-
grade. The grading level is determined based on two main criteria: raw quality and cup 
quality that constitute 40 and 60 points, respectively. The raw quality is determined 
based on four criteria when the coffee is washed coffee. The raw quality of washed 
coffee is thus determined based on defect level, shape and make, color, and odor 
respectively constituting 20, 15, 5 and 5 points. When the coffee is unwashed or dry 
processed the raw quality is determined based on two criteria: defect level and odor 
constituting 30 and 10 points respectively. The cup quality is determined for both 
washed and unwashed coffee based on four criteria: cup cleanness, acidity, body, and 
flavor each scored at 15 points. 
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Figure 2.4 Coffee market chain after ECX 
In order to determine the raw quality, 300 gram of sample coffee is drawn from different 
parts of the truckload. The coffee beans then will be examined for the number of 
defective beans, shape and make, color, and odor. The point level is then determined 
based on an objective assessment procedure set for each criterion. For instance, the 
defect level will be determined by counting the number of defective beans counted from 
the 300 gm coffee beans. The number of immature, black, white and broken beans; and 
the number of foreign material such as stone, soil, grains, and wanza seed. 
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In order to determine cup-quality a professional tasters tests brewed coffee in order to 
score the acidity, body, and flavor, and to detect defects and characters. Then expert will 
assign points for each criteria using a structured grading scale.  
The scores obtained from raw and cup quality assessment then will be summed up to 
arrive the total score out of 100 points. The grade levels will be determined based on 10 
points score, e.g. Grade 1 for scores greater than 90, Grade 2 for scores between 81 
and 90, Grade 3 for scores between 71 and 80, Grade 4 for score between 63 and 70, 
Grade 5 for score between 58 and 63; and so forth up to Grade 9. Coffee with a score 
below 20 will be assigned Grade 10 or under-grade. Finally, coffee with Grade 1 to 
Grade 3 can further compete for specialty coffee. Based on further cup quality 
assessment, coffee that satisfies a minimum score of 85 points will be awarded Q1 
specialty level and those that satisfy a minimum of 80 points will be awarded Q2 
specialty level.  
In addition, a contract system was developed that differentiates Ethiopian coffee based 
on processing method, geographic origin, and production method. Accordingly, the wet-
processed or washed coffee are divided into 25 specialty coffee types and 11 origin-
based commercial coffee types. The dry processed or unwashed coffee is further 
divided into 26 specialty coffee types and 17 origin-based commercial coffee types. It 
also identifies 15 types of coffee designated for domestic consumption only. Yet the 
product differentiation was made largely following administrative boundaries, instead of 
geographic boundaries5. For instance, the unwashed coffee originating from East 
Hararghe, West Haraghe, and Arsi Administrative Zones were classified under Harar A, 
Harar B, and Harar C, respectively.  
As described above in the old system, the auction was based on a quality assessment 
made using visual inspection of a handful of coffee drawn from the truckload. Grading 
and labeling were made ex post the transaction to certify exports. As a result, there were 
disputes between sellers (traders) and buyers (exporters) on quality. Under the ECX 
system, traders anonymously sell standardized and labeled coffee. ECX introduced an 
electronic warehouse receipt system to eliminate the payment and delivery disputes and 
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 While the branding was to symbolize geographic origin of the coffee, in some cases the geographic differences may 
not follow the administrative boundaries. 
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frauds that were common in the old auction system. Payments are now secured and 
mediated through clearing banks and ECX. There is no direct contractual agreement 
made between sellers and buyers. 
The other important procedural change is that transactions become impersonalized 
under the ECX system. In the past, while the transactions at the auction were de jury 
impersonalized, the transactions de facto were personalized as transacting parties made 
the agreement before they came to the auction. They came to the auction to formalize 
the informal agreements they made privately. The old system also provided room for 
exporters to collude. Under ECX, exporters buy coffee in an impersonalized bidding 
system. As shown in the figure below, all sellers with the exception of cooperatives must 
deliver their coffee to the warehouse. There, the coffee will be graded and labeled 
before it is offered for sale anonymously on the auction floor. Once exporters bought 
coffee at the ECX auction floor, they make further sorting in order to improve the quality 
of the coffee. Then, the coffee will be graded and labeled again by Coffee Quality 
Inspection and Assurance Center (CQIAC) before it is certified for export. 
Although the impersonalization of the transactions can eliminate potential collusions and 
increase competitions, the anonymity of the transaction also makes traceability of the 
seller impossible. It was reported that this raised a lot of complaint from exporters and 
foreign buyers who want to directly buy from certain suppliers and cooperatives (Gabre-
Madhin 2012).  
Finally, ECX established a real-time market information dissemination mechanism. 
Information dissemination of coffee price has long been a tradition in Ethiopia well 
before ECX. Auction price of coffee has always been part of the daily news on the 
national radio and television. But, ECX introduced detailed and accessible real-time 
price information dissemination through mobile SMS, electronic price display boards, the 
internet and a free call-in telephone services. Price discovery is now almost costless for 
traders. In sum, ECX has transformed the old auction system into a modern commodity 
transaction scheme. All these interventions directly affected traders and exporters, but 
not farmers. Virtually all coffee producers are small and cannot individually access 
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ECX’s facilities. The only intervention that directly reaches individual farmers is the 
dissemination of price information. 
While Fafchamps and Minten (2012) and Bassolet and Lutz (1999) found no significant 
impact of information dissemination through mobile texting on price transmissions, 
Courtois and Subervie (2014) found significant impacts. The main purpose of price 
information is to improve the bargaining powers of farmers. But to realize this potential, 
the local market should be competitive and efficient enough to respond to price changes 
at the central market. However traders in the market have segmented the market 
through social networks. In effect, a farmer has limited alternative buyers, who have 
great monopsonic power. Local markets continue to be governed by informal institutions 
(Meijerink et al. 2014; Getnet 2008) and transactions remain traditional, less competitive 
and personalized (Gelaw et al. 2015). The transaction is traditional in the sense that 
there is no grading, standardization or labeling. Quality assessments are made 
subjectively through visual inspection. It is not economical for an individual farmer to 
transport small quantities of coffee (usually not more than one hundred kg) to find an 
alternative buyer elsewhere. Trading coffee between regions is also illegal in the 
country. ECX did not offer new alternative buyers for farmers nor did it change the rules 
governing the local markets. According to the rule, farmers at all levels can sell only 
coffee cherries in wet or dried form, not beans. Meaningful quality differentiation can be 
made only after primary processing, after pulping/hulling.6 A recent experimental study 
showed how, despite the preference of farmers to make impersonalized trade, the 
institutional context forces them to embed their transactions in personalized 
relationships (Gelaw et al. 2015). In such conditions, whether farmers benefit or not, 
depends on the efficiency of the market in transmitting prices. In this case, the impacts 
of ECX will only change the distributions of benefits between traders and exporters. It is 
therefore questionable whether these interventions have changed the performances the 
coffee market chain and more specifically at the local market. 
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 In some areas, farmers hull coffee using some local instrument but the government discourage such traditional 
activities to maintain quality. Pulping/hulling is done by traders. 
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‘No tribe unites with another of its own free will.’ 
Arthur Keith  
Chapter 3 Historical analysis of institutions in Ethiopia 
Abstract 
This chapter examined the history of institutional changes. We found that the main origin 
of early civilizations observed in the northern region of Ethiopia was trade and 
commerce. We also found that the rise and fall of the strong empires and the associated 
emergence and decline of extended orders throughout the history of the country were all 
associated with the rise and fall of trade and commerce. But society's willingness to 
expand and contract trade was highly circumscribed by the degree of protection of 
private property rights. While we found that the emergence of the limited private 
ownership of land contributed to the emergence of extended orders in the Abyssinian 
empire and in the different kingdoms in the southern parts of the country, the communal 
ownership of land was the principal cause for the persistence of a closed tribal society in 
the rest of the country. The origin of the segregated social structure observed in the 
country was thus attributed to the confinement of transactions to a narrow community 
which was a function of private property rights regime. The dominance of socialist-
orientated beliefs can also be associated with the confinement of socio-economic 
transactions to narrow communal social system.   
3.1 Introduction 
As Greif (1998) noted, the question of why societies evolve along distinct institutional 
trajectories is among the fundamental questions of institutional economics. Such 
analysis can help to identify the key elements that determine the emergence, 
persistence, and changes of institutions. It not only help us to understand the origin of 
the existing institutions, it also provides important lessons to design and evaluate 
institutional interventions. Before I evaluate the behavioral aspects of agents (farmers 
and traders) toward the institutions governing personalized transactions, in this chapter I 
examine the origin of historical trajectories that crucially determined institutional changes 
over the past centuries. The main purpose of this chapter is thus to examine the effects 
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of historical trajectories in changing the socio-economic, physical and political landscape 
of the country and their implications for the evolution of institutions and shared-mental 
model. The roles are two-fold: first, it helps us to trace the historical origin of the existing 
contexts, particularly personalized transactions, and socio-economic fragmentation; and 
second, it helps us to identify key elements that shaped the historical paths of the 
country. I selectively discuss the evolution of markets, trade, and commerce, 
personalized transactions, property rights, the social and the political landscape that 
shaped the existing dominant shared mental models. 
The chapter is organized as follow. The first part introduces the role of history in 
explaining the evolution of institutions and economic performances. The second part 
describes the key historical trajectories that defined institutional changes in Ethiopia. I 
examine four historical periods: the period before imperial expansion, the period of 
imperial powers; the period during socialist system and the period after the ‘collapse’ of 
the socialist system.  
3.2 Historical trajectories that cause institutional changes 
Ethiopia was not colonized, with the exception of the Italian occupation of the country for 
about five years. This means Ethiopia is one of the two African countries which were not 
colonized by Europeans. Yet Eritrea, which had been part of the Abyssinian empire, was 
colonized by Italians from 1882 to 1947. Most historical analyses about Africa use the 
colonial legacy as a framework. But more fruitful historical analysis of institutions can be 
obtained by taking the situation before the colonial periods as a starting point. If 
colonization was to explain the current Africa, the continent should have evolved in a 
way similar to many other colonized Asian and Latin American countries. Using 
colonization as a starting point for historical analysis amounts to denying the existence 
of society before the colonization. Colonialism can have a lot of bearings in the current 
institutions, but a robust understanding of the current institutional and other problems of 
the continent can be gained by taking the situations well before the colonization as a 
starting point. The issue which needs to be examined is what institutional, socio-
economic and technological aspects enabled some societies to be powerful and 
sophisticated to colonize vast society and others naïve, negligent and weak to avoid or 
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be resilient to the shocks of colonization. What specific conditions made Africa’s colonial 
legacy worse than that of other colonized societies? Analyses that go beyond the 
colonial legacy would not only help to better understand the deep source of the current 
predicaments of Africa, they can also help for building a society which is resilient to 
various kinds of exogenous shocks including colonization. Hjort (2010) shows how the 
unique pre-colonial culture of Tswana vis-à-vis the neighboring regions shaped the post-
colonial success of Botswana differently from its neighboring Southern African countries. 
Colonization is just one threat among the many exogenous shocks that can upset the 
smooth functioning of society.  
Setting aside the capacity of the colonial legacy framework in explaining institutions in 
the rest of Africa, it cannot be relevant in the specific case of Ethiopia since the country 
has not been colonized by any external force. While some take the expansion of the 
former Abyssinian empire into the southern regions to form the current Modern Ethiopia 
as an internal colonization (Asafa 1996; Holcomb and Sisai 1990), such framework 
cannot explain the problems of the country as a whole. We therefore use the situation 
before the period of the formation of Modern Ethiopia in order to make a positive 
analysis about the historical origin of the current institutions. 
3.2.1 Pre-imperial expansion 
Levine (2011; 2012), Burstein (1998 cited in Kebede 2006) and many others contend 
that the history of Ethiopian nationhood extends back to the sixth century and before. 
But many also argue that such reference does not apply to the current Ethiopia but to 
the former Abyssinian empire. The current modern Ethiopia was established as a result 
of the territorial expansions of Emperor Menelik II in 1889 (Bahiru 2001; Levine 2012; 
Marcus 1994) from the empire historically known as Abyssinia to the rest of the country. 
Menelik II, in an attempt to realize the pivotal moments of his predecessor Tewodros to 
create a larger unified country, expanded to the southern parts of the country (Levine 
2012). 
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Figure 3.1 Abyssinian empire (Beeton's Dictionary of Geography) 
I thus make our analysis by comparing the evolution of the former Abyssinian empire 
(northern part hereafter) with the rest part of the country (southern part hereafter) in the 
periods before the imperial expansion. The history of the northern part is the history of 
the Abyssinian empire whose origin is traced from the Axumite kingdom. Figure 3.1 
shows the map engraved by Dower (1868) of the Abyssinian empire. It should, however, 
be noted that the geographic areas of this empire were quite flexible over time 
(Clapham, 2002). The map should, therefore, be taken only as indicative. 
Many historians (Meyers 2007; Clapham 2002) equate the ancient civilization and 
traditions of the Abyssinian empire with that of China or Persia. The origin of the 
Abyssinian empire was the Axumite kingdom. The Axumite kingdom had strong trade 
relations with Mediterranean-Red Sea regions (Gillespie 2003). It exchanged ivory, 
tortoiseshell, rhinoceros horn, gold, silver, and slaves for cloth, tools, metals and jewelry 
(Marcus 1994). The kingdom facilitated trade by minting coins from bronze, silver, and 
gold (Adejumobi 2007).  
Given that the early transportation system was maritime navigation and that the Axumite 
empire was near to the Red Sea, the kingdom had great advantages for trade. Historical 
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analyses show the intimate link between long-distance trade and evolution of institutions 
(North 1990; Greif 1989). But after Islam expansion controlled the coastal areas of Red 
Sea including the port of Adulis, the kingdom followed what historians call a closed door 
policy (Adejumobi 2007; Marcus 1994) in order to defend Christianity against foreign 
religion (Baykedagn 1995). Given the church, state and culture had been highly 
intertwined with each other, Christianity was the raison d'être of people (Kebede 2006). 
The civilization not only came to halt with the stop of the trade, the kingdom was even 
not able to maintain a large army, complex administration, and urban amenities (Marcus 
1994). The Axumite civilization which was once at its pick around 4th century quickly 
became history with the closure of the trading routes. This was a major downturn in the 
development path of the kingdom; a turn from the golden age to dark age (Clapham 
2002).  
With no revenue derived from external trade, the subsequently emerging political powers 
always had to virtually rely on taxes derived from domestic economic activities. But in 
the absence of external trade, the existing agricultural sector could not generate a 
revenue sufficient enough to maintain a strong state that can establish what Hayek 
(1988) called extended order even within its territory. In the absence of extended order, 
the domestic trade will, in turn, be limited. In the absence of domestic trade, the 
agricultural sector cannot grow to generate sufficient revenue. Such situation will lead to 
a vicious circle of low trade, poor economic sectors, weak state, weak institutions and 
low trade. The emerging powers had to exploit the subsistent peasants to their limits. 
The emergence of Abyssinian empire was a very long process of gradual expansion of 
the Axumite kingdom from the top northern part into the southern and western areas 
interrupted by contractions, disintegrations, and shift of powers from one group to the 
other.  
The Abyssinian empire possessed all the essential elements of ancient empires with 
some impressive archaeological remains, a monarchy, ancient Christianity, money-
based trade and most important of all, an indigenous written language7 (Clapham 2002). 
                                                 
7
 The only indigenous written sub-Saharan language known as Ge’ez have been used since Axumite 
kingdom and still being used in the Orthodox church. Ge’ez, a local Semitic language, is also the 
ancestor of the modern Amharic and Tigrinya languages spoken in Ethiopia today (Clapham 2002). 
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Axumite was the first empire in the world to introduce Christianity (Meyers 2007). As 
early as the third millennium B.C., the region cultivated thirty-six crops that make 
Ethiopia either the primary or the secondary source of many crops (Marcus 1994). There 
was also a very complicated tenure system in the Abyssinia empire among which a 
customary land tenure system called rist was the dominant one. Rist was a “sacred 
hereditary property” right on land acquired through inheritance (Donham 1986) and 
could neither be abridged nor abrogated (Markakis 1974). However rist and variant 
forms of it were largely private in principle, there were customary rules that restricted 
transfer of land to individuals outside the kinship. However the system was reported to 
have resulted in few landless farmers, it also led to perpetual fragmentation of holdings 
(Alula and Fassil 1983). But private transactions of land in the form of sale, mortgage, 
will, and gift were not uncommon (Habtamu 2015). In addition, there also was a 
relatively advanced court system (Kleiner 2009). 
The rise and fall, expansion and contraction of the subsequent kingdoms can all be 
associated with their ability to expand trade and commerce with the outside world 
(Gillespie 2003; Marcus 1994) and with their ability to create an extended order that 
facilitates both foreign and domestic trade.  
This being the situation in the Abyssinian empire, the other parts of the country, with few 
exception, were characterized by diverse fragmented small communities. A collection of 
small groups each of which was geographically, economically, and socially isolated from 
others. Generally, each group can be characterized by what Taylor (1982) called a 
‘chiefdom’ community.  
The prevalence, till this day, of the clan system in most parts of the country, the 
dominance of pastoralist and hunter/gatherer types of livelihoods, the lack of cultural 
homogeneity (even within same ethnic groups such as Gurage) and the heavy reliance 
on customary institutions provide a clearly show the historical differences between the 
two parts of the country. Even within the same ethnic group, the clan-based communal 
structure is very strong in those pastoralist areas and it is loose in the agriculturalist 
areas.  
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Levin (2012) considers Ethiopia as an apt place to apply the evolutionary perspective to 
understand the history of the country. We thus follow the evolutionary perspective in our 
attempt to understand the origin of the current socio-economic, political and institutional 
realities. The basis of our analysis of Ethiopian history is the presence of visible 
distinctions, vivid till this day, between the northern region and the southern regions. The 
first distinction is that while tribal-like hereditary-based (real or perceived form) social 
organizations such as clan are prevalent, until this days, in many parts of the south, they 
are nearly absent in the northern region (Lewis and Jewell. 1976). In the absence of a 
state power, it is this types of social organizations that organize and coordinate 
economic, social and legal activities and that defend the group from aggressions by 
neighboring group. Most activities such as economic exchanges, contracts 
enforcements, assignment and protection of property right, dispute resolutions, and 
territorial defenses are all organized and coordinated by this apparatus. The important 
features of this state-like apparatus, for economic analysis, is that it naturally confines 
socio-economic transactions to narrow homogenous and cohesive social groups. 
Communal ownership, especially of land, and the resulting communal livelihood 
structure are key in sustaining cohesiveness and homogeneity (perceived or real) of the 
group and the social organizations such as clan. This can be evidenced from the history 
of some kingdoms in the southern region. 
What is prominent in this history of the southern region is the Oromo expansion around 
the 17th century from the southern part of the country in Borena and Bale into the 
northern, western and eastern regions (Gillespie 2003; Bahiru 2001; Marcus 1994). As 
some of the Oromo group that occupied the high plateau started farming and settled life, 
their social and political system also changed from z egalitarian communal social system 
of administration called gada into a monarchical system (Bahiru 2001). We argue that 
the transformation from the gada into a monarchical system in the highland areas (e.g. 
Jima Aba Jiffar) was the spontaneous outcome of changes in the socioeconomic 
landscape that arise due to the changes in livelihood system (from pastoralism to crop-
livestock mixed farming), property rights regime (from communal to private land) and 
lifestyle of the people (from mobile to settled life). Levine (2012) characterizes this as a 
transition from communal to archaic society. The reason why the Oromo kingdoms didn’t 
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further expand might be due to the dominance of pastoralist livelihood in neighboring 
areas and their limited access to external trade.  
We argue that such transition from a traditional clan-based communal structure to a 
monarchy is the natural outcomes of, mainly, the change in ownership of land from 
communal to private. The complex and gradual effects of this transformation will be that 
communal bonds loosen, homogeneity of people declines, livelihood structure diversifies 
and assignment of statuses tends to allow merit and the clan institutions become less 
effective. In such condition, people in order to get economic and social protection, tend 
to submit to a powerful lord (Platteau 2009) which can gradually grow up into a monarch 
depending on the scope of economic transactions. To maintain the cohesion, the society 
develops more inclusive collective symbols than the communal one (Levin 2012). Along 
this, the degree of personalization of transactions will take a different shape with the 
expanded collective symbol. The overall economic implications of such transformations 
will be that economic space of society tends to expand. The scope for expansions of the 
economic transactions will, however, depend on the strength of institutions in reducing 
transaction costs and the scope for profitable trade with neighboring regions. 
The fact that the former Abyssinian empire was not that different in the last centuries 
from the rest of the country was because trade with the external world was limited which 
in turn limited domestic trade. In effect, the emerging power had to depend on the 
exploitation of subsistent peasants. But it should also be remembered that  their power 
was also limited by the level of trade. It was the expansion of trade at the end of the  20th 
century that gave Menelik II the opportunity to expand further towards the south (Marcus 
1994). 
3.2.2 After imperial expansion 
Although there were previous attempts, it was the expansion of Menelik II in 1889 to the 
rest part of the country that formed the current modern state (Crewett et al. 2008; 
Marcus 1994; Markakis 1975). The gradual expansion of the Abyssinian empire to the 
southwest coupled with the increased trade with European countries in the later periods 
provided Menelik II the incentive and the power to expand further to the rest of the 
country. The consolidation of the  central power and the associated mobility of people 
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into the southern part allowed the development of towns, the expansion of capitalistic 
agriculture, the development of infrastructure and expansion of trade and commerce 
(Bahiru 2001; Marcus 1994; Markakis 1975). These, in turn, enabled the emperor to 
consolidate his power.  
The expansion being sweeping and forceful, it involved disfranchising the native people 
(Mohammed 1996) through tenancy, land alienation and expropriation, cultural 
imposition and exclusions in the political power. As a result, there was no mutual cultural 
assimilation. Instead, the culture of Abyssinian became dominant. The Amharic 
language became the official language. This gave the imperial expansion a ‘colonial’ 
appearance as revisionist historian such as Holcomb and Sisai (1990) claim. One 
important aspect of this process was that the level of disenfranchisement differs from 
region to region. The evidence in Markakis (1975) shows that while disenfranchisement 
was severe in other areas, it was relatively lower in areas such as Wellega, Jima, and 
Shewa where a comparable monarchical structure had already developed. Similarly, 
while the participation of native people in the newly established towns in these archaic 
societies (Levin 2012) was considerably high, the towns in the rest were nearly 
exclusively occupied by people who came from central and Northern parts of the country 
(Markakis 1975), especial people from Shewa who dominated the imperial power (Levin 
2012; Young 1996). Those that transformed into archaic society were able to leverage 
the external domination. The emperor also expanded Orthodox Christianity and made 
Amharic the language of the central power. Although such domination and impositions 
could be  the main source of the current ethnic cleavage, the emperor’s expansion 
created a consolidated power. The modern state of Ethiopia begins here. 
The consolidation of power and the establishment of bureaucracy enabled the country to 
expand economic activities. The country constructed, with the help of the French, a 
railroad from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. Many of the current towns and cities, 
manufacturing industries, large private farms, telecommunication services, schools, etc. 
started during this time. Trade with the rest of the world considerably increased. The 
economic policy was quite along the line of capitalism. Even the few manufacturing and 
service sectors were entirely owned by private firms. Yet royal lineage also played 
important role in capturing economic opportunities. Thus while the political governance 
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was autocratic and characterized by feudal land ownership patterns, it also laid the 
foundations for a comparatively strong bureaucracy (Altenburg, 2010).  
The agriculture, transport, banks and other small- and medium-scale enterprises were 
private, and the level of restrictions both in domestic and foreign trade was minimal. 
While ownership was in principle private in the northern parts of the country, the right to 
sell and transfer land was highly limited by the traditional land ownership system called 
rist. While the rist system provided a sacred and secure right to individual owners, the 
customary rule also highly constrains the right to sell or transfer the land without the 
permission of all family members. The limited commodity market coupled with the 
absence of a modern law that protects property rights caused this customary rule to 
persist for millennia. As a result, the level of tenancy in this region was nearly absent 
(Kebede 2006). It is the tenure security and ‘private’ nature of the rist system that is 
behind the relatively individualistic and conservative culture of the Northern region 
(Brietzke 1976; Levine 2011) compared to the communal and collective culture of the 
Southern region. This is also the main reason for the low rate of land alienation and 
tenancy in the Northern region compared to the Southern region. 
In the newly incorporated areas, however, there had been no private land before the 
imperial expansion (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). Instead, land was generally a 
communal or open access resource. After the expansion, however, diverse ownership 
forms emerged. Private land ownership that equates freehold ownership emerged 
through expropriation, occupation of free lands and loosely defined communal lands and 
through purchasing (Srur 2014; Grover and Anteneh 2006; Belay and Manig 2004; 
Cohen 1973). In addition, government and church land also constitutes large parts and 
played important roles in the expropriation of land in the southern regions (Jema 2004; 
Markakis 1975). In effect, large private farms emerged in many areas of the southern 
regions. Yet, land also remained communal in many pastoralist and hunt/gather-like 
societies.  
Although the scope of markets was generally limited by the poor road network and the 
socio-cultural fragmentation, it was flourishing rapidly. In general, the involvement of the 
government in the economic sector was limited to the expansion of infrastructure (road), 
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justice, health and education services. Private firms were even emerging in the health 
and education sector. There were even many foreign medium scale firms.  
The expansion of Abyssinia into the southern parts and its consolidation of power 
enabled also Ethiopia to repulse the Italian attempt to expand their colonial territory from 
Eritrea and Somaliland to mainland Ethiopia (Levin 2011; Garson 2009). It enabled 
emperor Menelik II to mobilize a large native army of about 80000 from all parts of the 
country (Quinin 2009). While the military was untrained and armed with nothing more 
than spears and bows, it was able to defeat the relatively mechanized and trained 
military of Italy. But when it comes to markets, the cooperation of the society in the 
economic market was not as strong as it was to defend the country against foreign 
aggression. The problem was that the processes of incorporation of the diverse 
communal and archaic societies were made through force and sweeping occupation 
instead of by gradual and voluntary socio-cultural assimilations. On the one hand, such 
a forceful and sweeping integration naturally leads to domination of one group over the 
others at the risk of future disintegration. On the other hand, closed and communal 
societies never come together on their own as they had not come together for many 
millennia. As anywhere in the world, the incorporation of the diverse small communal 
societies into the Abyssinia empire was a long process of forceful integration and 
disintegration. The problem is that in an environment where the communal bonds are 
strong and personalized transactions are highly pervasive, the need for external state 
protection is less. As discussed earlier, people succumb to external protection when the 
collective bonds loosen and traditional institutions become less effective in protecting 
property rights and enforcing contracts. The main problem was that most societies were 
largely communal and archaic.  
It was at this early stages that the Marxist-Leninist ideology preoccupied the mindset of 
the elite. The reason is that the Marxist-Leninist ideology exactly fits with the naturally 
dominant beliefs and ideologies of collective non-market societies. Freeman (2004) 
touches this issue in his discussion of the history of Gamo. The socialist revolutions in 
the world swept overwhelmingly those non-market and segregated societies; not the 
integrated and market-based economies. Even though a proletariat group did not 
emerge and the exposures of the existing elite were limited to the western world, the 
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Marxist-Leninist ideology fascinated nearly every group, especially the elite (Adejumobi 
2007). Despite the liberalist ideology implied by their curriculum, students became the 
front runner of the socialist revolutions. This gave rise to the first African socialist 
revolution in 1974, a revolution that turned avid adherents into its primary victim: the 
elites, the students and even the peasants (Kebede 2001; Chege 1979).  
3.2.3 Socialist experimentation 
The military took power in 1974 ousting Emperor Haile Selassie I. The emerging market 
and private sector were strangled at its’ infancy. The government switched over to 
‘command economic system’ which can be thought as an act of reinventing the old 
communal system in a modern way. Various studies described the various economic 
measures taken after the 1974 revolution (Marcus 1994; Chole and Manyazewal 1992). 
The government took various sweeping measures. The first major reform was the land 
reform that turned every piece of land into state ownership in the name of distributing 
land to the tiller. The government also nationalized private enterprises, commercial 
farms, real estates and even extra individual houses. It introduced various measures 
restricting voluntary markets transactions. It introduced price control, quota and rationing 
systems for every market commodity, financial and foreign exchange markets. It 
introduced a ceiling on individual wealth accumulation (Birr 500,000) and diverse rules 
and regulations that restrain and discourage private business activities. It fixed the 
currency exchange rate at 2.07 Birr per Dollar. It also aggressively and coercively 
established various forms of cooperative organizations. In addition, it established diverse 
state enterprises and farms in the production and service sector. Private traders were 
replaced by marketing parastatals in the domestic and foreign markets. Such wider 
economic policy could be conceptualized as an attempt to organize the whole economy 
into a single firm or hierarchical central planning of socialist economies (Hobb 2003). 
The political system was changed into a one-party system and forced mass mobilization 
through campaign become the principal in the implementation of development programs. 
Rebel groups emerged everywhere in the north, west, and east (Henze 1990). The 
average annual GDP growth rate which was about 4.0 percent per annum in the years 
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1965-1973 declined by half in the years 1974-1990 (Chole and Manyazewak 1992). This 
was another turning point in the historical path of the country. 
Though the regime has tried to restructure the economy along socialist lines, there had 
been some small-sized private firms. Although de jure there were many restrictions that 
were intended to discourage private ownerships, de facto not only many firms were able 
to operate underground but some were able to capture rents by obtaining monopoly 
license on trading activities.  
Although the Marxist-Leninist ideology is still a captivating program for many, it 
particularly conforms best with the belief common shared-belief that arises in communal 
non-market societies. Nowhere else the socialist ideology fits as best as with the belief 
widely shared by the communal societies. It was due to this, against the Marxist-Leninist 
prediction, the socialist revolution swept non-market agrarian societies more than it did 
market-based industrialized capitalist societies. The Marxist-Leninist ideology nicely 
dovetails with the tribal shared-belief. This coupled with the captivating promises of 
communism motivated an overwhelming majority to embrace socialist revolution without 
a backward glance. Even after the Derg (military junta) regime proclaimed socialism as 
the economic policy of the country, various groups arose following the refusal of the 
Derg to share power. However, all the emerged political groups except one were 
socialist. Despite their common ideology, they were not able to create a coalition. 
Instead of cooperating against a common oppressor Derg, they started to fight each 
other. 
So each went guerrilla fighting in their sheer interest to bring heaven in the ‘resourceful’ 
earth of their people (ethnic group). With the exception of the conservative and pro-
monarchy Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the ideology of all the rest of opposition 
parties was Marxist-Leninist. The military government, unwilling to share power, 
annihilated all opposition parties through a military campaign called red terror (Chege 
1979). This later gave rise to numerous ethnic liberation fronts: Eritrea Liberation Front 
(ELF), Eritrea People’s Liberation Front (EPLF); Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden People Liberation Front (OPLF); Islamic Front 
for Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and many others (Adejumobi 
  
68 
 
2007). There were even two and more rebel parties for same ethnic group – separated 
mainly in terms of religion and location. 
After a long struggle, ‘coalition’ of rebel groups (largely dominated by the Tigrean ethnic 
group), with the decisive support of the well-organized ELF, took power in 1991 by 
military force – a relay from one military government to another. That gave rise to the 
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) a ‘coalition’ of four main 
Ethnic groups alliances: Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and a group that represents many 
ethnic groups existing in the south. 
The collectivist tribal mental model coupled with Marxist-Leninist ideology brought a 
separation agenda at the top of their struggle. The complete conformity of the Marxist-
Leninist ideology with the shared-belief that naturally emerged in the narrow tribal social 
settings provided youngsters strong motives to sacrifice their life for the aim of bringing a 
miracle to their people through centralized planning. It is the deep socialist ideology that 
not only triggered the revolution then but that is also shaping the current economic, 
political and social institutions. Even after the disastrous failures of the past socialist 
experimentation, the ideology still dominates the thinking of the majority (Renkow and 
Slade 2013).  
3.2.4 After the ‘collapse’ of socialism  
After the EPRDF took power in 1991, it established a transition government until it was 
constitutionalized in 1993. The first step taken in the political arena was the 
establishment of ethnic-based federal states. In addition, it took important steps in the 
economic arena to take the mixed-economy the Derg regime proclaimed in 1990. 
supported by foreign donors, the government undertook Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) to liberalize the market. The liberalization included trade liberalizations (lifting 
trade restrictions; loosening licensing requirements; abolishing of official price control, 
quota system and input subsidies; downgrading the role of state-controlled agricultural 
marketing boards); privatization of state- and public-owned enterprises, and 
liberalization of the financial sector to domestic investors (Getnet 2008; Dercon 2001). In 
addition, the exchange rate which had been fixed at 2.07 Birr per USD for 17 years was 
devalued to 5.0 Birr per USD. While the liberalization was sweeping in some ways, it 
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was not as sweeping as in other African countries. Not only the reforms were limited, 
there had been even reversals in Ethiopia on some of the reforms already made during 
the structural adjustment (Jayne et al. 2002; Kherallah et al. 2000). Particularly, the 
reform excluded key economic sectors. 
For instance, land continued to be state-owned and farmers only got use rights. The 
government took a strong stand against privatization of land and stubbornly continued to 
reaffirm the state ownership land policy of the Derg regime (Crewett and Korf 2008). 
Moreover, key economic sectors such as telecommunication, media, sugarcane 
plantations, sugar factories, power generation, and the like stayed government 
monopolies. In addition, what is unique in Ethiopia is that many medium and large-scale 
business enterprises are owned and run by the leading party (Altenburg 2010). The five 
largest microfinance institutions are owned by the governing political party. According to 
NBE (2014), more than 50 percent of banking activities are held by the government 
banks. In addition, many enterprises such as banks, insurance companies, publishing 
houses, cement factories, beer factories and heavy metal industry are owned and run by 
the governing political party – TPLF/EPRDF (Tigray People Liberation Front/Ethiopian 
People Revolutionary Democratic Front)8. Even the supply of key agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizer is run by party owned enterprises. Such enterprises are even growing 
at a rapid rate to include nearly all economic activities. Finally, the role of government 
even in the service sector is so dominant as to crowd out the participation of the private 
sector. For example, in the education sector of the 294,357 students enrolled in higher 
                                                 
8
 Even if EPRDF is a coalition of four Ethnic-based political parties: TPLF, APRDM (Amhara People Revolutionary 
Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People Democratic Organization) and SPRDM (Southern People 
Revolutionary Democratic Movement). Among these TPLF is the powerhouse of the coalition as the other three 
member parties were crafted by TPLF. The origin of the coalition party is that TPLF was able to free its ethnic 
territory in 1989. Once the front achieved the primary purpose it was established for – ‘liberating’ its people, it had 
to come with a new identity in order to extend its fight beyond the ‘freed’ ethnic territory. Thus, TPLF established a 
coalition party in the pretext of supporting efforts of other ethnic groups for achieving similar goals. However this 
strategic cooperation justifies the coalition to through the then government, it cannot as-is generate cooperation for 
economic and social development. Instead, the coalition should have given way to the formation of many sovereign 
ethnic nations or should be reformed to generate the required cooperation for economic development. It cannot also 
directly give the coalition a legitimate national political power. As Hayek (1988) noted, the conception that what 
has worked in time of war can also work in time of peace is mistaken. The coalition used to coordinate war cannot 
be used for coordinating national development; while the purpose of the former is temporary, the purpose of the 
later goes beyond a generation. It may be in the interest of the creator to maintain its power on the coalition to 
remain as ‘Revolutionary Fronts’ even after a quarter of a century in power. 
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education in 2012/13, 92.1 percent of students were enrolled in shoddily expanded 
public universities (MoE 2013).  
The foreign currency is rationed by the government. Tariff and non-tariff barriers are 
prohibitively high. For instance, the total tariff and non-tariff import taxes on a used 
personal car reach up to 500 percent. The government has significant monopsony 
power in the labor market (e.g. according to MoLSA (2013), ignoring the domestic 
workers and self-employed, the government employs 56.8% of the workforce). If we 
deduct those professionals employed by NGOs, the government becomes the sole 
employer of professionals. 
In sum, the government controls the key factors of production: land, labor, finance and 
hard currency. This coupled with the various restraining fiscal and monetary policies, 
creates a heavy and visible hand of the government in the market. The fundamental 
socio-economic system and the institutions and policies of the current government can 
be considered as natural extensions of the socialist system of its predecessor. The 
major difference is in the political arena. While the former used a unitary party and 
centralized government, the current government uses ethnic-based federalism with 
vaguely defined, nominal and inconsistent power sharing system (Abbik 2011). 
3.3 Elements defining the institutional environments 
3.3.1 Socio-economic landscape 
The primitive tribal social structure still exists in many parts of the country. While we find 
few culturally closed ethnic groups in the former Abyssinian empire, we find a lot of 
diverse groups in the rest of the country. According to a population census (CSA 2010), 
from the 82 ethnic groups currently found in the country, only five ethnic groups are 
found in the former Abyssinian empire. The remaining 77 ethnic groups, each occupying 
their own distinct geographic territory, are found in the rest of the country. It is due to this  
that the eminent Ethiopia specialist Carlo Conti-Rossini (1929) described this part of 
Ethiopia as tutta un museo ( a museum of extraordinary ethnic diversity)’ (cited in Levine 
2012). 
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The economy is dominated by subsistence farmers. According to MoLSA (2013), 88.0% 
of the population lives in rural areas and 80.2% of the total population depends on 
subsistence agriculture with little or no marketable surplus. The rural population which 
had been 92 percent in 1957 (Markakis 1975) declined only by about four present within 
half a century. The livelihood structure is generally either mixed-farming, agro-
pastoralism or pastoralism with very little off-farm and non-farm activities. The situation 
is even worse in some regions of the country such as Benshangul Gumuz, and 
Gambela. People in these areas are still largely hunter-gatherers with little farming and 
livestock rearing activities. In sum, Ethiopia is rural and poor even by African standards 
(Osborne 2005). 
Ethiopia had undergone a profound political and economic swing from one polar to 
another. Yet the informal institutions, the social settings, and the shared beliefs remain 
persistent. For many reasons markets are extremely thin in Ethiopia even by African 
standards. There are almost no big foreign companies in the country. The mindset of the 
vast majority is dominated by socialist ideology (Renkow and Slade 2013) and more 
prevalent among the polity and elite. Although ‘undoubtedly, markets can be considered 
as one of the most salient institutions that human beings have ever produced’ (Aoki 
2001), society’s attitudes toward it are specifically negative in Ethiopia. 
In the past, in the absence of state power that provided protection against external 
attack customary institutions and social organizations such as clan might have been 
essential. But in the presence of the state, the question becomes how to get an organ 
that provides impartial protection to the various groups. This is where politics come in. 
The recent political move of the country toward ethnic-based federalism can be 
considered as a response to the unfair and unequal protection of groups observed in the 
past.  
The government constitutionalized the right of ethnic groups to self-determination up to 
secession under Article 39. Brietzke (1995) takes such extended constitutional 
protection as an innovative response to democracy and ethnic nationalism. However the 
right to secession and self-determination is implicit in any society, such explicit 
constitutional provision, in the ethnically segregated fragile society, can lead to 
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disintegration (Clapham 2002; Abdullahi 1998). The recitation of divisive counter-
narratives on the history of the Ethiopian state promoted by the government is further 
aggravating the potential to dismember the state (Assefa 2012). The political 
movements that were established to liberate their ethnic group remained revolutionary 
and military parties even after 25 years in power. Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology is still highly reflected in their economic and political programs. 
The alignment of the political powers along ethnic lines may protect groups against 
potential suppression. However, it also bears the risk of disintegration of society into 
diverse small communities. This risk will be especially high given the high political rent 
that the socialist-oriented economic system naturally creates. Oppositely, creating an 
inclusive political and more market-oriented economic system can help society to 
gradually integrate and to form a unified country. 
3.3.2 The dominant mental model and institutions  
The concept of shared beliefs or mental/cognitive model has become an important 
element for a better understanding of informal institutions (World Bank 2015; Schlüter 
2009; Bollier 2007; Greif 2006; North 1994, 2005; Denzau and North 1994). However a 
unified theory about the mental model is not yet developed (North 2005), its role in 
shaping informal institutions has become widely recognized (World Bank 2015). The 
mental model defines the way individuals perceive the world around them (North 2005) 
and the way they respond to contextual cues (Schlüter 2009). We conceptualize it as the 
mental architecture that decisively determines the way people perceive, interpret and 
understand the environment around them and that determines their behavioral patterns. 
In this thesis, I use the terms “shared-belief” and “mental model” interchangeably.  
As described above, the ideological background of the current government is Marxist-
Leninist. In fact, ‘socialist-like’ institutions render the government more direct powers 
over resources than markets do. This could provide the government the incentive to 
promote non-market institutions. But this alone cannot be a reason for the institutions to 
be socialist oriented. The socialist ideology must also conform with the dominant shared-
belief. In a situation where markets are thin, transaction relationships are reciprocal, 
resource ownerships are communal and the social composition is homogenous (in terms 
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of livelihood structure, ethnic and religious identity, etc.), the dominant belief will be 
socialist orientated. It is not difficult for the people to consign with the demand of 
government.  
We argue that the dominant shared belief that emerges in such socio-economic 
environment will be that which undermines wealth accumulation, asset acquisition and 
private ownership of property. It takes wealth accumulation as an object of greed and 
work as a burden (Kebede 1999) and develops norms that incentivize distributive 
activities more than it does productive ones. It is a mental model that interprets hard 
work, profit motives, competitive behavior, wealth accumulations as irrational behaviors. 
It wants everyone to be selfless. As a result, it assigns social status based on 
generosity. In effect, individuals are strive to demonstrate (or at least pretend to show) 
their commitment for wealth sharing and rationalize their actions around this. All these 
behavioral patterns arose as a result of a lack of markets.  
For instance, Ethiopians take hospitality as culture unique to Ethiopian society. It may 
occur to a handful of people that hospitality is a strategic response to a lack of markets. 
It can rather be considered as a reciprocal exchange. The problem is that in a situation 
where markets are nearly non-existent, the marginal value of surplus products become 
nearly zero.  In such circumstances, it becomes rational for a person to use the surplus 
product for hospitality-related activities – exchanging a product whose value would 
otherwise be near zero for increased social status and future reciprocal exchange. The 
social status increases the person’s economic space in the community and beyond. It is 
not in regard for others, as it is generally believed, but in regard for the self. Adam Smith 
already called such activity as ‘rustic hospitality’ – a rational action whose economic 
return could be positive:  
‘A family which exercised great hospitality would be taxed much more lightly than 
one who entertained fewer guests.’ (Adam Smith 1776, p. 1178) 
Also, most developed countries have had such culture at the early stage of their 
development and this declined along with the rise of markets. The heavy reliance on  
wealth sharing and other similar cultural traits in many societies is the manifestation of a 
lack of markets. It certainly declines when markets flourish. For instance, milk was a free 
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good in most rural areas until its market expanded recently. It is the dominance of such 
activities in every economic sphere and the social organizations and institutions that 
facilitate the activities that in turn render people the shared mental model. 
However they seem hospitable to outsiders, they are deeply hostile to them. In effect, 
people widely share beliefs that view own culture as superior to anyone else and their 
resource endowment the richest of all others. They view all transacting parties outside 
the society invariably as exploiters instead of potentially beneficial partners. They tend to 
view neighboring people more as an enemy or rival than potential transacting party. 
They avoid cultural assimilation with neighboring people. Instead of promoting economic 
organizations they focus on preserving social and cultural organizations. This coupled 
with the communality, in use and ownership, of resources, the system inevitably tends to 
undermine economic activities internally and discourage cooperation with neighboring 
regions. It was due to this, the society remained fragmented and closed even until this 
day. It is also due to this reason, the nation formation impossible, as in most other 
society in the world, without the sweeping military expansion. It was this, so to speak, 
that made the African society more vulnerable to exigencies of nature and human 
aggression such as colonization then and even now. Such segregated social structure 
does not guarantee that a similar domination will not occur in the future. 
The main origin of the mental model seems to be the experience obtained in the process 
of the interaction of individuals with their physical, social, economic and institutional 
environment. Changes in this environment could gradually change the mental model of 
people. Bernard et al. (2014), by exposing subjects to new perspectives using 
documentary videos, found a change in fatalistic belief in Ethiopia. While such evidence 
indicates the role of exposure, it appears to oversimplify the mechanism through which 
the mental model shapes behaviors of people. Such snapshot exposure hardly changes 
the mental model that forms the whole architecture of the mind. Instead, individuals 
need tangible, repeated, and consistent experiences in order to revise their mental 
model. In an environment where the society has been excluded from the outside world 
for millennia, it is difficult for people to revise the long-standing beliefs. 
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In the past, the elaborate system of reciprocity embedded in the social relationships 
cushioned people against the exigencies of natural hazards. In the absence of state 
power, these institutions provided protection from potential external attacks. But one 
important feature of such social organizations and institutions is that they can be 
effective only in a closed system (Coleman 1988). Such closure will be easy when many 
key resources are communal in both ownership and use. In addition, members have to 
be continuously fed stories or myths about ‘we’ and ‘they’. While these strengthen the 
cohesion of the group, they also isolate the group from the rest of the world. In effect, 
people view others not as potential transacting parties but as a treat. The situation thus 
hinders socio-cultural and economic transactions between neighboring communities as it 
had been so for many millennia. This is why we still find diverse ethnic groups and 
communities even within narrow geographic areas. 
This mental model, for instance, considers traders’ motivation as grubby and 
opportunistic as opposed to the self-regarding motivations held in the mainstream 
economy. It is one thing to consider their actions as a ploy, rigging and cajole, it is 
another thing to consider them as treacherous, faithless and perfidious. It is one thing to 
denounce ‘opportunistic’ behaviors but it is another thing to wish them to be altruistic. 
Wishing traders to be altruistic is more selfish behavior than self-interestedness itself. It 
may be in response to this public perception that traders utter a lot of words by swearing 
in the name of Gods in order to convince buyers that their action is altruistic. The sad 
thing is that every time inflation becomes a serious problem, the government scapegoats 
traders and the public believes this. In effect, the government even expropriates the 
properties of some traders in the name of speculative behavior. Since it is consistent 
with the mental model, the public cherishes these actions of the government.  
It is the Marxist-Leninist ideology behind most policies and institutions in the country. 
The prohibitively protective foreign trade policies, the restrictive policies in the exchange 
rate, credit and finance and capital markets; the restriction on foreign companies; the 
various restraints on free mobility of labor and capital are all deeply intertwined with the 
mental model. The state ownership of land and direct involvement of the government in 
many economic activities are also related to the dominant shared mental model. The 
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authoritarian political system and weak justice system are inextricably linked to the 
socialistic mental model.  
The public debate thus is not on how to constrain the government from intervening in the 
market nor is it on what the government should do for the market to flourish, rather the 
debate is on how to get a government that can grow the economy. The discussion is not 
on how to get a well-functioning and competitive market, rather it is how the government 
controls the market. These conceptions are not limited to the lay people, rather widely 
shared even by scholars in the social sciences, including economists. In effect 
inefficient, unproductive, extractive and counterproductive institutions and organizations 
continue to crowd out the market. It is difficult to expect institutions that promote markets 
to evolve soon. 
The recent attempt of the government to identify itself as ‘developmental state’ is not 
only to rationalize the extended power of government but it can also be seen as an 
attempt to align its policies and programs with the dominant mental model. This enabled 
the government to gradually narrow the economic space of the private sector, the 
political space of rival parties and the social space of civil organizations and trade 
unions. One of the goals of the GTP is to ‘establish a stable democratic and 
developmental state’ (IMF, 2011). As IMF staff commented, the GTP is founded much 
on the heavy role of the state and the role envisaged for the private sector is limited (IMF 
2011). Not only the private sector has limited space relative to other comparable 
economies, the space of the private sector has still decreased over time in the past two 
decades.  
3.3.3 Personalized transactions: the dominant institutional arrangement 
Even a century after the emergence of the national state, the dominant transaction in the 
country remains personalized around dense social networks organized within the small 
and homogenous community, with limited inter-community transactions. Since the 
emergence of the modern state, there had been encouraging steps to protect the rights, 
encourage free mobility of labor and resources across different groups. This trend 
changed when the current government set a decentralized and ethnic-based federal 
system in the country. Conflicts between ethnic and cultural groups have become a 
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common phenomenon again. This is not only constraining the free mobility of labor and 
capital, it is also making distant trades difficult (Gabre-Madhin 2001). The country seems 
to be moving back to pre-state socio-economic structure. 
Of course, this is not to mean that the colonial legacy doesn’t have any bearings in the 
present institutions in Africa. Certainly, the colonial legacy has increased this complexity 
and the degree of the problems, but it is the above phenomenon that carried over the 
colonial legacy to this generation. For the colonial legacy to be the main framework to 
explain the current problem of Africa, either one of the following propositions should be 
valid. African societies should have been less fragmented and segregated before the 
colonization or the fragmentation and segregation should have been declining since the 
independence as Europe is much more unified than it was before the second world war. 
Nation building is not about putting a country on the world map, rather the development 
of impersonalized transactions and extended order, regardless of the identity of the 
citizen.  
The fact that most African communities had more or less similar cultural and physical 
appearances may compel us to view Africans as unified people. In the un-colonized soils 
of Ethiopia, there were limited exchanges (economic, social, etc.), even up to date, 
among groups whose cultural and biological identities are hardly differentiated. Cattle 
raiding, from neighboring community, was considered as a heroic act in almost all parts 
of the country in the past and it even still exists now in some areas. Killing a man that 
does not belong to the tribe/group was not seen as an immoral act in many parts of the 
country until recently (Freeman 2004). Reducing transaction costs requires not just 
efficient formal rules, it requires developments of what Platteau (2009) called 
‘generalized morality’ – morality that is not restricted to a reference ethnic/clan group but 
that applies to all people. 
Given the fact that markets have remained stunted because of various policy, 
institutional, infrastructural and social factors, people continue to transact within the 
bounds of kith and kin. When every locality is characterized by such transaction, not only 
the market will be small, but it will be difficult for a society to evolve. Particularly, through 
the land policy – communal and state ownership of land – the personalized transactions 
  
78 
 
and the tribal mental model are perpetuating. One of the great difficulties in learning is to 
draw experiences from ideas. Drawing experience from those ideas concerning the 
physical world is relatively easy as experimentation provides prototype experiences. But 
drawing experience from those ideas concerning society is very difficult for many 
reasons. It was due to this that many countries, in their attempt to bring heaven on earth 
through socialism, mired in insurmountable economic, political and social problems for 
decades.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The foregoing historical review primarily shows the origin of the present weak institutions 
and their persistence. It shows how the complex interrelationships of economic, social 
and political institutions shape the dominant mental model underpinning the weak and 
inefficient institutions. The dominance of socialist-orientated beliefs is also associated 
with the confinement of transactions to narrow communal social system. Communal 
property rights seem to be at the heart of this social environment. We found that while 
the emergence of ‘private’ land ownership contributed to the evolution of extended order 
in the northern parts of the country, the communal ownership of land and other 
resources was the key factor behind the persistence of closed tribal societies in most 
other parts of the country. Not only the socialist system of the past weakens the 
emergence of efficient economic institutions, but the socio-cultural and political 
environment that arises from pervasively personalized transactions in the closed 
communities also supports socialist-oriented institutions. Thus, the system, instead of 
expanding markets and trade, tends to limit them.  
An important implication is that the emergence of efficient formal institutions in Ethiopia 
requires more open and liberal market policies. It requires drastic measures that 
transform the currently closed and segregated social structure into an open and 
accommodative society. Finding a safe exit for the 85% of the population from small-
scale and subsistence farming is one thing, expecting to bring economic, social and 
political development by promoting policies that preserve the small-scale farmers with all 
its archaic culture and tradition is a chimera.  
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Chapter 4 Local coffee markets and quality improvement: Evidence 
from a choice experiment among coffee producers in Ethiopia9 
Abstract 
This study investigates transactions in the local coffee markets in Ethiopia. While the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, which was established in 2008, introduced regulatory, 
institutional, and organizational innovations in the coffee market, informal norms and 
conventions remain the primary institutions governing transactions in the local markets. 
Based on a choice experiment, we found that for coffee farmers the characteristics of 
the traders are more important than the price offered when anchoring their transactions 
into personal relationships. This is, however, an institutional response of farsighted 
calculative farmers to poorly organized coffee markets and to lacking credit and 
insurance markets. Contrary to the concept of embeddedness, that claims economic 
transactions to be embedded into social relationships, social relationships are observed 
to be embedded in economic relationships. One of the perverse effects of these 
personal relationship-based transactions is that farmers are insufficiently incentivized to 
maintain and improve coffee quality. 
4.1 Introduction 
Transactions in the local markets in Ethiopia are highly personalized (Meijerink et al. 
2014; Gabre-Madhin 2001). Making impersonalized transactions without incurring 
substantial costs is hardly possible. Despite many interventions made in the past, 
personalized transactions in the local markets remain persistent and pervasive. In 
addition, these personalized transactions are confined to narrow social circle connected 
by family lineage, acquaintance, kinship and patron-client relationships (Tadesse and 
Shively 2013; Meijerink et al. 2014). This paper attempts to critically examine the 
behavioral factors underlying personalization of transactions and its implications on the 
performance of the coffee value chain. The purpose of the study is therefore to identify 
                                                 
9
 This chapter is published as: Fekadu G., S. Speelman, G. Van Huylenbroeck. 2016. Farmers’ 
marketing preferences in local coffee markets: Evidence from a choice experiment in Ethiopia. 
Food Policy 61: 92-102. 
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the behavioral attributes of traders that determine the choice of  coffee selling farmers to 
personalize their transactions.  
Three possibilities can be hypothesized. First, traders may not have any other option but 
to transact with only those whom they know. This can arise if, for instance, traders 
collude to share the market. For few dozen of socially connected traders in a given 
district markets, reaching and sustaining such ‘cartel’ agreement may not be difficult. As 
described in Section 2.3.1, traders buy unprocessed coffee which is much difficult to 
judge quality ex ante transactions. This will create information asymmetry between 
traders and farmers about the quality of coffee: the farmer knows the quality of coffee 
much better than the trader. Given this information asymmetry about the quality of 
coffee, traders will have the motive to collude not just to capture monopoly prices but to 
restrain opportunistic actions of farmers through various strategies. This provides traders 
additional incentive to collude and to sustain the collusions. Such collusion will leave 
farmers with a monopsony buyer. But here, the source of segmentation is not 
personalization. Attributes of the trader should not be important here as the decision 
problem is whether to sell or not; not to which trader to sell. In this case, the farmers 
accept the monopoly price regardless of whatever the attributes of the trader are  
The other hypothesis is that segmentation is caused by voluntary choices of farmers to 
embed their transaction to a fixed trader. Two things must be fulfilled for transactions to 
be personalized: first the transactions need to be repeated and second the repeated 
transaction need to be among the known. The issue is what embed transaction parties 
into repeated transactions. in a personalized. The first is transaction costs and risks 
associated with information and enforcement costs. These costs can arise for various 
reasons.  
One straightforward reason could be proximity. A buyer located near the transacting 
party reduce a lot of costs associated with transportation. When everyone does so, the 
transaction becomes only among the neighbors. However this gives the transaction a 
socially structured appearance, the reality is just transportation cost. This requires 
controlling other transaction cost attributes such as search cost. The other reason is a 
buyer may take opportunistic actions during the transaction. Given that the transaction is 
  
81 
 
spot-market transactions, no opportunistic actions can arise in terms of enforcement 
costs. But even then, some costs can arise due to information problems. A trader may 
do different disloyal activities during transactions: cheat the weight, under-grade the 
quality,  provide wrong information and so many other tricks. Especially in a condition 
where there is no strong rule of law, a trader may have the incentive to take advantage 
of the context in order to capture gains through disloyal activities. But such behaviors 
are usually difficult to known transaction ex ante. The seller attempt to infer it from 
observed personality attributes of the buyer. But the buyer will also signal its 
trustworthiness through different actions. Even then, attributes such as trustworthiness 
are difficult to infer. The seller will have learned through repeated transactions. The 
other problem is in a situation where markets are limited, finding a buyer may take a lot. 
In order to minimize these costs, a farmer may prefer a reliable buyer whose availability 
is known in terms of time and place. In a social environment where everyone knows 
every other and in order to limit the competitions from opportunistic buyers, the buyer 
may also discriminate loyal sellers from those who sell to opportunistic buyers. The 
reliability of trader then become a valuable attribute that incentivizes repeated 
transactions.  
The above is about markets for the product under discussion: coffee. But in addition to 
the coffee markets, markets for other products and services could be missing. Especially 
in rural areas markets are thin and many markets simply do not exist. For instance, 
credit, insurance, inputs and capital markets are generally missing. In such 
circumstances, a seller may prefer its coffee transactions with, for instance, credit 
transactions. One strategy is the seller to demonstrate its commitment through repeated 
transactions. Coupled with other mechanisms, seller’s commitment to repeated 
transaction can serve as a guarantee and a means of collecting the debt. However the 
above factors justify the preferences of a seller for repeated transaction, they cannot 
justify the preference for personalized transactions. Controlling all the above possible 
factors, a seller must prefer a socially closed buyer. 
The third hypothesis could be that all farmers in a social circle could cooperate to 
personalize their transaction with a fixed buyer. This needs a mechanism that 
incentivizes such collective actions. A buyer can do this by investing in communal 
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goods. Suppose there is no such investment. The other option is to keep the reputation 
of the community’s coffee by being strict in his quality assessment. However this is 
unlikely, we hypothesize as one possibility that should be critically assessed vis-à-vis the 
reality on the ground.  
The above potential attributes are identified as factors that can potentially determine the 
preference of farmers for alternative traders. But the preference of farmers can also vary 
depending on the personal characteristics of the subjects. For instance, a person who is 
member of a cooperative may not have preference to the various attributes as that of a 
non-member of cooperative. Similarly, a person who was cheated before may not have 
the same preference for the various attributes as the one who have had no such 
incidences. We thus expect cooperative membership, client relationship, incidence of 
cheating, and owning mobile telephone are hypothesize to explain preference 
heterogeneity among sample households.  
By giving a hypothetical context to subjects, we measure the preference of sellers 
toward each of the above attributes. Controlling all other attributes, the preference of 
sellers for a personalized transaction will be measured by social membership. Otherwise 
and given some other factors, the observed personalized transaction is a strategic 
response of farmers to different transaction cost related factors. The primary objective of 
this paper is thus to analyze the factors behind the personalized transactions taking the 
case of coffee seller farmers. It wants to identify the attributes of traders that are 
preferred by coffee seller farmers. In order to differentiate the preference of farmers to 
embed their transactions into long-term relationships from personalized relationships, we 
provide subjects a hypothetical environment where alternative traders are the same 
except in those attribute described in the choice set.  
Choice Experiment (CE) enable us to construct such choice situations. But for such 
results to be practically useful, the result of the CE need to be further assessed in 
relation to the reality on the ground. Taking coffee producers in Ethiopia as a case, the 
study thus systematically identifies important attributes of traders that are preferred by 
coffee selling farmers and assess the implications of choice results on the performance 
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of the local markets with a particular emphasis in incentivizing quality improvements and 
maintenance. 
To our knowledge, the study is the first of its kind in systematically disaggregating the 
attributes underlying the personalized transactions which is characterizing most local 
agricultural markets of sub-Sahara African and other similar countries. However some 
studies considered personalized transactions as an alternative arrangement to reduce 
transaction costs (Meijerink et al. 2014; Gabre-Madhin 2001), no study has put 
personalized transaction at the center of analysis in order to assess the behavioral 
attributes underlying personalized transactions and examine the implications on the 
efficiency of the transaction. It provides important insights constraining most rural 
communities in these countries. We believe that the study will provide important insights 
for policy interventions to improve institutional contexts. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. It starts with a brief review of 
theories surrounding informal institutions (norm-based constraints) facilitating economic 
transactions. Particularly, the paper challenges the arguments surrounding social capital 
theory. A description of the choice experiment conducted and the econometric models 
used to analyze the data is presented in the second part. The third part presents and 
discusses the results. The implications of the findings are summarized in the final part. 
4.2 Personalized transactions  
Generally, two sets of viewpoints can be identified on the roles of personalized 
transactions: social-capital theories and new institutional economics. Both theories 
accept that informal institutions of norms, codes of conducts and customs that arise from 
the personalized relationships reduce transaction costs by structuring the behavior of 
transacting parties. But they differ in important respects. The social capital theory 
conceptualizes social relationships as an important ingredient of economic relationships 
and takes their effect on economic performance as always positive; by definition, they 
are ‘capital’. New institutional economics on the other hand explicitly recognizes the 
roles social relationships play in determining economic relationships but view them, 
within the neoclassical economic theories, as institutional responses of agents to 
transaction problems.  
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Social capital theorists view personalized relationships as an important input in 
facilitating and coordinating economic transactions. They construct causal relationships 
between social relationship and economic progress (Coleman, 1988; Putnam 1993). 
Social relationships being defined as ‘capital’, their presence and denseness always 
imply better economic (and political) outcomes.  
The theory contends that individuals rapidly learn the benefit of reciprocity, loyalty, 
trustworthiness, reputation and commitment from past feedback. They thus see dense 
social networks as an important milieu where cooperative behaviors emerge and 
collective actions are coordinated. But if the dense network of social relationships is 
considered as capital, whose deployment always produce positive outcomes, societies 
of SSA countries would then be the richer in the world. Social capital theory attributes 
failures of such societies exclusively to external factors as constraining the well-
functioning of social capital (Levien 2015).  
For social relationships to produce the ‘capital’, they require a closed social structure 
that has continuity over time (Coleman 1988). The closed social structure provides the 
organizational structure and the social means to facilitate information exchange and to 
continuously observe behavioral conformities and to sanction deviations. The critical 
issue then is on its requirement of a closed social structure. The continuous social 
interactions in the closed social structure are believed to create norms of trust and 
commitment (Granovetter 1985; Ostrom 2005; Coleman 1988) and reduce information, 
monitoring and enforcement costs (Greif 1989; Stiglitz 2002). Clearly, a sustained 
interaction of people in closed social system spontaneously produces informal 
institutions structure and constrain/incentivize transacting parties. What is less clear is 
their outcomes on the economy as a whole. Portes and Landolt (2000) identified four 
important adverse effects of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on 
group members, restriction on individual freedoms and downward leveling norms. 
Precisely, these negative effects are consequential of the closed social system. Yet the 
magnitude and severity of these negative effects depend on the context (Levien 2015).  
Especially in non-market primitive societies, the situation can produce an institutional 
environment that severely impedes economic progress. It is widely recognized that 
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networks of social relationships in non-market societies are formed based on ascriptive 
ties, largely based on fixed identity traits such as family lineage, ethnic/clan 
membership, or other socially assigned statuses (Arrow 1972; Posner 1980; Granovetter 
1985; Geertz 1987; Levien 2015). When the social ecosystem is dominated by such 
identity-based fragmented social structures, economic cooperation between the rival 
factions will be difficult and costly. But the beliefs and value system that emerge from 
such closed social system will also be that that consider wealth accumulation as an 
object of greed and work as a burden (Kebede 1999) and, as Granovetter (1985) 
acknowledged, that suppress the development of private properties. The resulting 
institutions will be that that incentivize distributive rather than productive activities and 
that limit economic opportunities rather than expanding them (North 1990; Posner 1980).  
Unless one assumes a social-interest maximizing agent, its societal welfare impact can 
be adverse. Social capital can be thought as exclusive ownership of a key resource that 
provides its owner a monopolistic power. By excluding outsiders, network owners can 
earn monopoly profits. The mechanism is the same opportunistic action that is 
considered as immoral in the transactions within network members will be considered as 
natural and morally acceptable if the transaction is with outsiders. As stressed by 
Platteau (1994, 2009) and echoed by Tabellini (2008) the norms and codes of conducts 
in such social settings lack ‘generalized morality’. As a result, transaction costs outside 
the networks could be higher (Kranton 1996; Durlauf 1999). Social relationship can thus 
have negative externalities by buffering members against outside competitions (World 
Bank 2002). Thus, in geographically or ethnically fragmented societies, the situation can 
further compartmentalize the social and economic spaces into rival factions (Platteau 
1994). However this can be a fact, its appeal to generalized morality require a behavioral 
assumption that depart from self-interest. 
New institutional economists on the contrary view personalized transactions as 
institutional response of agents to transaction problems and risks. In an institutional 
environment where there are no strong formal institutions that reduce information and 
enforcement problems, agents embed their transactions in personalized relationships 
(Posner 1980; Geertz 1987; Knack and Keefer 1997; Kherallah and Kirsten 2002; Hobbs 
2003). When formal institutions that reduce information problem and enforce contracts 
  
86 
 
and property rights are weak, agents use informal institutions by embedding their 
transactions with personalized relationships. They can be thought as a strategic 
response of far-sighted calculative agents to information and enforcement problems 
(North 1990; Williamson 1993; Durlauf 1999; Portes and Landolt 2000). This line of 
argument accepts rationality and self-interest seeking behavioral assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, however with qualifications by allowing bounded rationality and 
opportunism.  
To avoid the functionalist fallacy (Granovetter 1985) of going from the observation that 
an institution arises to reduce transaction costs to the conclusion that they do (Field 
1981; Stiglitz 2002), it is important to examine as to what extent they reduce transaction 
costs and their external effects on other transactions. Comparative assessment can be 
done, at least theoretically, with other feasible institutional arrangements. 
One line of explanation provided within the neoclassical economic theory is associated 
with missing markets. In response to missing markets (such as credit and labor markets) 
agents embed bundle of exchanges (goods and credit/labor) in long term personal 
relationships. Similarly, in response to enforcement problems and by valuing future 
benefits, agents can also embed their transactions in long-term relational contracts 
(Baker et al. 2002). Shapiro (1982; 1983) show how a firm, by ‘demonstrating’ its 
commitment to quality, obtains reputation that will enable it to capture long-term gains in 
the form of price premiums. When the information feedback is efficient, this can lead to 
an efficient outcome. But it can also lead to what Banerjee (1992) called ‘herd behavior’ 
– a behavioral pattern that arises when decision makers, instead of using their own 
information, follow the decision of others. He showed that such behavioral patterns lead 
to a socially inefficient outcome. 
Setting aside the internal efficiency of personalized transactions and its behavioral 
consistency, transactions need to go outside the social border if the community has to 
integrate with the rest of society. As Menard (2005) mentioned, ‘…all [transactions] have 
to go through or be confronted to markets at some point”. In such groups, incentivizing 
trustworthiness and conformity will be easier. For the personalized markets to effectively 
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perform, the nature of the transaction needs to be fully personalized all along the value 
chain.  
Complex transactions that go beyond the boundaries of dense networks of kith and kin 
require impersonal and impartial formal institutions that effectively enforce property 
rights and contracts (North 1990). According to North (1993) and World Bank (2002) in 
order for village markets to be effectively integrated with higher level markets, the 
informal institutions need to be replaced by formal institutions. Even though both 
informal and formal institutions coexist in advanced market economies, the development 
of formal institutions is seen as crucial (Fafchamps 2004). Hakey (1988) take the issue 
further to show the crucial roles of institutions that promote the formation of what he calls 
‘extended order’ - as opposed to relationship confined within the kith and kin - as the 
foundation of Western civilizations. In a similar way and contrary to the cooperative 
game theory that predicts cooperation tends to be successful in repeated game played 
among small and known players, Seabright (2004) in his book ‘the company of 
strangers’ provides excellent historical accounts on how transaction with strangers 
expanded economic opportunities in the western world. 
Human motivation is much more complex than described by the rationality as 
maximizing individual utility (RMIU) model described in the mainstream economics (Vatn 
2009) . The complexity arise not because human being has a different motive other than 
maximizing utility, but on the way of our understanding of it. The difficulty is we know 
little on how the complex factors shape the way human agency maximizes individual 
utility. The fact that players in ultimatum or dictator games were found to offer positive 
value, however can be a sufficient evidence to reject the narrowly framed utility 
maximization model, it is not sufficient to conclude that the motive of subjects is different 
from self-interest. 
Generally, primordial social relationships are established around narrow and fixed 
identity traits such as family lineage, clan membership and the like (Greif 1994). When 
market opportunities arise, the transaction will be embedded into the existing informal 
institutions regardless of the institutional arrangement the transaction specifically 
demands. Since these institutions have not evolved within a complex market, they are 
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likely to accommodate only few transactions even if many transaction opportunities exist 
out there. Thus, individuals in such institutional environment will either cut the shoe to fit 
with the small leg provided by the informal institutions or pick those shoes that fit only 
the small leg. The cumulative outcome will be that economic opportunities will be narrow 
and their outcome sub-optimal. Since competition is likely to be low in such identity-
based networks, a sub-optimal transaction will continue to persists. It also closes the 
possibility for the development of efficient formal institutions that widen the economic 
spaces of a vast majority of members. 
The informal institutions that emerge in market-based societies will be different. There 
are different possibilities. First, people after repeated transactions may develop social 
relationships to expand their economic activities. In this case, since the resulting norm is 
the product of the transactions, the emerging norm will be naturally transaction-
compatible because only when members develop suitable norms through repeated 
economic transactions, the social relationships comes to scale economic cooperation up 
the transaction to a higher level. The other alternative is individual can embed with the 
existing social relationships. Unlike the case in primordial organizations, individuals form 
social networks in such economies through self-selections. Members are likely to remain 
in the network as long as they willingly demonstrate the expected behavioral patterns. 
The institutional arrangement will likely to be incentive compatible and efficient. Given 
the competitive pressure in the system, the development of the network is contingent 
upon development of strong norms of cooperation, trust, and commitment that are 
implicit in the social capital theorists. It may be due to this fact that while empirical 
evidence about positive benefits of social capital in market economies are relatively 
large, they remained scanty in non-market societies (Działek 2014). 
One of the argument in favor of informal institutions is based on their exclusive role in 
handling some transactions that can hardly be handled by formal institutions. For many 
(largely for technology) reasons, some transactions can still be better handled by 
informal institutions. But this argument cannot automatically call for deliberate actions for 
their preservations. Due to the complementarity nature of institutions, the performance of 
informal institutions can be contingent upon the presence of alternative efficient formal 
institutions.  
  
89 
 
In an environment where formal institutions are weak or missing, the informal institutions 
may tend to be less efficient, biased and unfair. In addition, the evolution of informal 
institutions can also be shaped by the evolution of formal institutions and vice versa. 
Unfortunately, empirical evidences on the systematic effect of formal institutions on 
informal institutions and vice versa is scanty. A recent study by Melesse (2015) found 
that introduction of a costly legal fallback induced the decision of customary judges to be 
closer to the formal law. Similarly, Baker (2013) finds some reinforcement between 
informal and formal justice system in Ethiopia. 
The adoption of legal plurality in Ethiopia was a response to inefficiency and limited 
capacity of formal legal system and seems to improve justice within localities, the 
formalization of customary justice principles would also mean incentivizing transactions 
to be limited within locality. In a country where about sixty distinct customary law 
systems exist (Baker 2013), formalizing customary institutions, in strict sense, mean 
imposing some barriers on domestic trade. This coupled with the infrastructural, 
technological, political (ethnic-based Federalism), trading within the country becomes  
like ‘international trade’. It somehow constrain the development of value chain and other 
forms of hybrid governance structures that necessarily goes beyond the locals. In such 
institutional contexts, the existing thin market tend to persist even if they may not be 
conducive for economic progress.  
Thus the limitations of informal institutions is not just their inability to expand the scale, 
scope and complexity of exchanges. They also impede the potentials for the 
development of formal institutions. The pervasive functioning of informal institutions 
systematically foreclose the development of efficient formal institutions.  
The paper thus attempts to identify what is behind personalized transactions. Do farmers 
embed their transactions in a personalized relationship because the social network 
provides the appropriate institutional structure as the social capital theorists claim? Or is 
it just an institutional response of farmers to transaction problems: missing markets, 
information and enforcement problems? What are the implications of their preference for 
institutional intervention? 
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4.3 The data and the design of the experiment 
Data was collected from 227 coffee selling farmers from the Oromia region in Ethiopia. 
First  two zones were selected: East Hararghe and West Hararghe. Then two districts 
were purposively drawn from each administrative zone based on their volume of coffee 
production. Subsequently, within each district, two Peasant Administrations (PAs) were 
randomly selected from the coffee producing PAs. Finally, 26-31 coffee producer 
farmers from each PA were randomly drawn, with replacement10, in proportion to the 
relative size of their population. Then eight trained enumerators interviewed the farmers 
using structured questionnaire containing the choice sets, socio-economic 
characteristics of households and other relevant questions. In addition, two supervisors 
for each zone were also recruited to closely supervise the data collection. 
In this research, we use a choice experiment to reveal the preferences of coffee selling 
farmers for characteristics of local coffee traders in Eastern Ethiopia. Data about choice 
decisions of farmers can be obtained from revealed preference or stated preference 
data. While revealed preference data  have the advantage of capturing actual choice 
decisions, important variables that are driving the decisions might remain unobservable. 
Therefore a stated choice experiment is used here. One of the appealing features of 
choice experiments, given their limitations, is they offer control over many variables that 
no real life observations can give. It provides us freedom to include attributes that would 
otherwise be difficult to observe or combinations that are missing in the real markets 
(Carson et al. 1994) including the context under which the choice is made (McFadden 
1986; Jaeger and  Rose  2008).  
In order to identify relevant attributes and their levels, a preliminary survey and pre-test 
were executed. Based on the feedback from this survey and in view of the purpose of 
the study, the following 7 attributes were selected (see appendix for a template of the 
choice profile):  
                                                 
10
 Every peasant administration has full list of households living in the areas. We used this list as a sampling frame. 
When the randomly selected farmer was found to have no sufficient coffee trees, he/she would be replaced by the 
next person on the list taken. 
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1. Additional price on top of the prevailing market price - 0; 1; 2 and 3 Birr per kg of 
dried coffee cherries. This is respectively 0; 4; 8 and 12 percent higher than the 
current average market price of 25 birr/kg (1.2 USD/Kg) for dried coffee cherries.  
2. Trustworthiness:  a binary variable indicating whether the buyer/trader is trusted 
both in his words and actions or not. This refers to providing correct market 
information and correctly measuring quantity and quality (through inspection).  
3. Strictness of the trader in assessing quality:  a binary variable indicating whether 
the buyer trader was strict in the sense that he/she meticulously examine the 
quality of the coffee or not.; 
4. Social relationship: a binary variable comprising that the trader is member of the 
farmer’s social group (family, clan/ethnic, and other social groups) or not; 
5. Location: a binary variable representing if the buyer is buying in the village or 
outside of the village;  
6. Reliability of the trader:  a binary variable indicating whether the trader is 
permanently available for purchase or is an opportunistic buyer and 
7. Dependability of the trader: again a binary variable reflecting whether the buyer is 
easy in helping the farmer in time of social and economic crisis or not.  
Once the attributes and their levels are identified an appropriate design should be 
constructed. This involves combining the attribute levels in choice profiles (or 
alternatives) and  grouping the profiles in choice cards. In this way, information can be 
collected in the most efficient way and the reliability of the parameter estimates can be 
improved (Carson et al., 1994).  Minimizing D-error (D-optimality)11 is the most common 
way to construct efficient linear choice designs (Carson et al. 1994; Zwerina et al. 1996; 
Rose et al. 2008; Louviere et al. 2010). Following Kuhfeld (2010), for this study, a 
computer generated fractional factorial design was obtained. A potential problem of 
choice experiment is that subjects, instead of considering the trade-offs between all 
attribute that characterize the alternatives, consider a subset of attributes, ignoring the 
differences in other attributes (Hensher et al. 2005; Collins et al. 2013). Several studies 
found that respondents can evaluate trade-offs between a limited combination of 
                                                 
11
 D-efficiency – is a criteria used to measure the efficiency of the design by maximizing the determinant of the 
Fisher information matrix (Johnson et al., 2006).
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attributes at a time (Bunch et al. 1996; Lagarde 2013; Collins, et al., 2013). Therefore to 
simplify the choice tasks, we impose as a restriction to our design that randomly 2 to 4 
attributes should stay constant across alternatives within a choice set. In any choice 
contexts, alternatives naturally do not completely differ.  
Accordingly, an efficient and balanced design with a D-efficiency of 43% was generated 
with 32 choice sets of 2 alternatives. Furthermore, to reduce cognitive burden, the 32 
choice sets were randomly blocked into two blocks of 16 choice sets. Consequently, a 
total of 3632 choice observations (227 times 16) were obtained. Bekker-Grob et al. 
(2010) also found that inclusion of a brand name significantly reduces the attention of 
respondents for the attributes. Therefore this study uses generic alternatives. Finally, an 
opt-out option was added to each choice set. The inclusion of an opt-out helps: (1) to 
mimic the real market context and avoid violation of the Independence of Irrelevant 
Attributes (IIA)12; (2) to estimate potential market penetration (Carson et al. 1994; 
Haaijer et al. 2001) and (3) to increase the efficiency of the design (Brazell et al. 2006). 
We included ‘none’ option to minimize violation of IIA associated with forced choice. One 
of the possible problems of including this alternative is that subjects tend to choose 
‘none’ as a soft means of avoiding the cognitive burden when they face difficult choices 
(Carson et al. 1994; Haaijer et al. 2001).  
Detail description of each level was provided to enumerators. In addition, concise local 
terms were used in local language to precisely describe each level. For instance, 
farmers use terms such as ‘our person’ or ‘my person’ to describe social relatedness to 
a person. Similar languages were used to specify all other attribute levels as precisely 
as possible. Furthermore, in order to help respondents imagine each attribute 
independent of the others and to enable them to properly evaluate the trade-offs, 
enumerators provided brief explanations to each respondent about the attributes by 
using the written context description prepared for the purpose. 
                                                 
12
 IIA – implies addition or deletion of an alternative doesn’t change the ratio of choice probabilities of alternatives 
(Carson, et al. 1994). In generic alternative, inclusion of ‘none’ make the choice complete so that violation of IIA 
will not be an issue. 
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4.4 Choice modeling: Multinomial logit and latent class specifications 
The theoretical foundation of choice experiments is random utility theory. The models 
were originally developed to analyze the choice preferences of consumers. But they can 
also be used to analyze the preference of farmers as sellers see e.g. Roe et al., 2004; 
Blandon et al., 2009. The data obtained through CEs have traditionally been analyzed 
using multinomial logit (MNL) models (e.g. Lusk et al. 2003). In discrete probabilistic 
models, an individual's utility is represented by systematic and random components 
(Manski 1977). The multinomial logit estimates an individual’s utility (Adamowicz et al. 
1998; Lusk et al. 2003) as: 
𝑈𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
The utility that the decision maker i obtains from alternative j in choice situation t is 
decomposed into (1) a part labeled 𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 that is observed by the researcher, and (2) an 
unknown part 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 which captures variations in choice due to within- and between-
individual variance, omitted variables and measurement errors (Batsell and Louviere, 
1991) and which is treated by the researcher as random.  
The probability that a decision-maker i chooses alternative j in choice situation t is 
𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 > 𝑉𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑖𝑡    ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 ) 
      = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡−𝑉𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 > 𝜀𝑘𝑖𝑡    ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 ) 
Assuming that the systematic utility component 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is a linear function of the attributes 
and follows a generalized regression specification leads to: 
𝑉𝑗 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑗1 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑗2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑛𝑁 = 1, 2, … 𝑛 
where 𝑋𝑗𝑛 is the n
th attribute value for alternative j  and 𝛽𝑛 is a vector of preference 
parameters associated with the nth attribute of the jth alternative. 
The above specification assumes that all respondents share the same preferences for 
each attribute. Although the socio-cultural settings in our sample seem to be more or 
less homogenous, slight differences in institution-related variables can exert significant 
impacts on the preferences of farmers. To capture preference heterogeneity, a latent 
  
94 
 
class approach classifies respondents into relatively homogenous groups. Through a 
latent segment classification mechanism, the membership likelihood function determines 
the latent segment to which an individual belongs (Swait 1994). This segmentation uses 
information about the respondents and their decision context: socio-demographic, 
psychographic characteristics of decision makers as well as their sensitivity to the 
relevant attributes of the choice object (Swait 1994).  
Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) developed a model that jointly estimates the latent class 
segment membership and the choice preferences. That is, individual i’s choice among J 
alternatives at choice situation t given that individual i is in class c is the one with 
maximum utility, where the utility functions are (Greene 2005) 
𝑈𝑗𝑖𝑡|𝑐 = 𝛽𝑐
′𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑈𝑗𝑖𝑡|𝑐 = utility of alternative j to individual i in class c in choice situation t 
𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 = union of all attributes that appear in all utility function  
𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 = unobserved heterogeneity for individual I and alternative j in choice situation t 
𝛽𝑐
′ = class specific parameter vector 
Within the class, choice probabilities are assumed to be generated by the multinomial 
logit model given by 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐) =
exp (𝛽𝑐
′𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛽𝑐′𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
Class probabilities are specified by the multinomial logit form, 
𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐) = 𝑄𝑖𝑐 =
exp(𝜃𝑐
′𝑍𝑖)
∑ exp(𝜃𝑐′𝑍𝑖)
𝐶
𝑐=1
, 𝜃𝑐 = 0 
where 𝑍𝑖 is preference heterogeneity explanatory variables which are situation invariant 
characteristics. 
The joint probability of a specific choice of an individual is the expected value (over 
classes) of the class specific probabilities (Green 2005) 
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𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑐) [
exp (𝛽𝑐
′𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛽𝑐′𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
]
𝐶
𝑐=1
 
The latent class model thus is the product of the conditional distribution (probability 
farmer’s choice conditional on being in a specific segment) and the probability of being 
in a segment where the segments are the finite analogue to the random parameters 
distributions (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). This model allows choice attribute data and 
individual consumer characteristics to simultaneously explain choice behavior.  
4.5 Result and discussions 
The following two sections describe and discuss the results. The first part is intended to 
provide a brief picture of the choice context and the characteristics of the sample 
households. It describes the attributes that are examined in the choice experiment and 
the variables that are hypothesized to explain the preference heterogeneity of sample 
farmers. The second section discusses the model results. 
4.5.1 Descriptive results 
Before analyzing the choice experiment data, it is interesting to look at the 
socioeconomic characteristics and actual selling decisions of farmers. Table 4.1 
describes the socio-economic characteristics of sample respondents. Of the total sample 
respondents of 227 households, 205 (90%) of the respondents were male. The average 
of the respondent was about 35 years with a minimum of 17 and a maximum of 70. The 
average size of households was 6.6 of which 3.6 are male and 3.0 are female. On 
average a farmer owned 420 coffee trees with 12% of the farmer having less than 100 
trees and about 5% of farmers having greater than 1000 coffee trees. The average land 
size per household was found to be 0.87 hectares. The productivity of coffee is small. 
While the average productivity per tree for dried and red cherries is 0.9 and 1.9 kg, 
respectively, the average productivity per hectare is 1023.3 and 1592.5 kg. The average 
local market price was found to be 45.2, 30.6 and 102.6 Birr per kg for the dried 
cherries, red cherries and green coffee beans respectively. While there seems to be 
price variation among farmers, this was not the difference in terms of quality or other 
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attributes but difference in the timing of their sales. If we take the prices at a given point 
in time and marketplace, the price is generally uniform.   
Table 4.1 Description of household characteristics 
Variables N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Age of respondent 227 34.5 10. 17 70 
Male household members 227 3.6 1.7 0 10.0 
Female household members 227 3.0 1.7 0 9.0 
Land size 227 0.87 0.7 0.1 5.0 
Number of coffee trees 227 420.4 428.18 52 3500 
Productivity of dried cherries kg/tree 186 0.9 1.1 0.0 7.4 
Productivity of red cherries kg/tree 40 1.9 2.0 0.1 7.5 
Productivity of dried cherries kg/ha 186 1023.3 1111.8 20.0 9600.0 
Productivity of red cherries kg/ha 40 1592.5 1470.1 60.0 7200.0 
Local price of dried cherries Birr/Kg 186 45.2 26.5 30 50 
Local price of red cherries Birr/Kg 40 30.6 9.4 20 40 
Local price of green beans Birr/Kg 195 102.6 10.1 75 120 
Farmers in the study area can sell their coffee to assemblers in their village, primary 
cooperatives or to local traders (also called suppliers as they supply coffee to central 
market). But not all options are available to all sample farmers.  
Of the 198 farmers who already sold their coffee by the time the survey was made, 
about 59 percent reported that they sold their produce to village assemblers (Table 4.2) 
who in turn sell to suppliers. So although the local market suppliers are accessible in 
most of the sample PAs, a large proportion of farmers sell their produce to village 
assemblers. 
In addition, farmers were asked to identify the reason for their outlet choice. For this, the 
seven attributes of the choice experiment were considered. Price, trustworthiness, and 
dependability of the trader were found to be the most important attributes for about 71% 
of the farmers. The remaining 29% reported the presence of close social relationships, 
reliability and village membership as the main reasons for their outlet choice. 
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Table 4.2 Distributions of choices of farmers on selected institutional parameters 
Description Levels Freq. per cent 
Selling decision  In the village 106 59.2 
Outside village 92 40.5 
Primary reasons for outlet choice  Price 49 27.7 
Social relationship 16 9.0 
Reliability 16 9.0 
Trust 47 26.6 
Dependability 29 16.4 
Within village 7 4.0 
Other reasons 13 7.3 
Clientelization Yes 144 63.4 
 No 82 36.6 
Degree of client-relationship 
Never sell to others 97 67.4 
Rarely sell to others 20 13.9 
Sometimes sell to others 27 18.8 
Social relationship 
Social group member 40 27.8 
Family member 10 6.9 
Outsider 94 65.3 
Cooperative membership 
Yes 80 35.2 
No 147 64.8 
Incidence of cheating 
Yes 54 23.8 
No 167 76.3 
Mobile access 
Yes 91 40.1 
No 136 59.9 
The degree of clientelization in the study area was observed to be high. About 63 % of 
the farmers have a clientship with a particular trader. The fact that 67% of the 
respondents reports that they ‘never’ sell to other traders (Table 4.2) suggests that this 
relationship is strong. Of the remaining respondents, 19% and 14% reported 
respectively to sell ‘rarely’ and ‘sometimes’ to other traders. 
Contrary to the expectation that clientships are established with socially closely related 
individuals, it is found that about 65% of these relationships were made with individuals 
outside the own social group (family, clan, ethnic or any other social group). Only 28% of 
the farmers established such relationship with members of the same social group and 
even less (7%) with family members. These results seem to be in contradiction with the 
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social capital theory that emphasizes the role of social relationship in economic 
relationships (e.g. Coleman 1988; Grootaert 1998).  
Of the total number of respondents, 35.2% were found to be member of cooperatives. 
But unlike cooperative unions, most primary cooperatives are weak and only work as 
buying centers of their cooperative unions. Finally, access to mobile phone and 
incidence of cheating were found to be 23.7% and 40.1%, respectively 
Table 4.3 Reasons for establishing relational contract 
Attributes Freq. Per cent 
Price 16 11.1 
Social group member 9 6.3 
Trusted 72 50.0 
Dependable during crisis 39 27.1 
Reliable buyer 8 5.6 
Finally, farmers were asked why they stick to a specific trader for transactions. From the 
farmers who sell their coffee to a specific buyer, 50% indicated that trustworthiness was 
an important attribute for choosing the trader (Table 4.3) while 21% of them rated 
dependability of the trader in times of economic crisis as their main attribute and 11 
percent reported price. Finally, reliability and social relationships were each identified as 
important attributes by 6 percent of farmers. In a similar study, Tadesse and Shively 
(2013) found that farmers, instead of embedding economic relationships into social 
relationships, they anchor their client relationship after repeated tests for 
trustworthiness. Their findings implied that incidence of cheating can determine the 
preference of farmers for alternative traders. Of the total 219  respondents, 23.7% 
claimed to have been cheated in the past by traders.  
4.5.2 Results from the choice experiment 
Using choice experiment data first a traditional Multinomial Logit model was estimated. 
In addition, a Latent Class model was run. Based on the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), an LCM with four latent classes was 
selected. 
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5.2.2.1 Results of MLM 
The estimation results of the multinomial logit model show that the selected attributes 
(trustworthiness, strictness, social relationship, village membership, reliability, and 
dependability) all are significant determinants of the choice of farmers for a particular 
trader (Table 4.4). A farmer thus considers many transaction attributes, in addition to 
price, when he/she decides to choose a particular buyer. 
The expectation was that buyers who are trustworthy, reliable, dependable, not strict, 
members of the same social group and  living in the same village would be preferred. 
Except for the result concerning the strictness attribute, the results are consistent with 
this expectation.  
The significance of price is straightforward: sellers were found to prefer a trader that 
offers a price higher than the prevailing market price. Trustworthiness of the trader (as 
perceived by the farmers) was also found to be a significant determinant of the choice. 
In a market characterized by information problems, farmers rely on their personal 
judgment and on their experience with the trustworthiness of traders in providing market 
information, in measuring the quality and quantity and in keeping promises and 
complying with contracts. Since objective quality measurement is absent at the local 
market levels, the honesty of the trader in providing genuine quality assessment is a 
crucial behavioral attribute for the farmers. In sum, a buyer is considered to be 
trustworthy if what he/she does and says is credible. The results indicate that farmers 
prefer to deal with trustworthy traders.  
Another important determinant of the preference of farmers was the presence of a social 
relationship. Unlike in the impersonalized markets, economic relationships in local 
markets are expected to be embedded in some sort of social relationships. The results 
of the MNL shows that the presence of social relationship has a significant effect on the 
preference of farmers. 
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Table 4.4 Latent class estimation results of sample coffee seller-farmers 
Utility parameters 
MLM 
LCM   
Class I Class II Class III Class IV 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
Price .442*** 14.9 9.64** 2.25 0.21 0.53 .50*** 2.95 1.63*** 4.14 
Trust .526*** 15.3 7.20 0.00 .51** 2.36 .94*** 7.53 .76** 2.19 
Quality assessment .724*** 18.7 68.55 0.00 .74*** 4.34 .93*** 6.01 .39** 2.34 
Social relation .132*** 3.8 4.50 0.00 0.14 0.72 -0.02 -0.15 .39** 2.24 
Location .392*** 10.9 2.05 1.05 0.43 1.33 .78*** 3.67 .52* 1.88 
Reliability  .239*** 6.8 18.69 0.01 .44*** 2.79 .49*** 3.41 -0.32 -0.96 
Dependability (during social 
and economic crisis) 
.450*** 14.2 26.29** 2.46 0.015 0.1 1.13*** 7.9 .46*** 2.67 
Constant 
  
0.77 0.42 0.94 0.54 2.59 1.52 0  
Cooperative membership 
  
-1.56 -0.72 -3.59* -1.85 -3.56* -1.67 0  
Being cheated 
  
-36.29 0 -3.43 -1.07 -3.21** -2.09 0  
Have specific client 
  
0.35 0.23 1.84 1.34 1.35 1.25 0  
Have mobile telephone 
  
1.29 0.48 2.91 0.99 1.89 0.8 0  
Average class probabilities 
  
7.6% 23.3% 51.8% 17.4% 
Number of obs. 3152 3152   
Log likelihood function -1378.3 -574.73   
AIC 2770.6 1235.5   
BIC 
  
-1299.9   
R-sqrdAdj (Constants only ) 0.288 0.702   
Note: ***, **, and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
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Another attribute considered was the dependability of the trader in times of economic 
and social crisis. The positive and highly significant coefficient of this attribute indicate 
that farmers prefer a dependable trader. Mujawamariya et al. (2013) found long-term 
relationships with a trader in other transactions such as credit and consumption goods 
as a significant determinant in the choice of coffee farmers for alternative buyers. Coffee 
traders provide farmers with various types of support especially when their client-farmers 
face economic and social crises. This transaction resembles the gift exchange of 
primitive society (Kranton 1996; Dorward et al. 2009 and Ponser 1980). The norm is that 
if a farmer has requested a trader for some help or accepted some gifts from him/her, he 
has implicitly agreed to sell his/her coffee to that trader. From the traders’ point of view, 
the gift exchanges are a strategic response to future market risks; from the farmers’ 
point of view, it appears an adaptive response to the missing financial markets and legal 
protections.  
Table 4.5 Average marginal effects of multinomial logit estimation 
Utility parameters Coeff. z 
Price 0.006* 1.82 
Trust 0.094*** 16.07 
Quality assessment 0.129*** 21.9 
Social relation 0.029*** 5.05 
Buying in the village 0.055*** 9.52 
Reliability  0.046*** 7.92 
Dependability (during social and economic crisis) 0.079*** 13.52 
Note: ***, **, and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Finally, traders are expected to differ in their strictness in quality assessment style. 
Some traders are strict and meticulous in measuring quality before they decide to buy 
coffee at a particular price while others rely more on the words of the farmers and hence 
make little assessments. In the MNL regression, strictness in quality assessment was 
found to strongly and significantly determine the preference of farmers for alternative 
traders. The positive sign of the variable implies that farmers prefer a ‘strict’ trader to a 
‘non-strict’ one. The expectation would be that a rational seller prefers a ‘non-strict’ 
trader to ‘strict’ one. Our result thus seems to deviate from the self-interest rational 
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behavioral assumption held in mainstream economics. In the discussion section, we 
analyze this result in more detail and try to explain its meanings and implications. 
As presented in Table 4.5, the average marginal effect of the attributes ranges between 
0.006 and 0.129. Contrary to our expectation, price plays a relatively smaller role in 
affecting choice decisions of farmers, while strictness in quality assessment plays a 
relatively much greater role. For instance, a trader that offers one birr additional price (a 
4% higher than the market price) is 0.6 percent more likely to be chosen than a trader 
that offered the market price. Similarly, a trader who is strict in quality assessment is 13 
percent more likely to be chosen than a trader who is less strict.  
5.2.2.2 Results of LCM 
The multinomial logit model assumes that respondents have homogeneous preferences. 
But in reality, the preference may vary. To capture this, an LCM was estimated. While 
the LCM provide a microscopic view of the preferences of the different group of 
respondents (grouped according to their preference homogeneity), the MNL provide a 
macroscopic view of the preference of respondents in general. In other words, while the 
LCM show which attributes are important to which group, the MNL shows which 
attributes are important for the study areas in general. A four-class model was found to 
fit the data best. In this model 7.6%, 23.3%, 51.8% and 17.4% of the sample households 
belong to class I to IV, respectively.  
Members of the first class, which is limited in size, appear to rely on only two attributes 
in their choice decisions: price and dependability. Trustworthiness of traders, strictness 
of traders in assessing quality, location, reliability, and social relationship do not 
significantly determine the decision for this class. This class of farmers chooses a trader 
on demonstrated behavioral patterns. We can call this group of farmers as self-
interested but miss some markets. Their preference for reciprocal relationships might be 
a response to the missing capital and insurance markets. They could easily enter into 
impersonalized markets if these market constraints are removed. For the farmers of 
class 2, trustworthiness, strictness, and reliability were found to significantly determine 
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the choice. Price, social relationships, village membership and dependability, on the 
other hand, were found to be insignificant. These farmers seem to prefer to transact with 
an honest, trusted and reliable trader. They seem to be committed to forgo short-term 
economic gains to build long-term relationships with a reputable trader. They also did 
not show preference with respect to social group or location. As long as the trader is 
ethically reputable, they are willing to make impersonalized transactions. We call them 
reputation-oriented agents. 
About half of the sample, farmers belong to class III. Again social relationships were 
found to be an insignificant attribute. All other attributes nevertheless were found to be 
significant determinants of their choice. This group of farmers takes into account many 
attributes in their decisions. We can call these farmers self-interested and sophisticated 
agents. Contrary to embeddedness argument, they have no special preference for social 
group members.  
Finally, the remaining 17% of the respondents belongs to class IV. For this class of 
farmers, all attributes except reliability were found to be significant determinants of their 
choice. What makes this class of farmers different from the above is that in addition to 
economically relevant attributes, they also value the social relationships. They seem to 
have no problem in finding a buyer. But they also prefer to limit their transactions within 
their social group. They may be less responsive to institutional interventions intended to 
create impersonalized transactions. We call these group of farmers sophisticated but 
closed.  
Four variables were hypothesized to determine the preference heterogeneities of the 
respondents: cooperative membership, clientship, incidences of cheating and access to 
mobile telephone. While cooperative membership was found to be a significant 
determinant of preference heterogeneity of farmers of class II and III, incidences of 
cheating was found to be a significant determinant of class III only. The negative signs 
for both variables indicate that non-members of cooperatives and those with no 
incidence of cheating are more likely to belong to the respective classes. Contrary to the 
expectation, preference heterogeneity among farmers could not be explained by 
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difference in access to mobile telephone or clientele relationships . Table 4.6 presents 
the profile of respondents across the classes.  
Table 4.6 Profile of respondents of the different classes 
Variable 
 
Class I Class II Class III Class IV 
Zone 
West Hararghe 1.7 12.0 74.4 12.0 
East Hararghe 16.7 42.9 26.2 14.3 
Sex 
Female 0.0 20.0 65.0 15.0 
Male 8.8 25.4 53.0 12.7 
Education 
Illiterate 7.8 27.0 54.8 10.4 
Literate 8.1 22.1 53.5 16.3 
Wealth status 
Rich 0.0 18.8 68.8 12.5 
Medium 8.4 25.9 52.4 13.3 
Poor 10.5 21.1 57.9 10.5 
No. of coffee tree 
 
256 273 561 447 
Family size 
 
7.8 6.7 6.5 6.8 
Coffee land size   0.18 0.23 0.39 0.32 
In addition to the above preference heterogeneity variables, we also assess class 
membership of farmers against some socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents. 
We find difference in class membership of farmers between West Hararghe and East 
Hararghe. While majority of farmers (74.4%) in East Haraghe tend to be in the class III, 
large proportion of farmers in West Hararghe tend to fall in class II (Table 4.6). This may 
be due to that the level of market access and the complexity of social environment is 
better in the sample districts drawn from West Hararghe. We find little differences in the 
class distribution among female and male. The same is for the distribution between 
literate and illiterate respondents. Concerning those farmers with large number of coffee 
trees and hence more production tend to be in class III and class IV. The sophistication 
of farmers to combine diverse attributes of traders in choice thus increase as the stake 
increases with the volume of the transactions. A similar pattern is observed for land size. 
Concerning the wealth status measured in terms of self-identification, the rich seems to 
differ in the distribution of class from the rest of farmers. Finally, regarding the family 
size, those will large family size tend to be more in class I than the rest of others. 
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4.6 Discussion of key findings 
Overall subjects were found to conform to our priori expectations for all attributes except 
strictness of trader. Contrary to our priori expectation, all except class I, were 
consistently found to prefer a trader who strictly assesses quality. The fact that a farmer 
chooses a strict trader implies that he is willing to commit the resources that maintain 
quality requirements. This actually contradicts the basic behavioral assumptions. 
Moreover, this result will have important implications in quality issue. It is, therefore, 
important to assess if there exist circumstances that can incentivize farmers to prefer a 
strict trader to a less strict trader.  
Four possible explanations will be discussed. One explanation can be the reputation 
effect that emerges in repeated transactions discussed in Shapiro (1982; 1983) and 
McCluskey and Loureiro (2005) and Carriquiry and Babcock. (2007). The idea is that 
farmers may want to demonstrate their commitment to quality and may prefer a trader 
that values individual commitments. This can make sense if traders can measure 
individual commitments, at least ex-post of the transaction. But as explained above, the 
current transaction condition is such that a trader collects coffee from many farmers 
each selling very small quantities. Given that traders buy dried cherries (not coffee 
beans), it is difficult to measure quality ex ante. In addition the hulling will be made in 
bulk, making almost impossible even to trace quality problems much less measuring the 
commitments of individual farmers for quality ex-post of the transaction.  
The second possibility is that when farmers in a given location collectively build 
reputations, the reputation could be translated into a price premium and reliable market. 
Farmers may simultaneously believe that choosing a less strict trader will encourage 
some farmers to take opportunistic actions that will eventually damage potential benefits 
of building collective reputations. But such shared-belief cannot emerge in a vacuum. 
The majority of farmers can theoretically agree on its potential benefits. But this idea can 
become shared-belief only when it is deeply entrenched in the mind of the majority. It is 
not enough for the majority to share the belief, the ‘shared-belief’ has to be transformed 
into an effective norm in order to influence behavioral patterns. Such a norm comes 
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about after continuous reconfirmation and reproduction through strategic acts of market 
players (Aoki 2007). The transaction being personal, there is no strategic game that 
binds farmers and that provide them the incentive to monitor conformity to the belief. 
Owing to the nature of the commodity (dried coffee cherries), it is difficult for a trader to 
measure quality during the transaction. Neither it is easy to trace individual quality 
problems even after the transaction. Therefore not only identifying defectors and 
metering levels of defections is very difficult, but the overall social environment also 
makes collective action on defectors unlikely. Even if nested social networks exist at the 
village level, their role in coordinating collective action is quite limited. In effect, 
cooperation in economic matters is weak in the area. Thus collective actions theorized 
by Ostrom (1998; 2005) and others seems implausible. Such collective actions may be 
possible if the transactions were organized collectively as in marketing cooperative.  
The other proposition may be the one used to explain the spontaneous emergence of 
traffic convention – when the majority sticks to the right-hand side of the road, it is 
rational for others to follow (Hodgson, 1998). Likewise, when a farmer maintains quality 
(say for a reason of reciprocity), others may follow the trend provided that they find 
conforming individually beneficial or deviating costly. Unlike the traffic, the actions of 
farmers are unobservable, there is no reference point to measure deviations and thus 
one can act opportunistically without being detected by other farmers. Even in the case 
of traffic, the convention may create order at the beginning, but in the course of time and 
at some points, traffic rules are necessary to sustain the order (Schotter, 1981). The 
fourth explanation is that farmers actually prefer the not-strict trader but they pretend to 
conform to the shared belief. Even if farmers may well understand the collective benefits 
of choosing a strict trader, they may still find it costly to conform to it in a situation where 
prices are more or less uniform and in a condition where they cannot be sure that others 
will also conform. Instead, everyone may prefer to capture some gains by choosing a 
trader that allows opportunistic actions. In this situation, they should prefer the ‘not strict’ 
trader. But when they are asked to state their preference, they may not feel comfortable 
to openly express opinions that are against the shared belief. Instead, they may prefer to 
pretend to conform. Moreover, respondents may think that choosing a ‘not-strict’ trader 
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can create a bad self-image. In addition to the assumed shared belief, other factors can 
also compel farmers to pretend to conform. The actual context in the area is that 
government and non-governmental organizations highly insist farmers in every occasion 
to improve export earnings by ensuring and improving coffee quality. Rural people in the 
country might perceive all elites, including enumerators as government actors. Thus, 
instead of revealing their true preference, they may tell what they think the interviewer 
would like them to say. We believe this is the most likely explanation for the result 
obtained.  
Maintaining and improving the quality of coffee and ensuring compliance with 
international food safety requirements is crucial to maintaining the sustainability of 
agricultural trade and to upkeep better terms of trade (World Bank, 2000). But quality 
problem remains the main challenge of agricultural markets in general and of the coffee 
markets in particular (Dadi et al. 1992; Gebremeskel et al. 1998; Gabre-Madhin and 
Goggin 2005; Bitzer et al. 2008; Gabre-Medhin 2009; Musebe et al. 2011). 
Since the quality of coffee is a function of all pre- and post-harvest activities (Bertrand et 
al. 2006; Vaast et al. 2006; Wintgens 2009; Sualeh et al. 2014;), maintaining and 
improving it involves substantial resources. In situations where the local markets do not 
incentivize quality, farmers may be reluctant to invest their time and energy to maintain 
and improve quality. Instead, taking actions that compromise quality seems to pay for 
farmers. For instance, traders reported that farmers (including village assemblers) mix 
inferior coffee brands (such as Bale) with superior ones (such as Harar A, Harar B or 
Harar C). This particularly occur in those villages located around areas bordering other 
regions. Assemblers and farmers from inferior coffee producing regions sell their coffee 
to assemblers and farmers located neighboring villages located in the superior quality 
producing region. They then mix the inferior coffee with their own coffee and sell it in the 
name of superior quality to traders located in their region. Traders have also reported 
that adding stones, soil, wood and water to increase the weight and supplying without 
sorting out defective cherries are common actions.   
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As a result, traders have to invest in sorting and cleaning before they supply to the 
auction market. But even then, the grade level in the study area remains poor (Musebe 
et al. 2011). For instance, of the coffee sold in the first 6 months of 2013 at the auction 
market, only 0.6% was above grade 4. To put in a nutshell, instead of incentivizing 
coffee quality the current institutional context in the study areas seems to provide room 
for opportunistic actions that compromise quality. 
The irony is that while traders receive different prices for different grade levels and 
brands at the ECX auction market, they pay undifferentiated prices at the local markets. 
However, this is partly attributable to lack of objective quality standards at the local level 
(Gabre-Madhin 2009). In fact, quality levels at the local market are solely determined by 
visual inspection (Dadi et al. 1992). Having long experience in the coffee markets, 
traders are expected to make good judgments on quality. But they may still find such 
subjective judgments difficult to apply on personally and socially connected farmers. 
Traders also reported that they offer similar prices except for situations where serious 
quality problems are observable. Knowing that they will receive the same price 
irrespective of the quality, farmers primarily focus will be on increasing the volume. At 
least, they will have no incentive to improve quality. In such conditions, agents have no 
choice but to live with the prevailing Akerlof’s (1970) lemons’ market. We argue that 
even in an institutional environment where transactions are dominated by personal 
relationships, markets are prone to fraud and deceit if the transactions especially involve 
valuable attributes that are costly to measure.  
Another important variable was social relationships. While social relationships positively 
and significantly determine the choices of farmers as the MNL model result shows, the 
results of LCM shows that this is true for only 17% of the farmers (class IV). In other 
words, for 83% of the responding farmers, no evidence was found that they prefer  a 
trader who is a member of their social group. Also, the descriptive results concerning the 
actual transactions showed that farmers sold more to members outside their social 
group, a result consistent with (Fafchamps 2004). These results, therefore, do not 
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support the claim that in many developing country markets economic relationships are 
embedded in social relationships.  
Farmers establish long-term client relationships based on the economic merits of the 
trader. Once established, the relationships will continue as long as the trader fulfills the 
desired economic attributes – trustworthiness, dependability, reliability, location (buying 
in the village), and offering satisfactory prices. Perhaps such long-term economic 
relationship may expand into social dimensions. In this sense, social relationships are 
embedded in economic relationships rather than the other way round. Consistent with 
this finding, Tadesse and Shively (2013) found that farmers, instead of just relying on 
social connections, continue to learn through repeated transactions and based on the 
feedback of their neighbors, until they gain the required trust level that anchors their long 
term relationship. Similarly, Meijerink et al. (2014) found that social relationship declined 
after the informal institutions that were governing the sesame exchange in Ethiopia were 
replaced by formal institutions.   
The mere fact that transactions are infused in personal relationships alone cannot lead 
to the conclusion that transacting parties prefer to embed their economic relationship 
with members of a close social group. Individuals may embed economic transactions 
into social relationships because the wider institutional environment locked them into 
social relationships without providing alternative institutional arrangements that allow 
impersonalized transactions. The context is that farmers have to take Hobson’s choice 
of embedding their transaction in personal relationships. We argued that personal 
relationships are natural responses of boundedly rational self-interest seeking agents to 
transaction problems posed by the institutional environment.  
If trust, reputation, and reciprocity are circularly interrelated and are products of strong 
social bonds, and if they are crucial for economic cooperation, then it implies that no 
society can be more cooperative and productive than primitive tribal societies of African 
countries (the most primitive tribal societal system can be found in the pastoralist society 
of sub-Sahara). But the reality is that such types of societies are not only the least 
productive and inefficient, they also devote a large proportion of their scarce resources 
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on redistributing the meager wealth (North 1994; Posner 1980; Popper 1966; Seabright 
2004). Recent studies found a negative relationship between social ‘capital’ and 
economic performance (Egbert and Sedlarski 2011).  
4.7 Conclusions 
The local coffee markets in the study areas are personalized and segmented along 
social networks. We asked as to what underlay behind such personalized and 
segmented markets. We found transaction costs related attributes are behind such 
personalized transactions. Even if the institutional environments locked farmers in 
personalized relationships, we found that farmers differ in their preferences. Four 
classes of coffee producers are identified: self-interested, reputation-oriented agents, 
self-interested & sophisticated, and sophisticated but closed. For all groups of farmers 
except class IV (17.4%), economic rather than social motives seem to influence these 
preferences. The direction of the preference for all attributes was as expected, except 
for the strictness in quality assessment. In total contradiction to our expectations, 
farmers were found to prefer strict traders to non-strict ones. Given the experiment was 
made under an ideal choice contexts, we found no reason that justifies this result. Even 
if we tried to test the plausibility of the result under the real choice situations on the 
ground, we only found little explanations in relation to reputability. Rather we found their 
choice inconsistent both under an ideal and real choice contexts. We thus strongly 
believe that farmers have pretended to conform to some abstractly constructed desirable 
behavioral patterns. 
The study also showed the adverse effects of personalized transactions on coffee 
quality. In a condition where there are no alternative institutional arrangements that 
incentivize quality, farmers are not likely to invest their resources in improving quality. 
However the unique natural quality of the coffee produced in the areas provides ample 
market opportunities for farmers (Petit 2007), they could not even capture these 
opportunities let alone expand economic opportunities beyond. The efforts to improve 
quality in the study area through intensive advice cannot have a meaningful impact if the 
existing transaction system continues to be governed by the inefficient informal 
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institutions the personal relationships offer. Finally, we suggest further study in order to 
assess the implications of these results in the local markets on the performances of 
higher level markets along the coffee value chain. In addition, assessment of the traders' 
side on their choice of sellers will greatly supplement the study. 
Contrary to the arguments of social capital theorists, the LCM shows that only 17% of 
the farmers were found to prefer to transact with members of their own social group. 
Indeed, coffee transactions are embedded in personal relationships. Yet, the reciprocal 
relationships continue as long as it ensures long-term economic benefits. Given the 
experimental results of farmers’ choice under ideal choice contexts, we found little 
evidence that supports the argument that agents prefer to embed their transactions in 
social relationships. Rather the preferences of most classes of farmers can be 
interpreted as a far-sighted calculative response to institutional problems. Contrary to 
embeddedness argument, it rather seems that social relationships are embedded in 
economic relationships. Given there are no alternative formal institutions, the observed 
personal relationships can be interpreted as adaptive responses to missing markets and 
legal protections. For that matter, ‘oversocialized’ (Granovetter 1985) relationships are 
the principal embodiment of most developing countries. It can probably be the Pandora 
box of the weak performances of such society. Whether it can work in ‘under socialized 
word’ or not, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.  
. 
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Chapter 5 Preference of local traders to coffee sellers 
Abstract 
Using survey data collected from sample farmers, this chapter assesses the preference 
of traders for alternative seller farmers. While the result indicates that the preference of 
farmers to embed their transaction within social relationships is little, the institutional 
environment locked farmers into personalized relationships. With the exception of 
strictness, we found traders’ ranking of attributes most preferred by farmers as more or 
less consistent with the results of the choice experiment. Despite the presence of 
personalized transactions, the results also indicate high and increasing transaction risks 
associated with incidences of fraud.  
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 using a random utility theory framework, we analyzed the preference of 
farmers to the various attributes of traders. The central aim was to understand the 
source of personalized transactions and its implications on quality. By controlling 
attributes of the traders that have strategic importance for farmers, we found that social 
relationship is a valuable attribute only for small segments of the sample farmers. But 
embedding transactions with personalized relationships does not arise only from farmers 
choice of traders but it can also arise, for many reasons, from the preference of traders 
to transact with a particular group of farmers. 
First, traders, in order to minimize transaction costs and risks associated with 
information and enforcement costs, may prefer to embed their transactions in long-term 
relationships with a particular group of farmers. In order to avoid potential transaction 
risks that may give rise to possible opportunistic actions of farmers such as adulterating 
coffee, mixing different brands of coffee and the like, traders may prefer to embed their 
transactions in long-term relationships. Traders can also establish long-term 
relationships with farmers to avoid competition from other rival traders and to obtain a 
reliable seller. Traders can do this  by signaling their reputations in terms of  
trustworthiness, reliability, and dependability. For instance, traders can signal their 
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dependability by responding quickly to the social and economic crises farmers are facing 
by providing loans, by selling food grains in times of food shortage, by partly covering 
their medical expenditures and the like. They can also demonstrate their alliance by 
actively participating in social ceremonies such as wedding and funeral ceremonies and 
other social gatherings. Traders can also use their social status to resolve disputes and 
conflicts their clients may have with other parties 
All this can enable traders to obtain a loyal customer, not only in the coffee markets but 
also in other markets. Since coffee trading is seasonal in the area, most coffee traders 
also trade other products or inputs. They can thus extend the clientele relationship they 
have in the coffee markets into their other business activities. That is, traders can bundle 
the various economic transactions together. All this can lead to long-term relationships, 
but not necessarily to the identity-based personalized transactions that we 
conceptualized in this study. However, if the social landscape is already segmented in 
terms of some identity attributes such as ethnicity, religion or clan, the resulting 
economic relationship will also be segmented. This condition can provide traders the 
opportunity to take advantage of the segregated social structure in order to sustain their 
monopoly. But if the social landscape is already diverse and mixed, the trader will have 
to demonstrate its reputation continuously to each client individually. The trader can also 
sustain and expand his economic relationships by strengthening his social relationships. 
In such condition, the transaction may not be considered as personalized. In this sense, 
social relationships can be thought of as embedded in economic relationships instead of 
the other way round.  
Another possibility is that the trading context could be such that it leaves farmers with no 
option except transacting with a fixed trader. In our particular context where there are 
several traders in each local market, traders can acquire such monopsony power among 
a specific group if they collude to share the market. But in addition to the monopsony 
power which a trader may have in the coffee markets, he can also have 
monopsony/monopoly power in other markets e.g. manufactured goods market, 
agricultural inputs market and grain markets. In addition, traders can also have political 
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and even social power. In a less complex social environment where traders and farmers 
personally know each other and know each other’s actions and transact in multiple 
markets, traders can have more power to constrain the free choice of farmers in the 
coffee markets. They signal their power through various actions. In an environment 
where multiple transactions are interlinked and intertwined with the personal identity of 
the transacting parties, transactions will be complex and beyond comprehension. But the 
situation will obviously leave farmers with little options other than transacting with a fixed 
trader. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to identify the attributes determining the preference 
of traders for alternative coffee selling farmers and to understand the behavioral patterns 
of traders. The aim is to critically examine the implications of the results of the 
descriptive statistics vis-à-vis the overall transactions contexts characterizing the 
personalized transactions in the local markets.  
5.2 Methodology and data 
The study uses survey data collected from 43 traders in the four sample districts, namely 
Dara Lobu, Boke, Melka Bello and Bedeno. The first two are located in Western 
Hararghe and the other two in Eastern Hararghe. Since the number of traders in each 
local market is small, our sample contains nearly all of them. The data was collected 
using structured questionnaires. In addition, details informal discussions took place with 
local traders, farmers and coffee marketing experts of the local Agricultural Development 
Offices. Given the small sample size, we analyze the data using descriptive statistics.  
5.3 Results and discussions 
The following subsections present and discuss the results of the descriptive statistics. To 
draw useful conclusions, we try to critically examine the relationships between the 
various results of the descriptive statistics and confront these with the context of the 
local coffee markets which were described in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2. 
  
115 
 
 
5.3.1 Perception of traders about the preference of coffee selling farmers 
We first asked traders to rank attributes, that according to them will attract coffee selling 
farmers. We take the following attributes: price, trustworthiness, dependability, social 
relationship and strictness in quality assessments. We assign five points for those 
attributes ranked first, four points for the those ranked second, three points for those 
ranked third and so on. We then take the sum of the calculated weighted value of the 
rank levels for each attribute.13 We calculated the weights for each cell in the attribute-
rank matrix as a product of three ratios: the ratio of rank value to the sum assigned 
values, the ratio of observation to the sum of observations for the attribute under 
consideration and the ratio of observation to the sum of observation of the specific rank 
level under consideration.  
Table 5.1 Attributes of trader in terms of their rank in attracting farmers 
Rank 
Social 
relationship 
Dependability Price Strictness  Trustworthiness 
1st 6 5 10 0 21 
2nd 6 14 10 4 8 
3rd 14 11 9 2 6 
4th 13 9 10 8 2 
5th 3 3 3 28 5 
Weighted index 4.8 5.5 5.1 3.7 9.8 
The result in Table 5.1 show the index values and the distribution of ranks per attribute. 
Accordingly, in descending order of importance, trustworthiness, dependability, price, 
social relationship and strictness in the quality assessment were believed  to attract 
farmers. The relative importance of trust seems very strong as the weighted index value 
is considerably higher than that  of other attributes. This is more or less consistent with 
the result in Chapter 4, where the preferences of the farmers were assessed. The 
                                                 
13
 The weighted values for each rank is calculated as: the ratio of the value assigned to each rank to the total value 
assigned to the rank (5+4+3+2+1=15) multiplied by the ratio of the number of observation in the rank to the total 
responses in the attributes multiplied again by the ratio of frequency of the rank in the total choices of the rank 
multiplied by 100). For instance, if 10 respondents of the  41 ranked attribute A and if the number of total 
respondents that chose first rank are 41, the weight will be calculated as (5/15)*(10/41)*(10/43)*100=1.89. The 
calculation is made for the rest of the ranks and the total value will be summed up to arrive at the weighted rank of 
each attribute. 
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ranking of the strictness attribute is however in contradiction with the results in chapter 
4. Contrary to the results of stated preference by farmers, the traders rank strictness in 
quality assessment last. This substantiates the argument we provided to justify the result 
in Chapter 4. 
As we described in the Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the local markets are segmented 
through social networks. Our interest is to understand the source of this segmentation. 
One possibility is that when traders, in their attempt to reduce information and 
enforcement problems, embed their transactions into repeated relationships through 
clientelization or other means. But whether the clientelization is personalized or 
impersonalized depends on the social environment. If the social environment is itself 
segmented, the market structure that emerges from such clientelization will be 
personalized.  
Our field observations confirm the presence of a segmented market. The detailed 
discussions which took place with  the district coffee marketing experts and with 
selected traders revealed this fact. They reported that each trader has a specific 
geographic territory surrounding the native village of the trader’s extended family and 
that traders know each other’s segments and implicitly avoid intrusions. They also 
reported that disputes sometimes arise when one trader buys coffee from 
farmers/assemblers who come from  outside their own territory. As described in Section 
2.3.1, traders themselves reported that they visit the villages when the main harvest 
approaches. Traders know that farmers usually face financial liquidity problems at this 
time and they ask farmers if they need money or other help. Farmers usually accept 
such offers and this is considered as a promise not to sell coffee to other traders. 
Sometimes traders even influence  locally powerful individuals who can put pressure on 
farmers not to sell coffee to other traders. Informants  reported that in the past locally 
powerful individuals even physically forced farmers to sell to a specific trader. While 
such forceful measures are reported to be more rare, locally powerful individuals still 
constrain the free choice of farmers, especially weaker farmers. 
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5.3.2 The level of competitions among traders 
We first examine whether these elements provide traders competitive advantages in the 
local coffee market. From the total sample respondents of 43 traders, respectively 16.3 
and 30.2 percent reported that social network and clientelization to be  the source of 
their competitive advantage, (Table 5.2). 41.9 and 4.7 percent of the respondents 
believe that  working capital and ownership of essential facilities such as pulping/hulling 
machine, store and truck are the primary sources of their competitive advantage, 
respectively. Here the segmentations seems to have come through deliberate 
investments of traders in social networks and clientelization.  
Table 5.2 Source of competitive advantage of traders 
  N % 
Presence of sufficient working capital 18 41.9 
Presence of strong social network 7 16.3 
Presence of necessary facilities 2 4.7 
Capacity of client management 13 30.2 
Total 40 93.0 
Economies of scale, entry barriers (formal or informal) and other strategic actions of 
agents could result in geographically/socially segmented markets. However, while there 
are entry barriers for traders outside a locality, there is no formal entry barrier within 
district markets. But some institutional environments sometimes restrict entry even in the 
absence of legal restrictions. Besides, the social environment could be conducive for the 
traders to segment the market through some collusive acts.  
In order to assess the presence of collusion, we directly asked farmers if they made 
some agreements to avoid competition. We furthermore also asked trades in what 
trading activities they collaborate. As Table 5.3 shows, 79.1 percent of the respondents 
reported that there is no agreement among them. Only 18.6 percent of traders reported 
the presence of some types of agreements that can limit competition. 
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Table 5.3 Terms of collusion and extent of interdependence among traders 
Types of agreements among traders N % 
Not to compete for price 6 14.0 
Not to compete for clients 1 2.3 
Not to inter into one's trading territory 1 2.3 
No agreement 34 79.1 
Total 42 97.7 
Share marketing costs 5 11.6 
Share facilities 15 34.9 
Credit collaboration 3 7.0 
Using uniform buying price 3 7.0 
No collaboration 15 34.9 
Total 41 95.3 
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that competition exists when the firms are large 
in number and when each agent can act independently of others. In such conditions, not 
only making collusive agreements but also maintaining them will be difficult. However, in 
our case, the number of traders is not so large as to make collusive agreements difficult. 
Nevertheless, such collusion could be less effective when members operate 
independently. One of the main inherent problems of cartel arrangements is that 
members will have the incentive to cheat. Thus, such agreement could only be effective 
if members can monitor each other’s actions. In order to judge the level of independence 
of traders, we ask if there are trading areas that create some interdependencies. We 
found that 65.1 percent of traders use shared facilities, share marketing costs and 
collaborate in other trading activities. While in a narrow social environment not only 
every trader is likely to know the actions and statuses of every other trader, the situation 
also forces them to be interdependent in the social, cultural and political spheres.  
Moreover, traders in the local markets are tightly knit. They not only know each other’s 
actions, but they also have several social instruments to constrain each other. The social 
environment is thus not only conducive to make tacit or explicit agreements, but it is also 
conducive to monitor deviations and cheating. In such social environment, collusive 
outcomes can naturally emerge even in the absence of explicit agreements. Thus, with 
the evidence on the use of shared facilities and other means of collaborations coupled 
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with the conducive social environment, it is hard to expect the trading pattern to be 
competitive. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapters, in the social environment 
norms that undermine competitive behavior are pervasive.  
Traders were furthermore asked about their pricing strategies and their reactions to 
changes in price in general and to changes in the price by rivals. The pricing strategy is 
dominated by markup pricing.65 percent of traders reported the central auction price as 
their reference for their pricing (Table 5.4). The remaining 18.6 and 16.3 percent of the 
traders reported the prevailing market price and their personal judgment as a basis for 
their pricing decisions, respectively. The use of auction price has significant implications 
for the price transmission. This will be analyzed in Chapter 6. The analyses there try to 
see the level of price transmission over extended time periods before and after the 
establishment of ECX. While the descriptive results seem to suggest that the speed of 
price transmission is high, they do not show the symmetry of the transmissions between 
price decline and price rise. But when all traders follow a similar pricing strategy, the 
level of competition also declines in the local markets which can have a significant effect 
on the level of mark-up.  
Table 5.4 Distribution of pricing strategy 
  N % 
Based on the price prevailing in the market 8 18.6 
Based on the auction market price 28 65.1 
Based on personal judgment 7 16.3 
Total 43 100.0 
To shed more light on the price competition, we asked them as to when they compete 
more. About 70 percent of the respondents reported that the level of competition 
increases when prices in the auction market increase and only 30 percent reported it to 
increase when prices decline. This seems to point towards asymmetric price 
transmissions. 
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5.3.3 Transaction costs and risks posed by farmers 
Another important issue in the marketing of coffee we discussed in each of the chapters 
is the issue of coffee quality. We asked traders if they encountered considerable loss 
due to opportunistic actions such as adulteration problems. As discussed above, 53.5 
percent of local traders reported that they had faced substantial losses due to farmers’ 
adulteration of coffee.  
Social capital theorists emphasize the role of personalized transactions in reducing 
malfeasance and in increasing trust. Despite the fact that the transaction is largely 
personalized, the incidence of opportunistic actions was reported to be high. Given the 
institutional constraint, the personalization of the transaction could be a strategic 
response of sellers to missing markets and buyers to limit opportunistic actions. This 
may depend on the traceability of the transaction ex-post. 
Traders were asked as to what extent they can trace such adulterations. About 67 
percent of traders reported that they could fully trace the adulterator (Table 5.5). Given 
the transaction context discussed in Chapter 4, it is difficult to believe that traders find 
the task of tracing adulterators easy. These traders might be able to trace this through 
assemblers. Since assemblers are not allowed to operate under the new ECX 
regulation, they work in the guise of an agent of traders. Without them reducing 
information problem and segmenting the market can be difficult.  
Table 5.5 Traceability of adulteration problems 
 
N % 
Fully 29 67.4 
Partly 3 7.0 
Rarely 5 11.6 
Not at all 6 14.0 
Total 43 100.0 
Finally, we asked local traders whether the personalized transactions, compared to the 
past, have increased or decreased. Consistent with our historical analysis which was  
discussed in Chapter 3, the personalized transaction seems to be on the rise as 79.1 
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percent of the respondents reported increment in the personalization of transactions 
(Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6 Trend of personalized transactions   
Type of change Frequency Percent 
Increasing 34 79.1 
Decreasing 7 16.3 
No change 2 4.7 
Total 43 100.0 
Whether this is a good trend for the efficiency of the market or not depends on the trend 
in the incidence of fraudulent actions. About 81 percent of traders reported that the 
extent of adulteration and other fraudulent actions are increasing. If fraudulent actions 
are traceable and personalized transactions are increasing, then we would hypothesize 
the incidence of fraud to decline. But on the contrary, traders reported that it is 
increasing.  
This result shows the inefficiency of the personalized transactions as an institutional 
arrangement. It is also a good evidence for functionalist arguments that emphasize on 
the roles of informal institutions and organizations. But in the absence of efficient 
institutions that discipline sellers, the personalized transaction will continue to exist as a 
second best alternative. The problem is that there is no easy way out.  
5.4 Conclusion 
We examined important transaction aspects that we hypothesized to have bearings with 
personalized transactions. The descriptive results suggest that the environment is not 
only conducive for traders to collude in order to corner farmers into personalized 
transactions, the personalized transactions can also arise as a strategic response of 
traders to reduce transaction risks. These results coupled with the results of our broader 
historical analysis of institutions in Ethiopia suggest that the personalized transactions 
are induced by the social environment in the local markets. The efficiency of 
personalized transactions particularly depends on the existing social environment and its 
historical origin. The result also suggests that the personalized transactions are an 
  
122 
 
 
inefficient institutional arrangement. But these inefficiencies are also inextricably and 
strongly linked with the broader socio-cultural, economic and political environment. The 
implication is that in as long as the broader environment forecloses other alternative 
impersonalized arrangements, these inefficiencies seem to persist. 
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Chapter 6 Impacts of institutional intervention on price transmissions, 
case of ECX in Ethiopia 14 
Abstract 
In the aftermath of the liberalization reforms, policy intervention in developing countries 
shifted from towards building market institutions. One of such institutional intervention is 
the introduction of commodity exchanges. The general claim is that commodity 
exchanges provide the institutional means for reducing information and enforcement 
problems that are largely inherent in agricultural markets. But to what extent these 
potential gains are transmitted to the various markets along a value chain is not known. 
Particularly whether these potential gains are transmitted to the highly fragmented 
thousands of village markets is an empirical question. By taking the Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (ECX) as a case, this chapter examines the impacts of the 
introduction of the commodity exchange in transmitting price signals along the world-
export-auction-retail/producers coffee value chains. We found that both the speed and 
symmetry of transmission remains weak even after the launch of ECX. In a context 
where local agricultural markets remain traditional and export markets less competitive, 
the introduction of the commodity exchange will have limited impacts in improving the 
performance of markets in transmitting price signals. It suggests that for institutional 
interventions to benefit farmers require more than just introducing commodity exchange 
at the central market. It requires transforming local markets and liberalizing the export 
markets. 
Key words: Asymmetric price transmission, TAR, Commodity Exchange, ECX, 
Institutions 
                                                 
14
 This chapter is accepted for publication at Review of Development Economics: Fekadu G., S. 
Speelman, G. Van Huylenbroeck. Impacts of institutional intervention on price transmissions, 
case of ECX in Ethiopia. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Before the liberalization, the widely adopted policy goal in the agricultural commodity 
markets was reducing price volatility (Subervie 2011; Bellemare et al. 2013). This was 
done in the coffee sector through the International Coffee Organization (ICO 2015) and 
by the marketing boards of the respective member countries. But after the abolishment 
of these institutions that controlled the market in the framework of the liberalization 
reforms, a need for institutional support arose. ECX was established to provide such 
support. But the central question remains to what extent such intervention can improve 
the performance of the market . The main aim of this chapter is to assess the impacts of 
ECX on the performance of markets in terms of transmitting prices. Next to this the study 
also examines the impacts of some other measures associated with the liberalization 
reforms, namely the removal of price fixation and export taxes.  
Several studies have analyzed the impacts of the liberalization reforms on the 
performance of agricultural markets (Worako et al. 2008; Getnet 2007 for Ethiopia; 
Kilima et. al. 2008; Winter-Nelson and Temu 2002 and Coulter and Golob 1992 for 
Tanzania; Mofya-Mukuka and Abdulai 2013 for Tanzania and Mozambique; Fafchamps 
and Hill 2008 for Uganda; Subervie 2011 for El Salvador, India and Indonesia; Valdes et 
al. 2015 for Brazil). These studies generally attribute increases in market integration 
(esp. horizontally), increases in the participation of private traders and the rise in 
producer prices to the liberalization reforms. However, despite these positive impacts, 
agricultural markets in SSA countries, when compared to other developing countries, 
remain poorly organized, thin and less competitive even decades after the liberalization 
(Fiamohe et al. 2013; Osborne 2005; Coulter and Onumah 2002; Winter-Nelson and 
Temu 2002; Barrett 1997b). In addition, price volatility becomes a new important 
challenge (Fiamohe et al. 2013; Worako et al. 2011; Arslan and Reicher 2011; Barrett 
1997a).  
Some attribute the poor impacts of the liberalization to its partial implementation, to 
wrong execution and  to policy reversals (Jayne, et al. 2002; Dorward et al. 2005a) or to 
poor infrastructural settings (Kydd 2009). Many, however, attribute it to the institutional 
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environments which are considered hostile for private businesses (Poulton et al. 2006; 
Dorward et al. 2005b; Fafchamps et al. 2005; World Bank 2002). The relative poor 
performances of agricultural markets in SSA countries brought institutions to the 
forefront in the subsequent reform agenda (Subervie 2011; Easterly 2005). High 
transaction costs, coordination problems and some adverse consequences of the 
liberalization (volatility, inequality, etc.) can provide a rationale for institutional 
interventions (Sitko and Jayne 2012). But the outcomes of such interventions may not 
be second-best if the intervenor faces no less information and incentive problem than 
the private market (Stiglitz 1989). Institutional capture may also impede the future 
development of efficient markets (Laffont and Tirole 1991). 
Even though the coffee market received various institutional supports15, it was no more 
efficient than other agricultural product markets. Instead, the newly created institutions 
enable the government to control the coffee markets (ICO 2015; Gabre-Madhin 2012). 
Furthermore, studies indicated a lot of problems associated with the state-run old 
auction system. The collusion of exporters, the personalization of the transactions, the 
rigging behavior of brokers, the presence of a large number of intermediaries, the 
bureaucratic auction system and the high contract risks were critical problems of the old 
auction system (Hernandez et al. 2015; Renkow and Slade 2013; Gabre-Madhin 2012). 
In addition, the grading system at the CQIAC was not transparent and the government 
was using this institution to fully control the coffee market (ECEA 2008).  
However experiences of other African countries is disappointing (Sitko and Jayne 2012), 
Ethiopia launched the widely acclaimed commodity exchange16 in 2008 with the help of 
foreign donors. Subsequently, a law was passed that fully prohibited coffee trading 
outside ECX. As described in Section 2.3.3, a lot of interventions and investments17 has 
                                                 
15
 Unlike other agricultural products, diverse institutions support coffee markets in Ethiopia. Grading, 
standardization and certifications, dissemination of price information, research and developments and 
enforcement of contracts have been provided by specialized organizations for the past five to six decades 
(Berhe 2010). 
16
 It has been acclaimed for its success on high volume of trade within short time volume of transactions and for its 
IT excellence 
17
 The financial resources devoted to establish Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) was variously 
estimated to reach $55 million (Jayne et al. 2014). 
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been made by ECX in a way that dramatically changes coffee transactions at the central 
auction markets.  
Despite these interventions to improve the central auction markets, no meaningful 
intervention was made to improve downstream (export markets) and upstream (local) 
markets. Especially the local coffee markets remain traditional and less competitive as 
described in Section 2.3.3. Besides, the legal framework limits competition by prohibiting 
traders to buy coffee outside the district they are licensed to trade. This restriction will 
leave farmers with few local coffee traders. It is especially bad for farmers that sell red-
cherries as they cannot wait until price improves. Coffee for them is a perishable 
product. Finally, ECX being owned by the government (Renkow and Slade 2013) 
coupled with the stringent rule that entirely prohibits transaction outside ECX (Rashid et 
al. 2010) and past experiences of government controls, there is no guarantee that ECX 
does not distort the market instead of supporting it. Besides, the legal framework entirely 
prohibits trading of export-standard coffee for domestic consumption; a policy intended 
to ensure a continued flow of the country’s foreign exchange earnings but which can 
have negative consequences on producer prices.  
Currently, the entire volume of export-standard coffee and sesame are exclusively 
traded through ECX. Many studies take this as an indicator of the effectiveness of ECX 
(Mbeng-Mezui et al. 2013; UNCTAD 2009). But in a condition where traders are not 
allowed to trade outside ECX, the observed trade volume18 hardly indicates the 
performance of ECX. More importantly, the effects of the intervention on the rest of 
market are unclear. What is striking in many reports is that they consider ECX as a 
platform where individual smallholder farmers directly participate in the trading (Mbeng-
Mezui et al. 2013). In reality, no farmer directly sells coffee at the ECX auction center. 
Nevertheless, ECX could potentially benefit farmers if it would improve the efficiency of 
local markets in transmitting changes in auction prices and of the auction market in 
transmitting changes in Free-On-Board (FOB) prices. It is, therefore, interesting to 
investigate whether the interventions improved the performance of the supply chain. The 
                                                 
18
 For instance, in 2014, ECX traded 26.2 Billion Birr ($1.3 Billion) (Bloomberg, 2015) 
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main purpose of the study, therefore, is to analyze the impacts of the introduction of 
ECX on the linkages between the various levels of markets along the coffee supply 
chain. We evaluate the impacts in terms of changes in  the capacity of downstream 
markets in responding to price changes at upstream markets.  
Recently, Andersson et al. (2015) and Hernandez et al. (2015) have analyzed the 
impacts of ECX; the former on spatial price dispersion and the latter on market 
interdependence and volatility transmission. To our knowledge, no study has examined 
the impacts of institutional interventions through commodity exchange. More importantly, 
one of the limitations of these and other studies on coffee prices is that they use local 
(farm-gate) price of green coffee beans as producer price. But the traditionally 
processed green coffee beans are sold only for domestic consumption and therefore 
their price cannot reflect the local prices of export-standard coffee. For export-standard 
coffee, traders only buy sun-dried or wet coffee cherries and do the processing 
themselves using a standard pulping/hulling technique. The price farmers receive for 
their export standard coffee is thus the price of sun-dried or wet/red coffee-cherries. This 
distinction is particularly important because the transaction of coffee cherries involves 
information asymmetry as the quality of coffee-cherries is not as readily evident as that 
of green coffee beans. The risk of perishability is higher for farmers selling red coffee 
cherries than for farmers that sell traditionally pulped green coffee beans. Therefore 
analyses that use the local price of coffee beans cannot capture the transaction costs 
associated with the information problem and other problems related to storage and 
processing. We thus use the price of coffee cherries to capture the effects of ECX on 
smallholder coffee producers. 
Analysis of Price Transmission (hereafter APT) is an important way to measure the 
performance of markets (McLaren 2015; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004). The 
impacts of ECX can be reflected in terms of improving the speed and symmetry of price 
transmissions along the chain. Export-standard coffee has a single supply chain: 
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local/village market to auction markets to export market to world markets.19 It thus 
provides an ideal chain to measure impacts of institutional/policy interventions. Using 
monthly time series data spanning from January 1997 to June 2014, we investigate the 
speed and asymmetry of price transmission at each stage along the export chain. 
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. The first part describes the 
sources of data and methods of aggregation. We then describe the methodology used in 
part two. The results of the model are presented and interpreted in part three. Finally, 
key findings of the research and conclusions are presented in part four. 
6.2 Sources and type of data 
The study uses four sets of data collected from different sources. The first one is 
producer prices. Producer prices were compiled and aggregated from a CSA data set. 
CSA collects monthly data of agricultural products from more than 400 enumeration 
areas across the country. The raw price data of coffee (coffee dried/red coffee cherries) 
collected from major coffee producing areas, were aggregated to generate monthly time 
series price data that ranges from January 1997 to June 2014. 
The second time series data is the auction price data. This time series data was 
collected from two sources. For the periods before the establishment of ECX was 
obtained from Ministry of Agriculture. The price series for the remaining years was 
generated by aggregating the weighted (by the volume of transactions) daily auction 
prices obtained from ECX database. 
The other price data consisted of the export price data series. The export price data was 
obtained from Ethiopian Custom and Revenue Authority. Similarly, the monthly price 
series was generated by aggregating weighted daily export data. 
Finally, the world price series was obtained from the ICO website. We used the monthly 
price index of Brazilian coffee as a proxy for world price of Ethiopian coffee. 
                                                 
19
 Trading export-standard coffee for domestic consumption is legally prohibited. We can thus ignore the domestic 
markets as it is for non-export-standard coffee. However cooperatives are allowed to directly export, bypassing 
ECX, we assume this doesn’t affect the result as their participation in the direct export is relatively small as 
described in Section 2.3.3.  
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6.3 Modeling price transmission 
Major changes occurred in the coffee sector even after the liberalization reform made in 
1992: the removal of the export tax and price fixation in 2002, the introduction of 
trademarking around 2007 and the introduction of ECX from the beginning of 2009. 
These interventions and policy changes, if effective, must have a bearing on the speed 
and asymmetry of price transmission between the different market along the value 
chain.  
Perfectly competitive market assume that co-integrating markets will be at equilibrium. 
Any price shock in one market will be automatically and fully transmitted to the other co-
integrated market. A departure from this transmission process indicates inefficiency in 
the market. This can be manifested in terms of partial, lagging and asymmetric 
transmissions of the shocks. Measuring the magnitude, speed and asymmetry of the 
adjustment process can thus indicate the inefficiency of co-integrating markets 
(Hassouneh et al. 2010). Different factors are suggested as reasons for Asymmetric 
Price Transmission (APT). Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) identify market 
power, adjustment and menu costs and various forms of price interventions as potential 
sources of asymmetric price transmission. 
But the transaction costs and level of market inefficiency can also change due to other 
factors outside ECX interventions. For instance advances in the information technology 
could increase the speed of price transmission and the level of asymmetry. Especially 
the rapid growth of mobile and internet technologies can make information transmissions 
very easy, fast and less costly. For instance, the mobile telephone penetration rate 
which was 5.4 in 2009, increased to 33.3 in 2014 (NBE 2014). Price transmissions could 
thus increase independently of the introduction of ECX’s. While such gradual changes, 
can affect the speed and asymmetry of price transmission, they cannot cause structural 
breaks. Moreover, in our analysis, we introduce a trend parameter to control for the 
effect of gradual changes such as technology and infrastructural improvements. 
Demand or supply shocks can affect the level of integration. But such phenomena will 
have similar effects along a value chain. Perhaps one important change that can 
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disproportionately affect the performance of the coffee market is a change in the foreign 
exchange regime. We, therefore, normalize all prices using the official exchange rates. 
Many studies use APT to analyze impacts of institutional/policy changes on the 
efficiency of markets in transmitting prices. The impacts of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak (Hassouneh et al. 2010; Saghaian 2007), impacts of 
the end of coffee export quota system (Lee & Gomez. 2013) and impacts of the 
liberalization reform (Mofya-Mukuka and Abdulai 2013; Subervie 2011). We followed the 
methodology used by the last two studies. We measure impact in terms of improving the 
ability of downstream markets in transmitting changes in prices at upstream markets. 
Suppose the long run relationship between two markets along the coffee value chain 
can be given by: 
𝑃𝑡
1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡         (7.1) 
where Pt
1 and Pt
2 are (n x 1) vectors of co-integrating prices of two markets along a value 
chain,  intercept parameter,  parameter coefficients, and t is (n x 1) vector of normally 
distributed disturbances which should be stationary if any long-run relationship exists 
between the two price series. Eq. (1) holds if  and  are time invariant. The trend 
parameter may not capture such structural breaks. Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
developed three model forms: a model with only a level shift, a model with a level and a 
trend shift and a model with what they called  a ‘regime shift’ (change in slope with trend 
shift). We specify a more general model that helps to analyze a structural break with 
regime shift as: 
𝑃𝑡
1 =  𝛼′ + 𝛼′𝜑 + 𝛽′𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝛽′𝜑𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇′𝑡      (7.2) 
where  is a dummy indicating the period and  a trend parameter and 
 = {
0        𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < 𝑡𝑚
1        𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑚
         (7.3) 
where tm is the period at which the change occurred. If tm is known a priori,  will take a 
value of 0, the rest a value of 1 and the usual Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips test will apply. But since other policy changes have also occurred in addition to 
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ECX and even if we know the timing of the three institutional/policy changes, we cannot 
know which policy affects which co-integrating prices.  
Gregory and Hansen (1996) developed a test procedure that does not require a priori 
information about the timing of the change. The procedure tests the null hypothesis of no 
co-integration against the alternative of co-integration in the presence of a single shift at 
an unknown time t0 of eq(2).
20 We therefore identify timing of structural breaks for each 
co-integrating price along the single dominant coffee value chain. We then correspond 
known periods with the breaks identified by the test. Even if our primary interest is to 
assess the impact of ECX, we cannot ignore the other two changes: abandonment of 
minimum price fixation and abolishing of export taxes and trademarking.  
Since the country takes a small share of the world market, we take the export market as 
exogenous. To be sure about this assumption, we test for direction of causality. 
Following Subervie (2011) we can use the following co-integrating prices:  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑡 + 𝜇𝑘𝑡 with i≠j (7.4) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡, is 𝐼(1) variables for the ith price (producer, retail, auction, export or world 
prices); and 𝛽𝑖 is parameter coefficient for the jth price (producer, retail, auction, export 
or world prices); k the number of co-integrating equations and 𝛼𝑘 is intercept terms and 
𝛾𝑘 trend parameter and 𝜇𝑘𝑡 𝐼(0) disturbance terms corresponding to the kth equation. 
The standard error correction model can be derived from the residuals of the above 
estimations as 
∆𝜇𝑘𝑡 = 𝜌𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡  (7.5) 
Where 𝜌𝑖𝑘 measures the speed of convergence and kt is a white-noise disturbance term 
for the kth co-integrating prices. 
The co-integration equation above assumes a linear relationship and symmetric price 
adjustment. But if the adjustment process is asymmetric, eq. (7.5)  needs to be modified 
as 
                                                 
20
 This procedure first obtains ADF and Phillips test statistic for regressions of all possible values of t0. It then takes 
the value of t0 that produced the smallest value as a plausible breakpoint. 
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 ∆𝜇𝑘𝑡 = 𝐼𝑘𝑡𝜌1𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜌2𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡  (7.6) 
where Ikt is the Heaviside indicator function such that 
𝐼𝑘𝑡 = {
1   𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏𝑘
0   𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 < 𝜏𝑘
 (7.7) 
where k is the value of the threshold. The conditions 𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏𝑘 refers to positive 
deviations from the threshold and 𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏𝑘 refers to negative deviations from the 
threshold and d indicates the lag length and 𝜗𝑘𝑙 parameter coefficients for the changes 
corresponding to the dth lag. Traditionally the appropriate lag length is determined 
based on AIC or BIC. Chan (1993) provides an estimation procedure that yields a 
‘superconsistent’ value of k
21 (Subervie 2011). Many studies set the value of  to zero. If 
 is zero, as in most practical cases (Enders & Siklos 2001), It denotes positive 
discrepancies and negative discrepancies. But there is no reason to set the value of i to 
zero.  
The idea of a threshold error correction model is that due to transaction and adjustment 
costs, deviations should exceed some level - the threshold – before the markets respond 
to the shocks (Mofya-Mukuka & Abdulai 2003). This means that if transaction costs are 
zero or nearly zero, the value of k must approach to zero. It thus somehow measures 
the change in transaction costs before and after the interventions. We estimate the value 
of the threshold together with the adjustment parameters. Chan (1993) provides an 
estimation procedure that yields a ‘superconsistent’ value of i. This will provide the 
Threshold Auto-regression (TAR) model provided by eq. (7.6) and eq. (7.7). Enders and 
Siklos (2001) suggest the need for augmentation of eq. (7.6) with lagged changes in the 
∆𝜇𝑘𝑡 in order to better represent the dynamics of the adjustment process as: 
∆𝜇𝑘𝑡 = 𝜌1𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜌2𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜗𝑗∆𝜇𝑘𝑡−𝑑 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡 (7.8) 
                                                 
21
 The procedure is that the estimated residual series will be sorted in ascending order and the highest and lowest 
15% of the observation will be discarded and the remaining will be taken as possible thresholds. Then series of 
regressions will be estimated in the form of eq(10) and eq(11) for each value of the remaining 70% of the residuals. 
That estimated threshold that yields the lowest residual sum of square will be taken as appropriate estimates of the 
threshold value. 
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where d indicates the lag length and 𝜗𝑗 parameter coefficients for the lag changes. 
Traditionally the appropriate lag length is determined based on AIC or BIC. 
Enders and Granger (1998) provide another alternative specification to determine Ikt as: 
𝑀𝑘𝑡 = {
1   𝑖𝑓 ∆𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏𝑘
0   𝑖𝑓 ∆𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 < 𝜏𝑘
 (7.9) 
Instead of taking the previous period’s disturbance term, taking its first difference will 
yield the Momentum Threshold Autoregression (M-TAR) model. Enders and Siklos 
(2001) note that the above adjustment is specifically useful in an institutional 
environment where policy makers attempt to smooth large positive short-run changes 
without affecting the long-run relationships. Subervie (2011) suggest that the above 
representation doesn’t have a direct meaning for economic interpretation.  
Petrucelli and Woolford (1984) showed that the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the stationarity to kt in eq. (4) is 1k < 1, 2k < 1 and (1k + 1)(2k +1) < 1 for any value of 
k. If two prices were found to be co-integrated, the standard F-distribution for the test of 
equality of adjustment parameters (i.e. 1k = 2k,) can be valid (Enders & Siklos 2001). If 
the F-test accepts the null hypothesis, then the standard error correction representation 
of eq. (3) will be correct and the Engel-Granger test valid. While the test of 1k = 0 and 
2k = 0 is done using the conventional statistics, the necessary condition for the test of 
convergence (1k < 1 and 2k < 1) can be done using the t-max procedure suggested by 
Enders & Siklos (2001) and used in several applications (Asane-Otoo and Schneider 
2015; Subervie 2011; Abdulai 2000). The necessary condition is that t-max (the smallest 
of individual t statistics associated with 1k and 2k)  should be significant. Enders & 
Siklos (2001) note that the F statistic is used only when the point estimates of 1k  and 
2k imply convergence.  
The consistency of eq. (7.6) and eq. (7.7), with a wide variety of error correction models 
allows an error correction representation for the system (Enders & Siklos 2001) as 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾
+𝐼𝑘𝑡𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛾
−(1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖∆𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑑𝑑=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗∆𝑃𝑗𝑡−𝑑𝑑=0    i ≠j  (7.10) 
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where 𝛿𝑖 and 𝛿𝑗 are the long term relationships between co-integrating i and j prices and 
𝛾+ and 𝛾− are adjustment parameters for positive and negative deviations of the kth co-
integrating equation, respectively. 
6.4 Results and discussion 
6.4.1 Price trend 
The five price series show a co-movement, although the pattern of co-movement differs 
from period to period (Figure 6.1). The gap between price series which seems large at 
the beginning declines until 2001 and rises later around 2009/10. While all other prices 
represent prices of coffee beans, the pink line represents the producer price of coffee 
cherries. It lies far below the other prices and is relatively stable. While we see a 
narrowing of the gap between the other prices, the gap between other prices and 
producer price remains relatively wide. Especially there was no proportional growth in 
producer price during the time when the price of coffee reached its peak in all other 
markets.  
Figure 6.1 Price trend with breaks identified by Gregory-Hansen (1996) test 
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While there have been some improvements in the share of producer price in the export 
price since 2008, the share of producer prices remains well below 40%. In the 
relationship, the retail prices appear to fall above auction price in some periods and fall 
below auction prices in others. The reason may be that retailers buy coffee both from 
local markets and at the auction market. The reasons that the retail price falls below the 
auction price is that: first, the retail price refer to lower grade coffee which does not 
qualify export standards; second, the auction market involves additional costs than local 
retail markets. The retail prices are average of the very large number of local markets 
distributed all over the country.  
Despite the usual expectation that the world price will be higher than the FOB prices, it 
sometimes falls below it. The reason for this is that we used Brazilian natural average 
prices to represent the world price. But most Ethiopian coffees receive premium prices 
that are higher than the average prices of Brazilian natural in the world markets. Yet the 
FOB price of Ethiopian coffee shows a strikingly similar pattern with the average world 
price. Close examination of the relationship between FOB and world price shows that 
world price lags about 3 months behind the export price. This is because the price data 
obtained from Ethiopian Custom and Revenue Authority reflects the price during the 
export time. However, exporters ship the coffee they already ‘sold’ sometime before (i.e. 
the agreement is made before the time of shipping). Examination of the graphs by 
pushing the FOB price three months forward or by lagging the world price by three 
months gives a good overlap between the two prices. We, therefore, shift use by 
forwarding the FOB price by three months.  
6.4.2 Tests and identification of breakpoints 
The first step in time series analysis is to test for stationarity. A test for unit root was 
conducted following the step-wise procedures suggested by Enders (2004). All of the 
five price series were found to be insignificant when the ADF test for unit root was done 
on levels and all were found to be significant at 1% level when the test was made on first 
differences of the price series (see Appendix A Table 6A). The results indicate that all 
the five series are nonstationary on levels and stationary on their differences. The 
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evidence of stationarity for producer price might be because it was relatively stable. The 
same test made separately for sets of prices before ECX and after ECX also shows 
similar results. 
The Granger causality test shows that we find strong causality from world price to FOB 
prices, but we also find a weak causal relationship from FOB to world prices. This may 
be due to the unique quality of Ethiopian coffee. This causal relationship has also slightly 
increased after 2009. This may be due to the trademarking measure taken around 2007. 
We also find Granger causality from FOB to auction price but not the other way round, 
which is consistent with our priori expectations. Similarly, we find auction price to 
influence producer price but not the other way round, which is also consistent with our 
expectation. Perhaps a little deviation from our priori expectation was on the relationship 
between retail prices and auction prices where we found two ways causal relationships 
(see Table 6B of Appendix A). 
The first step in analyzing structural break is to identify the period at which major 
structural changes occur in the series. Even if our main goal is to assess the impacts of 
ECX and the time of its introduction is known, we want to identify a breakpoint for each 
pair of markets along the coffee value chain. We identified the breakpoints using the test 
procedure described above developed by Gregory and Hansen (1996).  
Table 6.1 Results of Gregory-Hansen test  
Pair of prices AIC/ BIC Break Date ADF Break Date 
FOB – World price  -98.85*** 2002m10 -7.64*** 2002m10 
Auction – FOB -85.95*** 2007m12 -5.95** 2007m12 
Producer – Auction -127.10*** 2011m3 -9.49*** 2011m3 
We find three breakpoints (Table 6.1). We find November 2002 as a breakpoint FOB-
world prices. This breakpoint can be associated with the abandonment of minimum price 
fixation and removal of the export tax. The other structural break for auction-FOB prices 
was found to be December 2007 which was one year before the beginning of ECX. This 
break can be associated with the Coffee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative to obtain 
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Geographic Indication (GI)-protection for the three coffee origins: Sidama, Yirgacheffe 
and Harar. The country obtained GI-protection around 2007 (see Arslan and Reicher 
2011). Finally, the break for the relationship between producer and auction prices was 
found to be March 2011 more than two years after the introduction of ECX. This last 
breakpoint also becomes a breakpoint for all co-integration of all the four prices. Given 
the considerable changes made by ECX to change the way coffee is exchanged at the 
central markets and given that other alternative arrangements are entirely blocked, we 
did not expect its effect to lag this long. In order to compare the results, we also use the 
actual intervention period of December 2008 as the main breakpoint to analyze the 
impacts of ECX. We use this to assess the impacts of ECX on the entire supply chain. 
In all cases, there is a time lag between the period of the actual change and the timing of 
break identified by the test. In developing countries where informal institutions govern 
every walk of life of people, formal institutional interventions may take some time before 
they bring meaningful impact. Even if ECX began its operation on coffee in December 
2008, the full realization of its activities such as warehousing, price dissemination, and 
other activities was not fully implemented across all coffee producing areas. In the 
absence of evidence for any other major policy change after the introduction of ECX,  
breakpoints identified after 2008 could be associated with the introduction of ECX.  
6.4.3 Analysis of price transmission 
We first estimate the price transmission for each pair of prices using the above 
breakpoints. But before that, we estimate the speed of convergence parameter 𝜌1𝑘 and 
𝜌2𝑘 for the whole period using Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). We first search a consistent estimate 
for the threshold (𝜏𝑘) using the procedure developed by Chan (1993) and applied by 
others (e.g. Enders and Silkos 2001; Subervie 2011). Following this procedure, we trim 
out 30% of the observations and run series of regressions for the remaining 70% of the 
kt. Then the regression with the lowest residual sum of squares will be taken as the 
appropriate TAR and the corresponding value as a threshold value. Accordingly, we 
found threshold values in US cents of 24.5, 25.7, 8.1  and 20.7 for the price relationships 
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of FOB-world, auction-FOB, producer-auction and producer-FOB prices, respectively 
(Table 6.2). 
For instance the value of 𝜏 and the point estimate 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 in the FOB-world price 
regression show that 87% (𝜌11 = -0.87) of the discrepancies in FOB price that are 
greater or equal to 24.5 US cents (𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏1 i.e. 𝜇1𝑡−1 ≥ 24.5) above the equilibrium and 
57% (𝜌21= -0.57) of discrepancies in FOB price that are less than 24.5 US cents 
(𝜇1𝑡−1 < 𝜏1 i.e. 𝜇1𝑡−1 < 24.5) above the equilibrium decay within one month. This implies 
that the positive discrepancies from the estimated threshold decay faster than the 
negative ones. This is in favor of foreign importers. The same interpretation applies to 
the rest of co-integrating prices. The point estimate adjustment parameters for auction-
FOB prices (𝜌12= -0.73 & 𝜌22= -0.47) show that positive discrepancies from the threshold 
of 𝜏2 = 25.7 US cents decay faster than negative discrepancies. This is in favor of 
exporters. Similarly, the corresponding figures for producer-auction prices are 𝜌13= -0.87 
& 𝜌23= -0.57, indicating that positive discrepancies decay faster than negative ones. This 
is against producers in that negative discrepancies persist more than positive 
discrepancies. 
In order to test whether the transmission is not different from a symmetric adjustment, 
we test the null hypothesis that 𝜌1𝑘 = 𝜌2𝑘. The sample F-statistics shows that the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected, evidencing the presence of asymmetric adjustment. The 
results show that the negative discrepancies do not decay as fast as positive 
discrepancies at all market pairs.  
Table 6.2 Results of TAR model for the whole period 
∆𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑘𝑡𝜌1𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜌2𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
FOB-World price 
Auction-FOB 
price 
Producer-Auction 
prices 
Prod-FOB prices 
k 1 2 3 5 
𝜌1𝑘 -0.87*** -0.73** -0.87*** -0.95*** 
 
(-12.12) (-9.61) (-9.99) (-9.91) 
𝜌2𝑘 -0.57*** -0.47*** -0.57*** -0.45*** 
 
(-9.72) (-7.32) (-9.73) (-7.26) 
𝜏𝑘 24.5 25.7 8.1 20.7 
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𝜌1𝑘 = 𝜌2𝑘 11.0*** 7.2*** 13.0*** 19.5*** 
F-stat 120.7*** 73.0*** 97.3*** 12.4*** 
N 149 149 148 149 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
The above evidence suggests that at each stage of the chain, buyers are favored more 
than sellers: the export market favor importers; the auction markets favor exporters and 
the local markets favor traders. The ultimate negative effect of all these asymmetric 
adjustments will be on the producers. The last regression (Producer-FOB prices) shows 
that 95% of positive discrepancies and 45% of negative discrepancies decay within one 
month. In all these pairs of markets, the point estimates 𝜌1𝑘and 𝜌2𝑘 suggest 
convergence. 
The next step is to see if situations have changed due to institutional and policy 
changes. We estimate the threshold co-integration model using the breaks presented in 
Table 6.1. Looking at the point estimate in the relationship between FOB-World prices 
(Table 6.3), there was no APT before the break. But there is weak evidence of APT after 
the break. The point estimates show that after the break, 104% of the positive 
discrepancies from the long-run relationship decay within one month (𝜌11= -1.04). But 
the corresponding figure for negative discrepancies was only 60% (𝜌21= -0.60). This 
may be due to the fact that the removal of export tax and the abolition of the minimum 
tax may play little role compared to the various distortions existing in the world markets. 
Note also that the magnitude of the asymmetry, in fact, does not reflect the true 
relationship as the world price refers to the average price of Brazilian natural coffee, not 
specifically of Ethiopian coffee.  
Perhaps more relevant for our analysis is the co-integration between auction and export 
markets. We associate this break with the trademarking that took place around 2007. 
The result provides no evidence of APT both before and after the trademarking initiative. 
The point estimates also show no substantial improvement in the speed of adjustment. 
The export market is dominated by few exporters most of which work as agents of 
foreign companies. Unless exporters partly or fully appropriate the potential increase in 
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prices of trademark/GI-protected coffee, they may lack the commitment to maintain the 
quality reputation related with geographic origin. In effect, the increase in price may not 
be transmitted to the rest of downstream markets. 
Table 6.3 Results of the TAR model before and after the breaks 
∆𝜇𝑘𝑡 = 𝐼𝑘𝑡𝜌1𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜌2𝑘𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡 
 
FOB-World (k=1) Auction-FOB (k=2) Producer-Auction (k=3) 
 Oct. 2002 Dec. 2007 Mar. 2011 
k Before After Before After Before After 
𝜌1𝑘 -0.62*** -1.04*** -0.33*** -0.71*** -0.97*** -0.86*** 
 
(-4.89) (-10.98) (-3.52) (-6.00) (-13.11) (-4.14) 
𝜌2𝑘 -0.89*** -0.60*** -0.52*** -0.48*** -0.60*** -0.60*** 
 
(-4.64) (-7.98) (-5.54) (-3.21) (-9.22) (-4.32) 
𝜏𝑘 -24.9 13.8 -10.9 -19.0 9.5 25.9 
𝜌1𝑘 = 𝜌2𝑘 1.61 3.14* 2.08 1.42 14.71*** 1.07 
F-stat 22.7*** 92.2*** 21.6*** 23.1*** 128.5*** 17.9*** 
N 47 101 91 58 117 30 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
The other break observed between auction and producer prices and producer and FOB 
prices was March 2011. Since we couldn’t find any other institutional/policy changes that 
can be associated with this break, we attribute it to ECX. The point estimates for the 
periods before this break shows substantial asymmetry in the speed of decay between 
positive and negative discrepancies. While 97% of positive discrepancies decay within 
one month, only 60% of the negative discrepancies decay within the same period of 
time. The situation has changed little after the break. After the break, the point estimates 
show that respectively 86% and 60% of the positive and negative discrepancies decay 
within one month. The above analyses were made using different breakpoints for each 
pair of co-integrating prices along the coffee market chain. They are thus not 
comparable across the coffee market chain.  
The interest of this paper being the analysis of impacts of ECX on the coffee market 
chain, we want to do a similar analysis using the actual timing of ECX intervention, 
December 2008. Table 6.4 shows the results of threshold TAR model. 
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Table 6.4 Results of TAR model before and after ECX (Dec. 2008) 
∆𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜌1𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡)𝜌2𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
FOB-World (i=1) Auction-FOB (i=2) Prod.-Auction (i=3) 
 
Before After Before After Before After 
𝜌1𝑖 -0.51*** -0.92*** -0.76*** -0.78*** -1.00*** -0.49*** 
 
(-7.12) (-9.29) (-6.35) (-6.94) (-10.36) (-4.36) 
𝜌2𝑖 -0.69*** -0.69*** -0.39*** -0.21 -0.61*** -0.75*** 
 
(-6.97) (-5.41) (-5.85) (-0.75) (-8.23) (-4.45) 
𝜏𝑖 -21.3 13.9 23.5 -37.0 9.5 -15.7 
𝜌1𝑖 = 𝜌2𝑖 2.04 2.13 11.0*** 3.6* 10.1*** 1.5 
F-stat 49.6*** 57.8*** 37.2*** 24.4*** 87.6*** 19.4*** 
N 99 49 99 49 98 49 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; t-value in parenthesis 
The point estimate of positive discrepancies which was 51% before ECX in the TAR 
model for FOB and world prices increased to 92% after ECX. But the corresponding 
values for negative discrepancies remain same at 69%. Yet, the test result of the TAR 
model shows no evidence of asymmetry nor before or after the introduction of  ECX. The 
observed slight improvements in the point estimates of positive discrepancies are 
however against the country’s export earnings. While the institutional interventions by 
ECX are largely to improve the domestic markets, the auction is based on real-time price 
information at the New York commodity market. Contrary to our expectation we found no 
evidence of the improvement in the performances of the export market in transmitting 
world prices to FOB prices. It seems that the interventions by ECX may not be so strong 
to affect the relationships between world and export markets. 
If ECX has improved the performance of the markets, its impacts must be directly 
reflected in the co-integration between the remaining pairs of domestic markets: auction 
prices and FOB prices and producer prices and auction. The result of the threshold 
analysis between FOB and auction price shows that there were no considerable 
improvements both in the speed and asymmetry of adjustments.  
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Before ECX, even if there was strong evidence of APT, there was convergence (t-max is 
significant). The point estimates of 𝜌12 = −0.76 and 𝜌22 = −0.39 suggest convergence 
and the test for the null hypothesis that 𝜌12 = 𝜌22 is strongly rejected suggesting the 
presence of APT. Positive discrepancies decay faster than negative discrepancies 
suggesting that the adjustment process favors exporters. No evidence of improvement 
was found after ECX. Instead, while the point estimate indicates a similar rapid 
adjustment for positive discrepancies, no evidence of adjustment was found for negative 
discrepancies. The point estimates 𝜌12 = −0.78 indicates that 78% of the positive 
discrepancies decay within one month and the point estimates of 𝜌22 for negative 
discrepancies was found to be not different from zero. The results suggest that while the 
auction market eliminates positive discrepancies, it fails to do so with negative 
discrepancies. The t-max value of -0.75 is below the critical value suggesting no 
evidence of convergence. The problem may be that the export market is not competitive 
and monopolized by few exporters. 
Finally, the result for the relationship between producer and auction prices show some 
improvements after ECX. Before ECX, the point estimates of 𝜌12 = −1.00 and 𝜌22 =
−0.61 indicates that positive discrepancies fully decay within one month, only about 61% 
of negative discrepancies decay within one month. The situation improves after ECX. 
The point estimates of 𝜌12 = −0.49 and 𝜌22 = −0.75 indicate that positive discrepancies 
are more persistent than negative discrepancies which are in favor of producers.  
The above analysis shows how discrepancies from the equilibrium decay. It may not 
clearly show price responses. Table 6.5 show the results of the threshold error 
correction model estimations. 
We found that dropping other lags doesn’t reduce the explanatory power of the model. 
We thus use only first difference and one lag of the first difference to capture the 
dynamic adjustment. The value of 𝛾𝑖
+ and 𝛾𝑖
− capture positive and negative short-run 
adjustments and 𝛿𝑗 captures the long-run relationship. In all the above regressions 
except the co-integration between producer and auction prices, we found significant 
long-run relationships between the pair of markets. 
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Table 6.5 Results of error correction model before and after ECX (Dec. 2008) 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑘
+𝐼𝑘𝑡𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑘
−(1 − 𝐼𝑘𝑡)𝜇𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑘∆𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡−𝑑
𝑙
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑘∆𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡−𝑑
𝑙
𝑙=0  & 𝜏𝑖 = 0 
 
FOB-World (1) Auction-FOB (2) Producer-Auction (3) 
k 1 2 3 
 
Before After Before After Before After 
𝛾𝑘
+ -0.48*** -0.87*** -0.66*** -0.59*** -0.95*** -0.47*** 
 
(-6.73) (-8.14) (-6.11) (-4.80) (-9.45) (-4.18) 
𝛾𝑘
− -0.62*** -0.71*** -0.27*** -0.37 -0.55*** -0.59*** 
 
(-6.13) (-5.62) (-4.20) (-1.41) (-6.82) (-3.32) 
𝛿1𝑘 0.01 0.12 0.17* 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 
 -0.14 -1.34 -1.94 -0.81 (-1.36) (-0.33) 
𝛾0𝑘 0.66*** 0.54*** 0.34*** 0.31** 0.25*** 0.14 
 -9.72 -6.15 -4.58 -2.66 -6.52 -1.17 
𝛾1𝑘 0.12* -0.06 0.14* 0.09 0.02 0.06 
 -1.68 (-0.78) -1.71 -0.77 -0.43 -0.53 
𝛾𝑘
+ = 𝛾𝑘
− 1.34 0.99 9.85 0.66* 10.47*** 0.01 
F-stat 35.62*** 23.58*** 17.31*** 10.35*** 31.95*** 5.96*** 
N 99 49 98 49 97 49 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
First, the FOB price was found to adjust at greater speed after ECX for both negative 
and positive discrepancies from long-run relationships and no evidence of asymmetry 
was found. Before ECX the auction price was found to adjust faster to positive 
discrepancies than to negative discrepancies. The situation became even worse after 
ECX. After ECX, the auction market adjusts prices to eliminate about 59% of the positive 
discrepancies from long-run relationships but fails to adjust prices to eliminate negative 
discrepancies. This suggests that negative deviations from long run equilibrium persist 
indefinitely. This is obviously against local traders. No evidence of convergence was 
found between auction and FOB prices after ECX.  
Finally, before ECX the local market was found to adjust producer prices to eliminate 
positive discrepancies almost fully but to only eliminate almost half of the negative 
discrepancies. After ECX, the local market was found to adjust producer prices to 
eliminate positive discrepancies no differently from negative discrepancies. While there 
was no evidence of asymmetric adjustment, the speed of adjustment was slower than it 
was before. In almost all cases, the point estimates suggest that downstream markets 
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adjust prices in a way that eliminates positive discrepancies more rapidly than negative 
discrepancies. The results were robust when the analysis is made with balanced data. 
Diverse problems could be responsible for these poor impacts. The first is there are 
almost no interventions made to transform local markets. In addition, coffee especially 
for those farmers who sell red cherries (20-30% of farmers), cannot be stored. A ripe 
coffee has to be harvested and should be sold within 2-3 days even if the price in the 
market is low. In addition, transactions are personalized and segmented through social 
networks (Gelaw et al. 2016). Traders in the local markets are few. The social 
environment is also conducive for collusion. Traders can, therefore, enjoy monopsony 
power. Oligopsonic traders thus may not have the incentive to increase prices when the 
price of the central market increases but have the incentive to reduce price when prices 
at the central market decline. Price declines are likely to persist more than price 
increases, leading to positive. Unlike asymmetric price transmission caused by other 
factors that generate asymmetry with respect to the speed of transmission but not with 
respect to the magnitude (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004), 
monopoly/monopsony power can cause asymmetry in both speed and magnitude. In 
addition, the export market is dominated by few exporters and distorted by various trade 
policies. Increase in FOB prices may not fully and rapidly transmit to auction markets. 
In general, local markets remain favorable to traders, auction markets favorable to 
exporters and export markets favorable to importers even after ECX. For interventions 
such as commoditization, trademarking and fair-trade policies to benefit smallholder 
farmers markets at the upstream of the chain must be efficient enough in transmitting 
prices. We conclude that interventions at the higher level markets such as the 
introduction of commodity exchange system, export promotion, trademarking or fair-
trade cannot reach farmers if the value chain is not efficient enough in transmitting price 
changes all the way down to farmers rapidly, fully and symmetrically. Otherwise, price 
improvements from these interventions dissipate in between. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The high transaction costs and risks that arise due to information and enforcement 
problems are considered to be responsible for the poor performances of agricultural 
markets in Ethiopia. These problems, if real, provide strong justifications for institutional 
interventions through the introduction of a commodity exchange system. The 
introduction of ECX was an attempt to reduce transaction costs and risks which were 
constraining the central market. Its primary goal was to create a market that works for 
millions of smallholder farmers.  
We evaluate the impacts of ECX and other interventions on price transmission along the 
world-export-auction-local coffee market chain. We first compare price transmissions 
between each pair of markets using each of the three institutional interventions as 
breakpoints. In most of the cases, we found an increase in the speed of adjustments for 
positive discrepancies but not for negative ones between pairs of markets. These results 
suggest improvements in favor of buyers at the upstream markets. Specifically, we 
found no improvements in the speed of adjustment between local and auction market.  
We finally compare the price transmission from upstream to downstream markets using 
the actual ECX intervention period of December 2008. The results indicate that the 
speed and symmetry of price transmissions have not changed considerably after ECX. 
Specifically, downstream markets adjust prices to eliminate positive discrepancies more 
rapidly than negative discrepancies. The primary aim of the sweeping reform made by 
ECX was to benefit smallholder coffee producers which are, according to FAO (2014), 
more than four million. There is a wide perception that ECX revolutionized agricultural 
markets (Mbeng-Mezui et al. 2013; UNCTAD 2009 and the media) and Gabre-Madhin 
(2012) claims ECX to be a market that works for the farmers. Contrary to these popular 
views and claims, we found little improvements in the speed and symmetry of price 
transmissions along the coffee chain. Hernandez et al. (2015) also found a limited 
impact on price integration between the different markets.  
ECX envisaged that providing price information will increase the bargaining power of 
farmers. But in a situation where local markets are less competitive, knowing at what 
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price coffee is being sold at the central market gives the selling farmers no more than a 
hint about the potential gains of their buyer. After all, the price information is about 
processed and graded coffee beans, what farmers sell is unprocessed and 
unstandardized coffee cherries. We conclude that as long as the local markets remain 
traditional and personalized and the export market little competitive, farmers will 
continue to receive a small share of the final price for their produce. All the evidence 
imply that improving the market to benefit farmers requires more than just institutional 
intervention through commodity exchange. Further liberalization reforms and 
infrastructural investments can better transform local and export markets. Particularly 
the various restraints that limit competition need to be removed. Traders should be 
allowed to trade across regions. In addition, other institutional support should be made 
to improve the local markets.  
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Chapter 7 Perception of traders and exporters about ECX 
Abstract 
The old auction system was fraught with information and contract enforcement 
problems. The central purpose of the intervention of ECX was to reduce these 
transaction problems by structuring the behavioral patterns of the primary transacting 
parties (exporters and importers) and by providing supportive services. Gabre-Madhin 
(2012) claims that ECX was  effective in meeting these objectives. To check this claim a 
survey was thus made to examine the perception of traders and exporters about the 
impacts of the intervention. The results show that there was a considerable improvement 
regarding securing payments and delivery, two issues which were  big problems of the 
previous auction system. However, the institutional efficiency of ECX in improving 
competition and providing efficient services was reported to be limited. Finally, most 
traders perceive the transaction fees charged by ECX as excessive. 
7.1 Introduction 
As described in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2, ECX has made a number of interventions 
that transforms the central auction market into a modern type of commodity market. A lot 
of interventions have been made that dramatically changed the playing field and the 
rules of the game. But how do the players view the playing field and the rules of the 
game? Our interest here is to know the perception of traders and exporters about the 
changes in reference with the old auction system. We evaluate the impacts of the 
interventions at the backdrop of the broader institutional environment in the country.  
The primary purpose of the intervention was to reduce the transaction costs and risks 
that were constraining the central markets. The assumption was that these transaction 
costs are not only transferred to the farmers but also that the high transaction cost 
reduces the efficiency of the central markets. So by reducing the transaction costs at the 
central markets the performance of the central markets could be improved and that this 
would be transferred to the farmers. In the previous chapter, we found little evidence that 
supports the improvement in the efficiency of markets. We found there that the change 
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in the performance of the markets in transmitting price changes from the upstream 
markets to the downstream markets was not only limited but also not symmetric. Here 
we are  interested to further examine the perception of the transacting parties about the 
impacts of the intervention on different transaction-related attributes: transaction costs 
and risks, effectiveness and efficiency of the auction operations and the level of 
competition and impersonalization of the transactions. We thus describe perceptions of 
traders and exporters concerning these aspects and examine the validity of their 
evaluation in terms of the reality on the ground. 
7.2 Data type and sources and method of Analysis 
The study uses data collected from 43 traders described in Section 6.2 and 10 exporters 
found in Dire Dawa city. Even if the numbers of exporters operating when the survey 
was made in December 2013 were 15, for various reasons we were able to interview 
only 10 of them. The data was collected using structured questionnaires. But in addition 
to this, informal discussions with exporters and experts of the Dire Dawa Coffee Quality 
Inspection and Assurance Center, ECX experts, ECEA, traders, Woreda coffee 
marketing experts of Agricultural Development Offices were also made.  
7.3 Results and discussions 
The following sections describe the results of the survey data. Due to the small size of 
the sample, we only use simple descriptive statistics. Two transacting parties usually will 
have competing interests on a given institutional arrangement. We, therefore, compare 
and construct the perception of traders and exporters in order to get a better 
understanding of the issues. 
7.3.1 Impacts of ECX on transaction costs and risks 
Payment and delivery failures were the main problems of the old auction system. While 
delivery failure is a transaction risk for exporters, payment failure is a risk for traders as 
described in Sub-Section 2.3.2.2. The introduction of an electronic payment system, in 
collaboration with partners banks, has made this activity easier and certain. The other 
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side of the transaction activity is transaction risks associated with delivery. However 
74.4% of traders reported improvement in delivery failure (Table 7.1), their result may 
not count as this action concerns them less. What counts more here is the perception of 
exports as it is them facing the problem. Regarding the delivery, only 40% of the 
exporters reported improvements in the delivery system. Exporters raise a lot of issues 
associated with ECX delivery system. Exporters once they paid the money, they collect 
the product from the warehouse located at different places in the country. They reported 
that there are a lot of delays, failure to deliver the specified quality and quantity, and a lot 
of inconveniences in the place of delivery. They reported that after they incurred a lot of 
transportation costs, they are rerouted to collect the coffee from another warehouse. 
Given these problems, the impact of ECX in eliminating payment risks cannot be 
exaggerated as the risk is simply a transfer of part of the transaction risks from traders to 
exporters. 
Table 7.1 Perception of traders and exporters about transaction costs and risks 
 Traders Exporters 
 Improved Worsen 
No 
change 
Improved Worsen 
No 
change 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Delivery failure 32 74.4 9 20.9 2 4.7 4 40.0 6 60.0  0.0 
Payment failure 35 81.4 8 18.6  0.0 7 70.0 1 10.0 2 20.0 
Adulteration and fraud 23 53.5 19 44.2 1 2.3 6 60.0 3 30.0 1 10.0 
Taxes and service fees 24 55.8 18 41.9 1 2.3 5 50.0 3 30.0 2 20.0 
Source: own computation 
Concerning transaction risks associated with adulteration and fraud again this is a 
transaction risk faced by exporters. Of the total ten exporters, 60% reported 
improvements in adulterations and other fraudulent activities. Exporters said that they 
sometimes receive below the grade level they agreed during the transactions. The 
problem seems to be associated with the grading and standardization system of ECX. 
During our visit of exporters have even shown us a pile of stones and other foreign 
materials sorted out from the coffee they purchased. Despite the efforts to improve the 
problem, the improvement was not considerable. Traders have even seemed to have 
admitted this problem in that only 53.4% of the traders reported improvements. It may be 
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an attempt of the traders to transfer the transaction risks they face in the local markets 
onto the exporters. Even if ECX established a legal system to resolve disputes 
associated with delivery and other contract problems, exporters reported that the dispute 
settlement and arbitration system is costly and less efficient. Finally, the majority of both 
traders and exporters agree that the transactions costs associated with taxes and 
transaction service fees have not decreased much. Both exporters and traders reported 
that the various fees are excessive and the restrictions (especially the limit on storage 
periods) are restrictive. 
7.3.2 Impacts of ECX on efficiency of key transaction activities 
Both traders and exporters reported an improvement in the efficiency of key transaction 
activities carried out by ECX. We asked both traders and exporters about the efficiency 
of the various operations made by ECX to facilitate the transactions. Except for the 
inefficiency of the delivery system reported by most exporters, the majority of both 
traders and exporters (greater than 70%) reported improvements in the efficiency of 
facilitating the transactions (Table 7.2).  
Table 7.2 Efficiency of key transaction activities 
 Traders Exporters 
 Improved Worsen 
No 
change 
Improved Worsen 
No 
change 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Clearing 40 93.0 2 4.7 1 2.3 6 66.7 1 11.1 2 22.2 
Handling 41 95.3 1 2.3 1 2.3 8 80.0  0.0 2 20.0 
Auction system 35 81.4 7 16.3 1 2.3 7 70.0 2 20.0 1 10.0 
Payment 34 79.1 9 20.9  0.0 9 90.0  0.0 1 10.0 
Delivery 32 74.4 11 25.6  0.0 3 30.0 7 70.0  0.0 
Grading  28 65.1 15 34.9  0.0 7 70.0 2 20.0 1 10.0 
7.3.3 Impacts of ECX on competition 
The other issue is the degree of competition and the presence of collusion in the market. 
While 50% of the exporters do not agree about the increase in competition in the local 
market, the vast majority (90.7%) of traders reported that the level of competition has 
increased in the local markets (Table 7.3). Given there is little intervention made by ECX 
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to improve the local market, observation of most exporters seems reasonable. With 
regard to the degree of competition at the auction floor, the majority of both traders and 
exporters believe competition at the auction market has increased with ECX. A similar 
observation was reflected both by the majority of traders and exporters about the 
impersonalized nature of the transaction. There is here a clear evidence that the degree 
of impersonalization and the level of competition has increased with ECX than without 
ECX. 
Surprisingly, almost half of traders and exporters believe that collusion increased with 
ECX than without ECX. This result was unexpected and contradicts the result reported 
about the level of competition. Both collusion and competition may exist if the traders are 
segmented into different groups. In such condition, there could be collusion among 
group members on each side of traders and exporters, but there could be completion 
between these various groups. In an environment where individuals are socially 
connected and less independent, it is always difficult to avoid collusion of various sorts. 
Despite the interventions made to make the transactions impersonalized, collusion 
apparently remains a problem. However ECX introduced various IT-based technologies 
that make the transactions impersonalized, the technology may not break the 
sophisticated human relationship if the social environment is knit with dense social 
networks. The social environment plays an important role here. 
Table 7.3 Extent of collusion of seller and buyers 
Actors relationships 
Traders Exporters 
Increased 
Decrease
d 
No 
change 
Increas
ed 
Decreas
ed 
No 
change 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Competition (local market) 39 90.7 3 7.0 1 2.3 4 40.0 1 10.0 5 50.0 
Competition (auction market) 38 88.4 2 4.7 3 7.0 6 60.0 1 10.0 3 30.0 
Impersonalized transaction 41 95.3 2 4.7 0 0.0 6 60.0 2 20.0 2 20.0 
Collusion among buyers 22 51.2 15 34.9 6 14.0 6 60.0 4 40.0 0 0.0 
Collusion among sellers 24 55.8 13 30.2 6 14.0 6 60.0 4 40.0 0 0.0 
Extent of Illegal trading 22 51.2 19 44.2 2 4.7 3 30.0 5 50.0 2 20.0 
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Finally, we asked both parties two interesting questions. Who benefits due to ECX 
interventions? Exporters, traders, farmers or agents? In order to check the consistency, 
we also asked them the counterfactual of the above question: who would have benefited 
if there was no ECX intervention i.e. if the old auction system had continued to this day? 
The result was surprising but consistent – each party construes the other party as 
benefited more both with the intervention and without the intervention.  
Table 7.4 Distribution of gainers and losers with ECX interventions 
Market actors 
With ECX Without ECX 
Traders Exporters Traders Exporters 
N % N % N % N % 
Producer/farmers 27 62.8 7 63.6 6 14.0   
Middlemen 1 2.3 1 9.1 5 11.6 1 9.1 
Suppliers 3 7.0 2 18.2 12 27.9 6 54.5 
Exporters 12 27.9 1 9.1 20 46.5 4 36.4 
As presented in Table 7.4, in both scenarios, the exporters take suppliers as benefited 
more with ECX intervention and even without ECX. But they both agree on one thing; 
the farmers benefited more due to ECX interventions. The intervention clearly changed 
the rule of the game of the central market. If it affects, it should affect the situation at the 
central market than it does the local markets. On the contrary, no deliberate intervention 
was made to alter the rules of the game between local traders and farmers except for 
delivery of information about auction prices. As discussed in Chapter 5, the role of this 
price information is minimal. Perhaps the rise in the level of export, the number of 
exporters and the level of competition coupled with the rise in domestic prices might 
have enabled farmers to benefit more now than they were before  
7.4 Conclusions 
Generally, the perception of both traders and exporters on the impacts of ECX was 
positive. We conclude that ECX intervention has eliminated the transaction risks 
associated with payment failure. But given the different delivery problems exporters are 
facing, the impact of ECX in eliminating payment risks cannot be exaggerated as the 
effect was simply a transfer of part of the transaction risks from traders to exporters. 
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Even if there are undeniable improvements in the transaction risks associated with 
delivery and payment failures, ECX should still improve the efficiency of its delivery 
system. Concerning the impacts of ECX in reducing the level of collusions and 
increasing the level of competitions, we found that both collusion and competition 
existed even with ECX. This is surprising given the transaction at the auction market is 
impersonalized. We suspect that there are factions in both traders and exporters side. 
However ECX introduced various IT-based technologies that make the transactions 
impersonalized, the technology may not break the sophisticated human relationship if 
the social environment knit with dense of social networks. Finally, while both perceive 
farmers as gainers ECX, each views the other as gainers both with and without the 
interventions. In all cases, there seems to be lack of objective judgment of the impacts of 
ECX. 
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Chapter 8 Impacts of trademarking on export and producer prices 
Abstract 
Like some developing countries, Ethiopia, with the help of a public campaign by Oxfam, 
managed to obtain trademark protection in many Western countries for three of its fine 
coffees: Yirgachefe, Harar and Sidama coffees. The main goal of the trademarking 
initiative was to help smallholder producers to capture price premia for their fine coffee. 
We analyze the impacts of trademark protection on the relative Free on Board (FOB) 
and producer prices of trademarked coffee in comparison with non-trademarked 
Ethiopian coffee. We found that the trademarking has positive impacts in improving the 
level and trend of FOB prices. However, producing farmers capture only small portion of 
this price premia. Besides, we also found that the trademark protection is not compatible 
with the non-traceable transactions system of Ethiopian commodity exchange.   
8.1 Introduction 
The increasing demand for food offered by the globalized trade incentivized firms to use 
not only yield-increasing intensive technologies but also made the use of processing and 
preservation technologies necessary in the agri-food sector. Potential adverse impacts 
of the modern production and processing systems on health and the environment have 
increasingly become a public concern. As a result quality of food products has become 
an important variable in determining the direction of trade and export performances of 
countries. Moreover Curzi & Pacca (2015). The unobservable nature of most quality 
attributes has led society to generalized indicators of quality, especially in the food 
sector. One of such indicators has become geographic origin. In response to this shift in 
taste and preference, firms in the agri-food sector have come to increasingly use product 
differentiations as an important strategic instrument (Bramley et al. 2009). Among 
others, “geographic origin” has become an important tool for product differentiations. 
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Geographic Indication (GI) is an umbrella term whose overall purpose is to distinguish 
the identification of a product’s origin (ITC, 2009). It ranges from labeling the origin22 
(without conveying any information about quality-origin relationships) to the protection of 
origin as a property for having a distinct quality to certification of origin and quality. GIs 
are legally implemented in different forms such as Appellation of Origin (AO), 
Denomination of Origin (DO), Protected Designated Origin (PDO), Protected Geographic 
Indication (PGI), and Marks. 
The economic reason behind a shift to GIs is the information problem. While for 
consumers the shift to GIs is an attempt to reduce information problems, for firms’ 
product differentiation through GI is a strategic response to supply the information 
consumers need. But in a globalized world, this does not only lead to product 
proliferation and differentiation, it also creates an information burden, because the 
reliability of the information can become a major concern. 
Neoclassical economic theory claims that the pricing mechanism, in the long run, 
incentivizes firms to supply reasonably reliable information. On the contrary, institutional 
economics argues that information asymmetry is an inherent failure of the pricing 
mechanism that limits the development of the market itself. Institutional interventions 
should correct these market failures. Given the potential adverse effects of ‘short-run’ 
information asymmetries in the agri-food sector on public health and the environment, 
this provides a strong argument. As a result, institutions that define and enforce quality 
standards have become an important component of the agrifood markets (Bramley et al. 
2009). 
Effective product differentiation through GI protection creates a niche market 
(Rangnekar 2004) that confers farmers some monopolistic power and motivates their 
market participation (Josling 2006). Many studies in EU and US markets found that 
consumers are willing to pay price premia for GI-protected products including coffee 
(e.g. WTO 2004; Teuber 2010; Barjolle et al. 2009; Loureiro and McCluskey 2000). 
Whether this price gain is sufficient to cover the additional marketing costs (GI-
                                                 
22
 Unless mentioned when necessary, origin in this document refers to geographic area where the product is produced 
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protections administration and promotion costs) is less known. But even if the premium 
is sufficient to cover these marketing costs, producers may have to incur additional 
costs, compared to standard products, in the production of GI products. The two-fold 
concern is thus how much of the price gain reaches producers which are located at the 
bottom of the value chain and whether that gain is sufficient to justify additional 
production costs. 
Developing countries have increasingly become interested in obtaining legal protection 
for their agricultural products in the world markets. Examples include Blue Mountain 
coffee of Jamaica (Schroede 2009) and Kona coffee of Hawaii (Giovannucci and Smit 
2009). With the help of Oxfam, Ethiopia also launched a trademarking initiative to 
register its fine coffee. As a result, in 2008 many European countries, United States, 
Japan, and other western countries signed the agreement to register three Ethiopian 
coffees namely: Harar, Yirgachefe, and Sidama coffees under a Community Trade Mark 
(CTM), with the government being the owner of the trademark (Teuber 2010). Each 
coffee type occupies distinct regions. Yet the demarcation of the boundaries is not 
strictly geographic in that it follows administrative boundaries. Even though no legal 
protection was provided in the foreign markets before the trademarking, these origins 
were legally designated already long ago. Through the country’s Legal Notice No. 196 of 
1955 which amended the Coffee Cleaning and Grading Regulations of 1952, the origin 
of coffee was designated to be “Harar,” “Sidamo,” “Jimma” and “Lekemti” (broadly called 
Wellega) (Berhe 2010). Since then, these names were used in the domestic as well as 
in the export transactions. The trademarking is only meant to obtain legal protection in 
the foreign markets. 
The primary motive for this move is to improve rural livelihood by capturing some 
lucrative markets. To what extent the trademarking improves price and increases market 
access depends on how the process is implemented, protected and exploited (Bramley, 
2011). In addition, there is nothing in the system that guarantees that the rural poor 
ultimately benefit from such institutional interventions.  
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The implicit assumption behind GI-protection is that the market is efficient to distribute 
the price gain according to their marginal contributions in the process of GI-related value 
additions. One of the concerns here is that there are increased instances of exploitation 
and misappropriation especially in the export markets (Bramley et al. 2009) as upstream 
actors have better access to the channels and the different modes of exploitation of the 
reputation of the product (Belletti 1999). In addition, various market distortions at each 
level along the market chain could also erode the producers’ share of the price premium. 
Teuber (2010) studied the impacts of trademarking on the world price. He found that GIs 
is an important determinant of the price paid by importers and roasters. But he also 
noted that in spite of the increasing reputation in consuming countries, the price 
premium of Ethiopian fine coffee is not as large as that of GI coffee of other countries 
such as Colombia. Notwithstanding how effective the trademarking may be in improving 
the relative prices of Ethiopian coffee in the world market, it does not guarantee that 
exporters fully capture the price gains. Using FOB price data of Ethiopian coffee for the 
periods between November 2005 and February 2009, Arslan and Reicher (2010) also 
analyzed the impacts of the Oxfam campaign for trademarking of Ethiopian coffee on 
export prices. They found positive impacts of the campaign on export prices. But two 
years after the trademarking, Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) took a step that 
potentially curbed the potential positive impacts of the trademarking by changing the 
auction system in a way that erodes traceability of coffee. In a condition where 
transactions are not traceable, traders may have the incentive to mix products of less 
reputable origin with reputable ones. This will negatively affect the price premium of 
coffee of reputable origins. Leung (2014) estimated the negative impacts of this erosion 
of traceability on the export prices of Ethiopian coffee to be equivalent to 26% of the 
income a farmer gets from the coffee.  
For the eroded traceability to have no effect on coffee export, there must be a system 
that provides assurance to buyers about the quality. Ubilava and Foster (2009) found  
that quality certification and traceability are substitutes in consumers’ quality evaluation. 
Even though the Speciality Coffee Association America (SCAA) strongly suggested to 
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go for certification, the Ethiopian Government chose trademark protection over 
certification (Arslan and Reicher 2010). But while certification gives better guarantees to 
foreign buyers about quality, trademarking doesn’t really give such guarantees.  
The efficiency of the trademark-protection in ensuring quality thus depends on the 
efficiency of the system; on what Belletti (1999) called “the institutionalization of 
reputation”. Studies indicate that trademarking works best in incentivizing reputation 
when a single firm controls the value chain or when there are strong coordination and 
control among the diverse parties along the chain (Barcala et al 2007). Such 
coordination is possible when farmers’ cooperatives control the value chain (Moschini  et 
al. 2008). But the participation of cooperatives in the coffee export is limited as 
described in Section 2.3. Thus coffee transaction involves millions of producers, 
thousands of small local traders and hundreds of medium-sized exporters and importers, 
such coordination is hardly possible. In such a case , it is not clear how the GI-protection 
impacts on price  along the chain.  
Given that the primary goal of GI-protection, especially in the case of developing 
countries, is to create a niche market for farmers, there is increased interest to analyze 
the impacts of GI-protection specifically on producers (Arslan and Reicher 2010; 
Bramley et al. 2009; Teuber 2010). Even if producers capture a substantial portion of the 
price gains, the sustainability of the gains depends on the strength of institutionalizations 
in incentivizing reputation. Particularly of concern in the case of developing countries is 
the lack of strong local institutions that incentivize collective reputation all along the 
value chain (Bramley, 2011). When the “institutionalization of reputation” is weak, the GI-
protected product will finally become generic as in the case of Yemen’s Mocha coffee 
(Giovannucci 2005).  
Unlike previous studies, we are interested in the long-term impacts of the GI-protection 
(through trademark protection) on both export and producer prices. We, therefore, 
analyze the impacts of trademark protection both on the level and trends of export (FOB) 
and producer prices of trademarked coffee in comparison with non-trademarked 
Ethiopian coffee. Moreover, we are also interested in the interaction between  two 
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institutional interventions: trademarking and EXC. Studies in the areas of coffee use 
producer prices of coffee beans. However, farmers sell coffee to local traders either 
dried or wet coffee cherries, not coffee beans. Since quality assessment is less evident 
for coffee cherries than for green coffee beans, we conjecture that selling coffee cherry 
involves additional transaction costs. Thus, to capture such transaction costs, we use 
two sets of producer prices: the price of dried and wet coffee cherries and the price of 
green coffee beans. In addition, the study also compares the volatility and price 
divergence between the trademarked and non-trademarked coffee. 
8.2 Institutional aspects surrounding GI-protection 
The economic arguments around Geographic Indication (GI) schemes are founded on 
the economic theories of information and reputation. Generally, distinctive quality traits 
of food products are not readily observable. Thus verifying the exact origin of a product 
before purchase is very difficult. Nor do such traits become evident by a single 
consumption. Verifying quality of a product thus involves what Nelson (1970) called 
‘experience’ costs. In order to minimize these costs, consumers, after repeated 
consumptions, identify some quality attributes (Carriquiry and Babcock 2004). It may be 
due to this Van der Lans et al. (2001) found the preference for origin label products 
specific to the consumers who are residents of the product’s region of origin. Although 
these attributes can be imperfect, and sometimes wrong indicators of quality, 
consumers’ valuations will depend on these attributes. For example, after using in-depth 
surveys and research, Cenicafé has successfully identified 36 out of 1,050 chemical 
components that enable buyers to determine the origin of coffee in Colombia 
(Giovannucci and Samper 2009). The question, of course, is how these quality 
differences lead to geographic origin. Empirical evidence on the link between terroir and 
quality is mixed (Deconinck and Swinnen 2014). 
Under natural production circumstances, there is a logical reason to believe that the 
agro-ecological milieu will have a lot of bearing on the quality of the product such as the 
nutritional content, flavor, color, texture, etc. But production processes can also distort 
these natural relationships. 
  
160 
 
 
In a modern production environment where producers use diverse ‘imported’ organic 
and inorganic inputs and sophisticated production and processing technologies, the 
correlation between quality attributes and geographic location of the production is likely 
to be small. But in an environment where producers use traditional production systems 
that approximate hunting-gathering, most of the quality attributes will be substantially 
determined by the specific agro-ecological milieu and the associated indigenous 
production practices. In such conditions, obviously many of the quality attributes will be 
coded in the geographic origin of the product. Attributes that make up the terroir. It is 
precisely this biological-ecological interaction that underlies the GI regulation (Deconinck 
and Swinnen 2014). Naturality being an important attribute for GI-protection scheme 
(van Ittersum and Candel 1998), origin in such environment becomes an important 
indicator of quality. As a result, geographic origin has become one of the most important 
attributes, especially in the agri-food sector. 
In Ethiopia diverse agro-ecological zones exist, with a wide range of altitudes from 125 
m below sea level in the Afar Depression to 4550 m above sea level at the Ras Dejen  
Semen mountains. This agroecology provides an ideal environment for many types of 
crops. This coupled with the centuries old cultivation practice made the country the 
birthplace of many crops (Marcus 1994). Coffee is one of them. The traditional nature of 
the production system furthermore gives many crops in the country distinctive quality. 
Thus, by virtue of its diverse agroecology and the traditional nature of its production 
system, specific locations in the country are reputable for specific products. The primary 
information buyers demand in Ethiopia often is  the origin of the product. This applies to 
almost all types of crop and livestock products - cereals, honey, beef, mutton, etc. Every 
location is reputable at least for one agricultural product. Consumers use such reputable 
origins (or origins that approximate them) as an important indicator of quality. Cognizant 
of this, traders and service providers such as hotels, restaurants, butcheries and 
groceries commonly use the names of reputable geographic locations as a strategic 
means to promote their products. This is not different for coffee . 
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The link between geographic origin and quality seems to be evident especially when the 
production assumes the ideal natural environment. The problem is how to incentivize 
firms to provide reliable information about true origins. Because the market fails to do so 
there is room for institutional interventions to correct the existing information asymmetry. 
However this alone does not justify GI protection. Like the information asymmetry in any 
other market, the institutional interventions through a combination of labeling, 
standardization and the like would suffice to correct the information problem. The goal of 
institutional interventions through GI protection seems to be broader than correcting 
information asymmetries.  
GI and trademarking are the protection of goodwill against free-riding and they reduce 
search costs associated with information problems faced by consumers . Trademarks 
are used to differentiate products and do not necessarily indicate quality. GI-protection 
can be viewed as a process whereby reputation is institutionalized to reduce information 
asymmetry and to discourage potential free riding on reputation (Bramley et al. 2009). It 
provides protections for both consumers and producers; consumers by reducing 
information asymmetry and producers by protecting reputation as an asset (OECD 
2000).  
Like other market failures, GI-protection systems can also suffer from institutional 
failures. First, knowledge of the designer about consumers’ valuations of geographic 
origins is limited. Second, the political process involves many interest groups (Deconinck 
and Swinnen 2014) and its design could be distorted. This occurs especially when the 
GI-protection is used more to create lucrative markets for producers than to correct 
information asymmetry. Third, reputation rewards commitment only with a lag, it works 
only imperfectly (Shapiro 1982). While there are potential benefits both for consumers 
and producers, GI-protections are still controversial (Bramley et al. 2009) as evidenced 
by the divisive debate in trade negotiations which Josling (2006) called a ‘war on terroir’. 
Much of the concern on GI-protection is that it can limit competition (e.g. Hassan et al. 
2011) and that it can be a non-transparent trade barrier. Hassan et al. (2001) for 
example showed undesirable effects of PGO cheese on competition. The controversy on 
  
162 
 
 
GI increased due to a range of cases that arose concerning the precise relationship 
between geographic location and quality and the different unintended outcomes of 
alternative public interventions (Josling 2006). 
When the transactions are organized along a vertically integrated value chain, 
enforcement of standards will not only be easier, it will also match commitment with 
incentive. The problem is that when chains of several independent actors trade a 
product for which it is costly to verify the origin, enforcement will not only be difficult but 
the GI-protection may not align incentives with commitment. 
Even before the trademarking initiative, the reputation of Ethiopian coffees can be 
evidenced by the price premia they receive in the world market (see Chapter 6). 
Ethiopian government initiated the trademarking project when Starbucks wanted to start 
a trademark under the name ‘Sidamo’ (one of the Ethiopian fine coffees). The Ethiopian 
government with the support of Oxfam, America took the issue to court. Finally, the 
government succeeded to obtain trademark protection. The source of the initiative and 
the important events that have led to the trademarking initiative are extensively 
described in Arslan and Reicher (2010).  
The primary target of the trademarking initiative was to improve the export earnings of 
the country and increasing the bargaining power of exporters. Thus, it should primarily 
have effects in the international market. But the ultimate goal of the trademarking 
initiative was to improve the magnitude and the stability of coffee prices at the producer 
level. The idea is that providing legal protections to the already recognized unique 
qualities of Ethiopian fine coffee in the world market will not only reduce the information 
asymmetry which foreign buyers face but it also incentivize Ethiopian exporters to 
maintain quality reputations.  
In an environment where there are no institutions that protect the use of trademarks by 
others, other traders will have the incentive to cash in on the names of origins reputable 
for quality in specific product attributes (Josling 2006). In such a case consumers cannot 
take full advantage of origin as an indicator for quality. In the long run, information 
asymmetry will drive prices of reputable origins to the prices of marginal quality. It can 
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even drive reputable origins out of markets if the production costs in the reputable origin 
are higher than in the less reputable origin. This is similar to the case of Akerlof’s (1970) 
used car markets. This may require strong legal protection from the public. 
Unfortunately, the costs of these activities tend to be prohibitively high as the market 
environment is such that individuals buy from millions of smallholder farmers, who sell 
very small proportions in widely scattered village markets. It might be due to this reason 
modern hybrid varieties entirely replaced many indigenous varieties of crops and 
livestock breeds that have unique quality attributes. 
8.3 Conceptual framework: A case of small-holder farmers 
Theoretically, an exporter choosing between trading GI-protected and GI-unprotected 
coffee will equate the relative marginal costs of buying GI-protected coffee (relative to 
GI-unprotected coffee) with the relative marginal benefits of selling GI-protected coffee. 
To simplify our analysis, let us take the export market as a starting point. Let us assume 
that the market is perfectly competitive and marketing costs between GI-protected and 
GI-unprotected coffees are equal. For the latter to be plausible, the transportation, 
handling, and other marketing costs should depend on the volume of coffee, not on its 
monetary value. However although transportation costs usually depend on volume, other 
costs such as handling, service fees, etc. depend on the value of coffee. The implicit 
assumption here is that the transaction costs of trading differentiated products are equal. 
Curzi & Pacca (2015) noted the magnitude of the relationship between price and quality 
of food exports to differ according to the level of product differentiation. Given the 
products are close substitutes, we can safely assume that the differences are small 
enough to be ignored. 
Let us suppose these costs are negligible. Thus, an exporter will pay for GI-protected 
coffee until its domestic price premium equals its FOB price premium. Since exporters 
usually buy coffee after they make the contractual agreement with the importer, they 
fully know the FOB price. In effect, the price margin between GI-protected and GI-
unprotected coffee in the domestic market will be equal to FOB price premium of GI-
protected. By taking FOB prices, we omitted those freight, insurance, import tariffs and 
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other costs that depend on value. If we consider insurance, import duties and other 
trading costs that vary with the value traded, thus FOB price premium will be less than 
the price premia importers receive in the world markets. The FOB price premium will 
thus be less than the price premium the importer receives. If there are distortions like 
taxes and other distortions in the foreign market a similar difference will exist between 
the world market price premium and the price premium that final consumers pay. Since 
our interest is to see the impact of trademarking on the relationship between export and 
domestic price, we can ignore the above distortion.  
Since GI-certification is based on the origin of the product and the scheme inherently 
requires that products of another geographic origin cannot be traded within GI-protected 
territories, there are no trademark-protection costs.  
The above hypothesis is based on perfectly competitive export and domestic markets. In 
the real domestic and export markets, not only the level of competition is limited 
especially in the export markets (Gelaw et al. 2016), there are also a number of failures 
in the domestic markets. One of the critical issues, in this case, is the information 
asymmetry on the true origin of the coffee. 
The context is such that very large number of farmers naturally produce a reputable 
coffee in a geographically wide territory. Also, the overall context is such that it is difficult 
to organize and coordinate collective marketing. The dominant supply chain is that 
traders buy coffee from farmers and sell graded and origin-labeled coffee to exporters at 
the central auction market. The grading and labeling are made by ECX. Even if the 
transaction at the central auction market is impersonalized and non-traceable, 
information problem will not arise if the origin-labeling is perfect.  
If trade across the different terroir is effectively blocked, the labeling can easily be done 
at the warehouses. In this case, there is no information problem at the auction market. 
Whether they pay quality premium or not depends on the efficiency of the export market 
in incentivizing reputation. This is because, once exporters buy coffee at the auction 
market, they can mix different brands. The export market for Ethiopian coffee is such 
that it provides trademark-protections for some of the geographic origins: for three 
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origins among the dominant five. Since the geographical designations are protected by 
trademarks and there is no origin-certification, the trademarks become a common 
property for exporters and importers. Thus free-riding can be a potential problem. 
Exporters can also export genuine origin in order to build a reputation. But such 
commitment arises from the motives of the firm to build the reputation. For this to occur, 
it is necessary that the firm must capture a certain portion of the price premium as a 
reward for its commitment. But the reputation will only be rewarded  partially because 
information on who is reputable is imperfect. Thus there will be some deadweight loss in 
the premia. Anyway, a certain portion of the premia will be absorbed by the exports. 
The willingness of exporters to transfer the realized premia to local traders will depend 
on the competition between exporters at the auction market. If the auction market is 
perfectly competitive, the premia that remain after compensating commitment will be 
transferred to local traders. If the competition is imperfect, the exporter still captures the 
premia above the amount used to compensate commitment. This further erodes the 
portion of premia that goes to traders.  
Furthermore,  the portion of the price premia that is transferred from traders to farmers 
will depend on the efficiency of the local markets. Traders can also capture a certain 
portion of this. The premia that go to farmers will thus only be the total export premia 
minus the premia used to compensate the commitment of the exporter minus the extra 
premia the exporter gain due to market imperfection in the auction market minus the 
portion appropriated by the local traders. 
In addition all this is based on the assumption that origin labeling is perfect. In a situation 
where traders buy from a large number of sellers the true origin of coffee is less evident 
before the transaction (ex-ante) and is less traceable afterward (ex-post). In addition, the 
context is such that blocking trade between different terroirs is achieved only partially. 
Producers themselves sell coffee of mixed origin. Since farmers sell coffee cherry 
identifying the true origin is much more difficult (Gelaw, et al. 2015). The same holds for 
local traders when they sell in the auction market. But in all these cases, actors at all 
stages may refrain from taking such opportunistic actions when the long-term benefits of 
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building a reputation are high (Shapiro 1982). Unfortunately, reputation will not always 
be an effective strategy at all stages and detecting brand-mixing is never easy. It is the 
dynamic interaction of a seller’s commitment to quality and consumers’ learning of that 
commitment that determines the level of equilibrium reputation (Shapiro 1983). 
Institutions that reward both seller’s commitment and consumers’ learning thus increase 
the level of equilibrium reputation. 
A study found Ethiopian traders to be little trustworthy on the origin of coffee and other 
quality attributes that are not easily verifiable (Thomas and Minet, 2015). Thus, 
exporters that buy coffee from local traders face information problems from two sources: 
the risk of brand-mixing made by producers and passed over to exporters and the same 
risk caused by local traders. Exporters will then have to take this risk premium in their 
buying decision if the brand-mixing is detectable at higher level markets. Thus in 
addition to the portion of the price premia required to reward exporters’ reputation, the 
exporter will also have to use part of the price premia to cover the above risk premium. 
This further erodes the potential price premia that can trickle down to producers. 
Moreover, the act of blocking inter-terroir trade has another disadvantage in that it 
creates monopolistic rent by limiting competition in the local market. In a particular 
political environment where ethnic identity provides special political privilege to trade in 
the region and the social environment is such that one needs identity-based social 
networks to trade in the terroir (Gelaw et al, 2015), the GI scheme increases the 
monopoly power by further limiting competition. This, in addition to the compensation 
required to reward exporter’s commitment and the risk premium of the exporter and local 
traders, the monopoly rent captured by local trade further erodes the potential gains of 
farmers. We thus hypothesize that farmers will capture only a portion of the FOB price 
premia. 
If there is a significant change in the magnitude and/or trend of price differences 
between the trademarked and non-trademarked Ethiopian coffee, the changes can be 
attributed to the trademarking initiative as all coffee shares the same institutional 
environment. Since only three among the five origin-known Ethiopian coffee obtained 
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trademark protection, the context provides an ideal experimental environment for testing 
the impacts of trademarking (legal-protection) on the change in the relative prices and 
on its stability. We hypothesize that relative FOB prices of trademarked coffee, 
compared to non-trademarked coffees, will not only be higher but also more stable than 
they were before. But both of these relative premia will be substantially lower in the case 
of producer prices. 
8.4 The data 
The study used panel data of prices obtained from two sources. The first one use FOB 
price data obtained from Ethiopian Customs Authority. This data contain FOB prices, the 
volume of export, geographic origin of coffee, destination country, grade level and 
exporting company. Discarding observations of unknown coffee origin and unknown 
grade levels, the study used 39637 observations, running from November 2004 to June 
2014. The other type of data were producer price data. This data were obtained from the 
Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (ECSA). ECSA undertakes monthly producer price 
survey in 463 selected Peasant Administrations (PAs) located across the country. These 
data contain farm-gate prices of two forms of coffee: coffee cherries and green coffee 
beans. Since farmers usually sell coffee cherries, not green coffee beans, the price of 
coffee cherries reflects the actual price farmers receive. But for comparison, we also use 
farm-gate prices of green coffee beans. Following the geographic locations of the 
sample PAs, we categorize each PA under the five geographic coffee origins. 
Accordingly, each coffee origin contains different prices of PAs located within each 
coffee origin. Discarding price data collected outside the five geographic origins, we 
obtain a panel data set containing monthly prices of 14503 observations for coffee 
cherries and 4983 observations for green coffee beans for the time periods ranging from 
January 2002 to June 2014. One issue surrounding the trademarking is under the 
current ECX system, it is made through labeling. All coffee that comes from a specific 
region will be given the label of the region. Given brand-mixing is a possibility, the 
potential impact of the trademarking depend on the credibility of the labeling.  
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Figure 8.1 Coffee producing regions of the country 
Figure 8.1 shows the different coffee producing areas in the country. Even if the 
government strictly prohibit cross-border trade between the coffee producing regions, 
and this was, partly to control the transaction and partly to reduce avoid mixing of 
different coffee origins, there is still problem especially in those areas bordering two or 
more coffee producing regions. But even if the government is effective in blocking cross-
border trade at the local markets, there is nothing that controls this at exporters level.  
8.5 Method of analysis 
Studies often estimate price premia from consumers’ survey using hedonic pricing, 
conjoint analysis, multinomial logit (Bramley et al. 2009). But it can also be estimated 
from market data if there was a perfectly substitute commodity. As we have no 
consumer-based data, we estimate price premia based on the comparison with non-
trademarked coffee. As described above, the particular context permits us to do so. We 
take the price premia offered by importers as a starting point. While this may not show 
the full story of the GI-scheme, it serves our purpose. 
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Although we followed the methodology used by Arslan and Reicher (2010), our analysis 
differs from them in a number of ways. First, the purpose of their analysis is to analyze 
the impacts of publicity for trademarking. They attributed the permanent change in price 
to the publicity. We argue that such price changes can persist due to the trademark-
protection, not just a one-time publicity for trademarking. In addition, we simply assume 
that the GI-protection was applied on all the five coffee origin for two reasons. First, only 
a few countries (The USA, Japan and EU countries) agreed to provide GI-protection. In 
addition, destination countries may differ in the mode and timing of implementations. 
Second, we don’t know whether they were exported as GI-labeled or not even in those 
countries. We thus multiply all origins by a trademarking dummy (DL =1 for the period 
after 2008 and zero before that) and trademarking time (DT = t-2008 for the period after 
2008 and zero before that). We furthermore multiply each origin by the three categories 
of destination countries (West, Middle East and the rest of the world).  
To separate the effect of trademarking, we control the following variables. One of the 
changes that, can support or counteract the effects of trademarking is the introduction of 
ECX. We, therefore, multiply each geographic origins by a dummy for ECX. First, the 
different types of coffee origin differ in their distribution of grade levels. We assign five 
for first grade, four for second grade, three for third grade, two for fourth grade, one for 
fifth grade and zero for under-grade. We then multiply each coffee origin by the 
respective grade level. To capture the transaction costs we take the inverse ratio of the 
volume of each export transaction. In addition, we weight each origin by their export 
share (the ratio of the amount of each origin to total monthly export). We finally include 
origin and month interactions to capture any origin specific seasonality. Given this, if the 
GI-protection has positive impacts, it has to improve the relative prices of trademarked 
coffees compared to non-trademarked coffees (Jimma and Wellega).  
Moreover, to capture the effect of trademarking on the long term trend of the various 
coffee origins, we include the interaction of trademarking as a continuous time with the 
different coffee origins. This will help us to see how prices evolve after the introduction of 
GI-protection  
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The following FE regression is specified to capture the effects of time-invariant 
characteristics, in this case, different coffee origin on the dynamics of prices. The FE 
model is specified as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝑋 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗
𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑅𝑜𝑊 + 𝜗𝑚𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   (8.1) 
where 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡 is  the price for the i
th observation for the period t  n = 1, 2, 3,…, N; t = 1, 2, 3, 
…, T,  
𝐼𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the inverse of  the volume for i
th observation for the time period t 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 is a dummy for the i
th observation for jth coffee types  j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for 
Wollega, Sidama, Yirgachefe, Harar and Jima, respectively 
ECX is the dummy for ECX, 1 for the period after ECX and 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑀𝑙 is the dummy for Trademarking 1 for the period after Trademarking and 0 
otherwise 
𝑇𝑀𝑡∗ is time 1, 2…T*  for the period after the Trademarking and 0 otherwise 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑡 is grade level 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the i
th observation for the period t 
𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the market share of the i
th observation for the jth commodity 
𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡 is a dummy which is  1 for coffee exported to western countries and 0 
otherwise 
𝑅𝑜𝑊 is a dummy which is 1 for coffee exported to the rest of the world and 0 
otherwise 
Month is month, m - 1 to 12 for the months January to December 
𝛽𝑛𝑗 parameter coefficients for the j
th coffee type 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 disturbance terms 
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A similar regression can also be run on the monthly producer data set collected across 
the various locations of the country. The only difference here is that some of the above 
variables cannot be included due to a lack of data. Grade level, market share and the 
inverse of the volume does not appear in the producer and retail price data. The 
regression was made on two types of producer data: price data on coffee cherries and 
coffee beans.  
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (8.2) 
The next step is to assess the stability of the relative price of trademarked coffee relative 
to non-trademarked one. An ADF-type of the equation can help to test the presence of 
price convergence/divergence. By taking  the difference of prices of various trademarked 
coffee from a reference price (non-trademarked coffee), it is possible to test the 
stationarity of the price differentials as 
∆𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖∆𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡       (8.3) 
where 𝑥𝑡 is price differential between price of a given trademarked brand (𝑃𝑇𝑀(𝑡)) with 
reference price (𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑀(𝑡)) in logs 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑇𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑀(𝑡)         (9.4) 
If the null hypothesis 𝛿 = 0 in (eq. 9.3) is rejected, the price differential is non-stationary, 
meaning that there is no convergence between the various trademarked and non-
trademarked Ethiopian coffee. 
8.6 Results and discussions 
The following sections describe and discuss the results obtained from a fixed effects 
model analysis. Before we analyze the panel data, we describe the evolution of the 
export price data. 
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8.6.1 Trend of export prices 
Figure 8.2 Comparison of overall prices of different origin of coffee 
Figure 8.2 shows the trend of the five coffee price series. Export data disaggregated by 
geographic origin covers only the period starting from November 2004. Although the 
applications of Ethiopian government for trademarking the three coffees started in March 
2005, the registration in many countries was implemented since 2008. We, therefore, 
take January 2008 as a starting point. We can see from Figure 8.2 that there were price 
differences between the various geographic origins even before the trademarking. But 
the price differences seem to have become more pronounced after the trademarking 
initiative. 
8.6.2 Result of the Fixed Effects model 
Table 8.1 shows the fixed and random effects regression on FOB prices of the five 
origins of Ethiopian coffee.23 The model represented by eq. 8.1 is semi-logarithmic. All 
the coefficient of the FE regression shows the response of the dependent variable in 
terms of percentage change in price (after transformed)24 for a unit change in the 
independent variable, obviously holding other variables constant. Also, the result for 
                                                 
23
 For the sake of convenience, we present part of the regression results on coffee specific seasonality separately in 
Table 8.1a and Table 8.2a of Appendix A. 
24
 The value of 𝑏∗ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑏) − 1 
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dummy variables should be interpreted with reference to Jima coffee. We also present 
the results of the RE model for comparison. 
Controlling for the effects of grade level, destination region, market share, the effect of 
trademarking on the relative price level and trend and origin-specific seasonality, the first 
four rows show the average prices of the different coffee origins in reference to Jimma 
coffee (the baseline). The result shows that there was a significant decline in prices of 
Harar, Yirgachefe and Sidama coffee by 13.6, 25.8 and 15.5 percent relative to the price 
of Jimma coffee (Table 8.1). Wellega coffee was dropped due to collinearity. This may 
be because we controlled all the key variables that are expected to determine price 
differentials. 
Table 8.1 FE and RE regression results of export data (2004-2014) 
Variables 
Fixed Effect (N=41259) 
Random Effect 
(N=41259) 
b* b sd t b t 
Cons 1.541*** 0.930*** 1.167 91.50 0.89*** 51.84 
Inverse of volume 3610*** 29.158*** 0.023 24.97 29.19*** 24.93 
Harar -0.136*** -0.146*** 0.040 -6.35 -0.15*** -6.58 
Sidama -0.257*** -0.297*** 0.022 -7.44 -0.30*** -7.58 
Yirgachefe -0.153*** -0.166***  -7.57 -0.05 -1.64 
Wellega  0.000 0 0.012 - - - 
Harar*ECX -0.234*** -0.266*** 0.008 -21.94 -0.26*** -21.65 
Sidama*ECX -0.012 -0.013 0.012 -1.59 -0.01 -1.23 
Yirgachefe*ECX -0.172*** -0.189*** 0.009 -16.07 -0.19*** -15.78 
Wellega*ECX -0.002 -0.002 0.014 -0.20 0.00 0.11 
Harar*DL 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.014 4.05 0.06*** 4.33 
Sidama*DL 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.024 8.35 0.12*** 8.70 
Yirgachefe*DL 0.326*** 0.282*** 0.013 11.65 0.29*** 11.83 
Wellega*DL 0.012*** 0.012 0.000 0.98 0.02 1.30 
Harar*DT 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.000 24.65 0.01*** 24.59 
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Sidama*DT 0.000 0 0.000 1.12 0.00 1.06 
Yirgachefe*DT 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 15.15 0.00*** 15.08 
Wellega*DT 0.000** 0.000** 0.005 2.33 0.00** 2.30 
Harar*Grade 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.001 17.17 0.09*** 17.13 
Sidama*Grade 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.002 80.88 0.09*** 80.63 
Yirgachefe*Grade 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.004 15.00 0.03*** 14.96 
Wellega*Grade 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.001 17.65 0.07*** 17.61 
Jimma*Grade 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.009 102.11 0.11*** 101.79 
Harar*MS -0.085*** -0.089*** 0.007 -10.34 -0.09*** -10.29 
Sidama*MS -0.062*** -0.064*** 0.008 -9.71 -0.06*** -9.65 
Yirgachefe*MS -0.108*** -0.114*** 0.006 -15.13 -0.11*** -15.08 
Wellega*MS -0.090*** -0.094*** 0.009 -14.82 -0.09*** -14.76 
Jimma*MS 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.92 0.01 0.99 
Harar*Western 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.011 4.67 0.06*** 4.64 
Sidama*Western 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.021 2.81 0.03*** 2.85 
Yirgachefe*Western 0.181*** 0.166*** 0.011 7.81 0.17*** 7.82 
Wellega*Western 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.012 3.86 0.04*** 3.84 
Harar* RoW 0.005 0.005 0.023 0.41 0.00 0.36 
Sidama* RoW -0.103*** -0.108*** 0.015 -4.77 -0.11*** -4.79 
Yirgachefe* RoW 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.012 3.19 0.05*** 3.19 
Wellega* RoW -0.033*** -0.034*** 1.167 -2.81 -0.03*** -2.79 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
MS – Market share 
The other important variable was the introduction of ECX in the coffee market. Since 
ECX change the previous transaction system that somehow allow personalized 
transactions and which was easier for tracing the origin of coffee (Gelaw et al. 2016), it 
is expected to affect the relative change in prices between the various coffee origins. It 
was found to have a significant negative impact on Harar and Yirgachefe coffee. No 
significant effect was observed on Sidama and Wellega coffee. Prices of Harar and 
Yirgachefe were found to have fallen by 23.4 and 17.2 percent compared with Jimma 
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coffee after the introduction of ECX. But the result could have been different if ECX, in 
addition to its current impersonalized transaction system, allows an alternative 
arrangement that is compatible with the trademarking protection. This can be done for 
instance if exporter or importer are allowed to directly buy coffee from 
traders/cooperatives. Such arrangement can be beneficial even for those cooperatives 
that could not directly export. The result was consistent with our expectation that the 
ECX mandatory single transaction arrangement contradicts with the trademarking 
arrangement that requires a traceable transaction system.  
The other variable of interest was the impacts of trademarking on the relative change in 
prices. We found that the trademarking initiative significantly increased the average 
prices of trademarked Ethiopian coffees relative to Jimma coffee. The result shows that 
the average change in prices of Harar, Sidama and Yirgachefe coffee was found to be 
5.6, 12.1 and 32.6 percent higher than Jimma coffee after the trademarking. As 
expected, no change was observed for Wellega coffee after the trademarking. 
In addition to the effects of trademarking on the relative average prices of the four coffee 
origins, we also analyzed the effect on the price trends. The price of Harar, Yirgachefe 
and Wellega coffees were found to have an average monthly growth rate of 0.7%, 0.4% 
and 0.05% in reference to Jimma coffee, respectively. No difference in the relative 
average growth rate of prices of Sidama coffee was observed after the trademarking.  
Since the distribution of grade levels differ between the different coffee origins, we 
controlled the effects of origin specific grade levels. The results on grade show that 
improvement of the grade by one level apparently increased the average prices of all 
coffee origins. Moving from one grade level to the next higher grade level significantly 
increased average prices of Harar, Sidama, Yirgacheffe, Wellega and Jimma coffee by 
9.0%,  9.9%, 3.3%, 7.6% and 11.5% respectively. The return on grade improvement was 
smallest for Yirgacheffe coffee. The reason is that Yirgacheffe coffee already attained 
the highest grade level as 83% of Yirgacheffe coffee were of first and second grades. 
On the contrary, those coffee origins whose average grade levels were below that were 
found to have a higher return, in terms of percentage increase in price, for improvements 
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in grade by one level. Whether this return is attractive for sellers or not depends on the 
cost of improving the grade level. Given the marginal costs of improving grade, the 
return could also increase as the efficiency of the market in rewarding quality improves.  
With regard to the effect of market shares on prices, the price elasticity of the market 
share was found to be negative for all coffee types except Jimma coffee, where its price 
elasticity of market share was found to be insignificant. The percentage change in prices 
for a unit change in market share of Harar, Sidama, Yirgacheffe and Wellega were found 
to be -8.5%, -6.2%, -10.8% and -9.0% respectively. No significant effect of market share 
on prices was found for Jimma coffee. 
The prices of the four types of coffee received price premia when they are exported to 
the western countries compared to Jimma coffee. Yirgacheffe coffee was found to 
receive the highest price premia of 18.1% in reference to Jimma coffee, Harar and 
Sidama were found to obtain price premia of 6.3% and 3.2% respectively. The non-
trademarked Wellega coffee was however also found to receive a price premia of 4.5 % 
in comparison with Jimma coffee. The result is slightly different for the coffee exported to 
the rest of the world. While Yirgachefe and Wellega received negative price premia of 
10.3% and 3.3% in comparison with Jimma coffee, only Harar coffee received a positive 
price premium. No evidence of premium price was found for Sidama coffee exported to 
non-western countries . 
The result indicates that in the markets where the trademarking obtained institutional 
protections (Western markets), the relative price premia are more or less conform to the 
trademarking. This is not the case when the destination country is a non-western 
country. The market outside Western countries seems to discriminate Ethiopian coffee 
differently and in contrary to the reputation of geographic indications. That is while 
Yirgachefe, Harar and Sidamo coffee were given trademark protection, it is non-
trademarked coffee that received a significant price change in the non-western 
countries. In general, the result indicates that exporters that have access to western 
markets enjoy higher relative price premia for trademarked coffee, compared to those 
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traders that export trademarked coffee to non-western  countries. Except for Harar 
coffee, it is also desirable for other types of coffee to be exported to western countries. 
The result also shows that there was significant origin specific seasonality for all coffee 
origins (Appendix A Table 8.1A. Finally, the inverse of the lot size of individual export 
was found to have a strong positive effect on the percentage change in the price of 
Ethiopian coffee. This coefficient can be interpreted as a negative relationship between 
average fixed cost and percentage change in prices (Arslan and Reicher ,2010). 
8.6.3 Producer prices 
Two types of producer price data were used in the analysis. Producers in the major 
coffee producing areas sell dried or red coffee cherries to local traders. Local traders 
then undertake dry processing or hulling of dried coffee cherries or wet processing of red 
coffee cherries. To see the actual effects of any interventions on coffee prices, producer 
prices of coffee cherries is the most appropriate one as it reflects the price coffee 
farmers actually received. Most studies use the price of green coffee beans as producer 
price data. To our knowledge, no study used the price of coffee cherries as producer 
price. Our analysis focuses on producer prices of coffee cherries (called coffee whole) 
but we also make a similar analysis on producer prices of coffee beans for comparison 
purpose. 
The result in Table 8.2 shows that while the changes in prices for Harar, Yirgachefe, and 
Wellega coffees were higher, relative to the change in the baseline price of Jimma 
coffee, of the opposite was true for Sidama coffee . Given this the effect of the 
trademarking on change in relative prices of Harar coffee was found to be positive and 
significant. But no evidence was found for the effect of trademarking on the change in 
the prices of Sidama and Yirgachefe coffees. Instead, the change in relative prices of 
Wellega (non-trademarked) coffee was found to be positive. After the trademarking, the 
change in average prices of Harar and Wellega coffees was found to be  11.2% and 
16.2%  higher than that of Jimma coffee. In addition to the above effect of the 
trademarking on the level, we also analyzed the effect of the trademarking on the price 
trends of each coffee relative to Jimma coffee. We found that prices of Harar and 
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Sidama coffees grew at an average monthly rate of 0.31% and 0.09% above the growth 
rate of Jimma coffee. On the contrary, the price of Wellega coffee grew at an average 
monthly rate 0.16 % Jimma coffee. No effect on the relative growth rate of Yirgachefe 
coffee was observed after the trademarking. 
The effects of the trademarking on the relative average level and trend of producer 
prices of green coffee beans was slightly different from coffee cherries. The effect of 
trademarking on relative average price levels of coffee beans were higher than its 
corresponding effect on producer prices of coffee cherries. After the trademarking, the 
change in relative prices of Harar, Sidama, Yirgachefe and Wellega coffees was found 
to be 14.0%, 23.5%, 58.6% and 37.0%  higher than average prices of Jimma coffee, 
respectively. On the other hand, the average price trends of Sidama, Yirgachefe and 
Wellega were found to grow at average monthly rate of 0.3%, 0.7% and 0.3% below 
Jimma coffee. No significant difference was observed in the monthly growth rate of 
prices of Harar coffee beans. 
These two sets of results show that the trademarking was found to have a higher 
positive effect on producer prices of green coffee beans than on coffee cherries both 
relative to the respective Jimma coffee. But these price gains are being eroded by the 
negative growth rate in prices. This is a good evidence that the higher gains in the price 
of the trademarking that we saw at the export market share being captured by exporters 
and traders before they reach the local markets. Moreover, the negative growth rate in 
the local market shows that the effect of trademarking erodes over time. 
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Table 8.2 FE and RE regression results of producer prices (2002-2014) 
Variables 
Producer price of coffee cherries (N=14503) Producer price of coffee beans (N=4983) 
FE RE  FE RE  
b sd t b t b sd t b t 
Harar 0.333*** 0.106 3.15 0.33*** 3.09 0.490*** 0.054 9.01 0.47*** 8.8 
Sidama -0.136*** 0.040 -3.38 -0.55*** -14.7 0.038 0.066 0.58 0.01 0.17 
Yirgachefe 0.568*** 0.033 4.45 0.39*** 3.05 0.132 0.181 -0.63 0.11 0.58 
Wellega 0.203*** 0.128 6.1 0.19*** 5.64 0.180*** 0.058 3.12 0.16*** 2.81 
Harar*DL 0.106* 0.054 1.96 0.12** 2.13 0.131*** 0.033 3.93 0.15*** 4.47 
Sidama*DL 0.025 0.026 0.94 0.04 1.52 0.211*** 0.043 4.92 0.23*** 5.32 
Yirgachefe*DL 0  . - . 0.460*** 0.104 4.42 0.48*** 4.55 
Wellega*DL 0.150*** 0.025 6.1 0.16*** 6.6 0.315*** 0.037 8.49 0.33*** 8.96 
Harar*DT 0.003*** 0.001 2.7 0.00*** 2.76 0 0.001 0.05 0.00 0.94 
Sidama*DT 0.001* 0.000 1.85 0.00* 1.88 -0.003*** 0.001 -3.76 -0.00*** -3.03 
Yirgachefe*DT 0 - . - . -0.007*** 0.002 -3.87 -0.01*** -3.5 
Wellega*DT -0.002*** 0.000 -3.49 -0.00*** -3.27 -0.003*** 0.001 -4.36 -0.00*** -3.48 
Cons. -0.367*** 0.005 -72.84 -0.34*** -10.86 0.291*** 0.007 42.2 0.29*** 9.91 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
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8.7 Prices convergence 
Table 8.3 compares the dynamics in the relative price of trademarked coffee in relation 
to non-trademarked coffee before and after the trademarking.    
Table 8.3 ADF test for convergence between trademarked and non-trademarked coffee 
Trademarked_Non-
trademarkd coffee 
FOB Producer prices 
Whole 
period 
Before 
TM 
After 
TM 
Whole 
period 
Before 
TM 
After TM 
Harar_Jimma -2.08 -0.45 -1.95 -3.26** -1.88 -2.77* 
Harar_Wellega -1.91 -0.69 -1.88 -3.80*** -2.79* -2.55 
Sidama_Jimma -2.52 -0.30 -2.88** -5.62*** -3.26** -4.45*** 
Sidama_Wellega -2.87** -0.96 -2.80* -7.25*** -4.76*** -5.16*** 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
TM – Trademarking 
Before the trademarking, the FOB price of trademarked coffee relative to non-
trademarked coffee was found to be stable without showing any tendency of 
convergence or divergence for all combinations of prices. But contrary to our 
expectation, the relative price of Sidama coffee in reference to both Wellega and Jimma 
coffees shows converge after the trademarking. Although there was no evidence of 
divergence in the relative FOB price of trademarked coffee, there was also no evidence 
of convergence. But the situation is different when it comes to producer prices. The 
relative producer prices of trademarked coffee (Harar and Sidama) in reference to non-
trademarked coffee (Jimma and Wellega) showed evidence of convergence both before 
and after the trademarking. The result indicates that relative producer prices of 
trademarked coffee are more convergent than FOB prices. It suggests that the 
trademarking was more effective in keeping relative FOB price of trademarked coffee 
stationary.  
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8.8 Discussion of key findings 
The results of the Fixed Effect regression revealed positive effects of the trademarking 
on the level and trends of relative FOB prices of trademarked Ethiopian coffee. After the 
trademarking, the change in average FOB prices of trademarked and other non-
trademarked coffee in comparison with the numeraire (Jimma coffee) was substantially 
and significantly higher. One of the interesting results of the study is that it shows the 
negative effects of ECX on the change in relative prices of the different geographically 
designated coffee. The result is consistent with the findings of Leung (2014). This may 
be due to the impersonalized and non-traceable nature of the transaction introduced by 
ECX. The implication is that for GI-protection to meet its goal, it requires a traceable 
transaction system, however, it may not necessarily be personalized. It provides 
important evidence that the mode of transaction introduced by ECX is not compatible 
with the trademark-protection initiative. Consideration needs to be made on the relative 
gains from a non-traceable ECX transaction system vis-à-vis the trademark-protection. 
Theoretically, the trademarking initiative initially can increase prices by promoting the 
product. For this price premium to continue to rise, the trademark-protection needs to be 
efficient in building the institutions of reputation. If the institution of reputation is strong, 
the relative demand for trademarked products is expected to shift to the right as more 
buyers learn the quality differences and tend to become more inelastic as consumers 
develop a special preference for the products. But when buyers fail to find quality 
differences, not only the demand will fall, it can even become more elastic as consumers 
view the product as a commodity. Thus, long-term effects on the relative prices depend 
on the ability of the market in maintaining the reputability of the trademarked products. 
But the non-traceable transaction system of ECX does not provide a room for the 
institution of reputation.  
The result of the price elasticity of market share can suggest the structure of market 
Ethiopian coffee faces in the world market. If all Ethiopian coffee equally competes in the 
world market as other commodity coffee, the price elasticity of market share would be 
near zero as the share of Ethiopian coffee in the world markets will be negligible in this 
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case. But price elasticity of market share should be higher if Ethiopian coffee 
(individually or collectively) has its own segment of the world market. The higher price 
elasticity of market share suggests that Ethiopian coffee has a segment in the world 
market. 
8.9 Conclusion  
Using a large number of observations of export transactions recorded over 11 years and 
producer price data collected over a wide range of areas of the country, we analyzed the 
impacts of trademarking on producer and export prices using a Fixed Effect model. We 
found that generally, trademark protection significantly and considerably increases the 
levels and growth rate of export prices. However, this gain was counterbalanced by the 
introduction of non-traceable and impersonalized trade by ECX. Given the institutional 
context of the country, the introduction of impersonalized transactions in the coffee 
market can have far-reaching effects in improving the performance of the coffee market. 
But the commoditization also undermines the potential price gains from product 
differentiation through trademark protections of Ethiopian fine coffee. This may require 
institutional arrangements that provide alternative channels for both trademarked coffee 
and commodity coffee.  
The study also estimated the percentage price gains that can be achieved by improving 
the grade-level of the different coffee. For most of the coffee origins, there is substantial 
price gain from improving the grade level. We also found that Ethiopian exporters can 
benefit more by exporting to western countries than the rest of the world. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and policy implications of the thesis 
This chapter discusses key conclusions and their policy implications. The first section 
draws key conclusions from the various chapters of the thesis. Based on these 
conclusions, the key policy implications of the results are demonstrated. This can 
provide policy makers important insights for future interventions. 
9.1 Conclusions 
The study made a comparative analysis of institutions between the northern and 
southern regions of the country in the early centuries. It revealed that the emergence 
and decline of powerful empires and early civilizations were highly correlated with the 
scope of private property ownership of key resources and the associated level and 
scope of commerce and trade. While the presence of private (in limited sense) 
ownership of land and the associated trade and commerce in the early periods helped 
the northern region to create extended order going beyond the narrow kith and kin, the 
poorly defined communal ownership of land and other key resources in the southern 
region did not only limit the scope of trade and commerce, but also confined 
sociocultural transactions to the bound of kith and kin. As a result, while in the northern 
region an empire was  created, the southern region remained for many years a 
conglomerate of diverse small communities. 
But the study also revealed that in the northern regions the various restrictions imposed 
by the rist system on private rights not only limited the scope of trade and commerce but 
also limited the scope and stability of the empire. In effect, the northern regions evolved 
through a rough historical path frequented by anarchy. In contrast, the communal (or 
open access) types of ownership of key resources in the southern region caused the 
diverse groups to evolve through relatively stable collective egalitarian communities 
occasioned by clan/tribal wars. In sum, we found the scope of private property rights and 
the associated scope of trade and commerce to be key determinants of the institutional 
path of the country.  
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The dominance of socialist-orientated beliefs is also associated with the confinement of 
transactions to the narrow communal social system. Communal property rights seem to 
be at the heart of this social environment. Property rights, trade and commerce 
determine the social-economic space which in turn determines the degree of 
personalization which defines the widely shared mental model. Although we see some 
differences in the dominant mental model between the northern and southern regions, 
the dominant mental model can be generally characterized as collective and socialist-
oriented. We claim that this socialist-oriented dominant model not only determined the 
various economic institutions but it also shaped other institutions in the social and 
political spheres. Particularly, the mental model undermined competition, wealth 
accumulation, creativity and commercial behavior. It seems that the greater tendency of 
the current and past governments toward socialist-oriented policies emanates from the 
widely shared mental model. However, this mental model does not offer a different 
motive other than self-interest. The degree of social interdependence affects the actual 
behavioral patterns of individuals. Contrary to the embeddedness theory, the result from 
a choice experiment done with farmers strongly suggests that the preference of subjects 
to personalize transactions is dominantly driven by economic reasons.  
We found the social environment to be segregated along ethnic/clan and religious 
identities. In effect, we find personalized transactions to be the most ubiquitous 
institutional arrangement in the country. But the personalization is also confined to kith 
and kin. Although individuals are willing to make impersonalized transactions, the social 
environment locked them into a too narrow social environment. Analysis of the 
preferences of farmers revealed that farmers embed their transactions in personalized 
relationships in order to reduce transaction costs and also as a response to the lack of 
credit markets. So this is not merely due to their affiliation with their social group. Even 
though subjects were found to have no specific preference for their social network, the 
segregated social environment left them with no other option but to transact with the kith 
and kin. This segregated social landscape was highly shaped by the historical evolution 
of communal ownership of property rights and limited trade and commerce. Thus the 
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pervasiveness of personalized transactions depends not only on the current broader 
environment, but it is also deeply rooted in the history of the society.  
Even though the results of the choice experiment in itself do not imply inefficiency of the 
transaction, critical examination of the results within the framework of the existing 
institutional and broader environment suggest inefficiency of the personalized 
institutional arrangement. Particularly, it fails to incentivize coffee quality. The detailed 
examination of the impacts of personalized transactions also shows far-reaching and 
diverse effects that go beyond the coffee market. The descriptive results also suggest 
that such social environment is not only conducive for traders to collude in order to 
patronize farmers into personalized transactions, the personalized transactions can also 
arise as a strategic response of traders to reduce transaction risks. 
Intended to reduce transaction costs and risks, ECX introduced new transaction 
arrangements that eliminate personalized transactions at the central markets. The 
analysis of the impacts of this intervention found it to impersonalize the transactions, but 
its effects on improving the market linkage between the local, central, export and world 
markets were found to be limited. Specifically, downstream markets adjust prices to 
eliminate positive discrepancies more rapidly than negative discrepancies. Contrary to 
these popular views and claims, we found little improvements in the speed and 
symmetry of price transmissions along the coffee chain. We conclude that as long as the 
local markets remain traditional and personalized and the export market remains little 
competitive, farmers will continue to receive a small share of the final price for their 
produce.  
Concerning the impacts of ECX on reducing the level of collusions and increasing the 
level of competitions, we found that both collusion and competition existed even with 
ECX.  
We also conclude that ECX has made important contributions in eliminating transaction 
risks associated with payment failures. However, given the different delivery problems 
exporters are facing, the impact of ECX on payment failure cannot be exaggerated as 
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the effect part of the transaction risks simply seems to have been transferred from 
traders to exporters.  
Although the government of Ethiopia was able to secure trademark protection under the 
legal scheme of GI-protection, it took, at the same time, a measure that fully contradicts 
GI-protection by precluding coffee transaction outside ECX. Examination of the 
institutional interventions made through trademarking shows a considerable impact on 
export prices. Not only total percentage change in export prices was higher following the 
introduction of trademarking, but there was a positive change in the monthly growth rate 
of prices. But these gains were also counteracted by the introduction of a non-traceable 
trading system at ECX. We conclude therefore that the two interventions are 
incompatible. Legally proscribing the use of alternative arrangements is a measure that 
is contrary to the purpose of the trademarking initiative. The study also revealed that the 
gains from improving quality are high for all coffee types. The gains were also found to 
be higher when the trademarked coffee was exported to Western countries than non-
Western countries. But unfortunately, only a  small portion of these changes was 
captured by coffee producing farmers. Finally, finding a safe exit for the 85% of the 
population of small-scale and subsistence farmers is one thing, expecting to bring 
economic, social and political development by promoting policies that preserve the 
small-scale farming with all its’ archaic culture and tradition is a chimera. 
9.2 Policy implications  
The irony about the economic and political ideology is that a country that experienced 
the sordid failure of past socialist experimentation still dares to re-experiment it again 
and again. The historical path of the country, with the exception of the imperial periods, 
has been the history of a closed socio-economic system. History has not only 
demonstrated that expanding trade beyond the narrow tribal system is the source of 
civilization, it has also demonstrated time and again the consequence of confining 
transactions within locality leads to stagnation and weakening of society. Instead of 
promoting policies that segregate society into small communities, policies that 
encourage gradual cultural assimilation among different groups are needed. Protection 
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of property rights, free mobility of labor and capital and privatization of land are crucial 
components of such policy. No society has ever developed by preserving a segregated 
and fragmented society. 
The result also suggests that the personalized transactions are an inefficient institutional 
arrangement. But these inefficiencies are also inextricably and strongly linked with the 
broader socio-cultural, economic and political environment. The implication is that in as 
long as the broader environment forecloses other alternative impersonalized 
arrangements, these inefficiencies seem to persist. 
One of the key misunderstanding in the development thinking of Africa in general and 
Ethiopia, in particular, is the underestimation of the role of market, trade, and commerce. 
It should be fully recognized that market, trade and commerce are key necessary 
requirements without which no meaningful development can be achieved. Furthermore, 
the role of these economic activities is not limited to their direct contributions to the 
wealth of the nation, much more comes from the second-order effect of stimulating 
institutional progress – political, social, and economic. However, it should also be 
recognized that these economic activities cannot emerge in an institutional vacuum. 
One important implication of the study is that the structure of property rights, especially 
of land, crucially determines the resulting social landscape and institutions and the 
historical path of the country. The study, therefore, suggests a move away from the 
current state-owned and traditional communal land system into a private ownership 
system. We recommend a careful and gradual transformation of the current ownership 
system into a private ownership system 
Privatization of key resources especially land will gradually change the socioeconomic 
landscape which breaks the existing narrowly confined social bonds and give chance for 
people to revise their mental model. Thus, unless deliberate and gradual measures are 
taken to privatize land and other key resources and to liberalize the domestic and 
foreign markets, institutional progress will remain limited. The liberalization measures 
should transform the currently closed and segregated social system into an open and 
accommodative society. Otherwise, the country could regress back into fragmented and 
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segregated socioeconomic and political structure, as the historical path of the 
Abyssinian empire showed us. In line with Berhanu Abegaz (2006), we thus suggest for 
strong measures to be taken to liberalize markets. However, this cannot come without 
deliberate reforms in the judicial and political system, because that is  key for efficient 
performances of the institutions.  
Although currently, personalized transactions are the only institutional arrangement, the 
good news is that the majority of the farmers are willing to use impersonalized 
transactions if there would exist efficient product, input and credit markets. The 
implication is that policy measures should be taken for markets to flourish.  
The study also showed the limits of deliberate institutional interventions. The impact of 
an institutional intervention tends to be more limited when the intervention is confined to 
the central or export market; as ECX in the case of the former and GI protection 
(trademarking) in the case of the later. Not only incentive compatibility is crucial for the 
effectiveness of institutions, but the compatibility between different institutional 
interventions is vital. The current intervention by ECX is not incentive compatible in that 
it forced transacting parties to use the ECX platform by legally prohibiting the use of 
other alternative arrangements. In addition, ECX is not compatible with the institutional 
arrangements that  GI-protection requires. The use of the ECX platform must be on a 
voluntary basis. Thus transacting parties must be free to choose any institutional 
arrangement outside ECX. 
But the commoditization of coffee by ECX also undermines the potential price gains from 
product differentiation through trademark protection of Ethiopian fine coffee. The study 
showed that even though there is a potential to exploit the long term benefits of GI-
protection, the gains are counteracted by the intervention of ECX. The study also 
revealed that the current attempt to maintain the reputation of GI by blocking cross-
border trade was not effective as brand-mixing is still a problem. Allowing traders and 
exporters to use alternative institutional arrangements can better incentivize exporters 
and traders to build the reputation by which the country could benefit from GI-protection.  
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Moreover, given the overall context, the current GI-protection through trademarking 
seems to be not a suitable instrument as it undermines the role of producers in adding 
value through product differentiations. Alternative ways of GI-protection that increase the 
role of farmers such as through certification can work better; both in improving the 
confidence of foreign buyers and in increasing the bargaining power of farmers. 
ECX introduced various IT-based technologies to impersonalize the transactions at the 
central markets. The introduction of IT technology has made important contributions. But 
the technology alone is not sufficient enough to fully break the sophisticated human 
relationship if the society is closely-knit with dense of social networks. The implication is 
that creating impersonalized transactions requires more than investment on IT 
technology. 
The study also found that the price gains from improving the grade-level of the different 
coffees were high. But the study also identified different inefficiencies in the operation of 
ECX particularly in the grading system and the mode of delivery. Thus, ECX should 
improve its operations in these areas. 
The study also found that Ethiopian exporters can benefit more from exporting to 
western countries than to the rest of the world. Export promotion that direct exports to 
areas where they can fetch the highest foreign exchange earnings can help. 
All the evidence implies that improving the market to benefit farmers requires more than 
just an institutional intervention through a  commodity exchange. Further liberalization 
reforms and infrastructural investments can better transform local and export markets. 
Particularly the various restraints that limit competition need to be removed. Traders 
should be allowed to trade across regions. In addition, other institutional support should 
be made to improve the local and export markets. 
The other important implication of the study is that the diverse formal and informal rules 
that restrict domestic and foreign trade and commerce do more harm than they benefit 
the society. They also put a lot of restraints on the development of efficient institutions. A 
series of measures needs to be done to further liberalize the market. 
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In a condition where land is communal, the social landscape tends to be closed and 
homogenous. In such social landscape, social organizations such as clan, tribe and the 
like determine the economic, social and political life of people. The historical origin of 
this social systems was to provide collective protection against external threats and to 
promote reciprocal exchange and mutual supports. They thus served as ‘state’ organ in 
the past. But such social structure inevitably undermines transactions with outsiders and 
even constrains the diversification of livelihood within. They thus create a closed system 
that in turn undermines private property, wealth accumulation, specialization and 
monetary exchanges. In the past, in the absence of state power these customary 
institutions and social organizations might have helped the society to survive, if not 
progress, from the exigencies of nature and human aggression. But these institutions 
create only limited order; not extended order that expand socioeconomic opportunities. 
Using them in the process of creating extended order by the state is one thing, 
preserving them as the only desirable institution is something else, that perpetuates a 
segregated society. The major misconception emanates from the failure to understand 
the far-reaching adverse consequences of these institutions on every walk of life. 
These institutions and social organizations should be viewed, not as an end themselves, 
but as a means toward creating extended order and an open society. But it should also 
be emphasized that the process of creating an open and integrated society can be 
achieved more through the gradual fulfillment of market fundamentals than through 
excessive conscious design that resembles command system. 
9.3 Limitations of the study and direction for future research 
We used a framework where transacting parties choose between personalized and 
impersonalized transactions. Our study assessed the preference of farmers using choice 
experiment data in order to identify the attributes of alternative transacting parties that 
are more preferred by farmers. That helped us not only to identify the factors that 
determine the personalization of transactions but also indicated the factors that are 
required for impersonalized transactions to develop. But the result would have been 
robust if a similar analysis was made on the choice of the other side of players - buyer-
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traders. We suggest a study that compares and contrasts the preference of both sides of 
players – sellers and buyers. 
While our historical analysis of institutions in the country provided us important insights 
on the origin of institutional constraints observed in the country, a separate in-depth 
historical analysis on the origin of institutions is very important given the unique 
(compared to other sub-Saharan African countries) history the country passed through. 
A cross-country comparative analysis of the history of institutions will add further value.  
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Summary 
The central aim of the thesis was to examine the role of personalized transactions in the 
development of society. The study was intended to analyzes the role of informal 
institutions governing personalized transactions and institutional interventions on the 
performance of markets taking the coffee supply chain in Ethiopia as a case. We 
conceptualize that personalized transaction arises when buyers and sellers, given the 
institutional environment, choose an institutional arrangement that suits their interest. 
But the prevalence of such institutional arrangement substantially determines the 
broader socio-economic, political and physical environment. In view of this framework, 
the thesis review theories about personalized transactions as an institutional 
arrangement and how it evolved over time. It then explored the behavioral and historical 
origin of personalized transactions and assesses its prevalence at different socio-
economic units. It thus examines its overall effects on the broader environment.  
Using these historical contexts as a background, we explained the sources of 
personalized transactions in the case of local coffee markets. Past closed systems and 
communal/state ownership of property rights and excessive state involvement in the 
economic sector are responsible for the current inefficient institutions. The analysis 
suggests the powerfulness of private property and freer market on institutional evolution. 
We conclude that the current communal and state property rights will constrain the 
development of institutions that can handle complex exchanges.  
In order to identify the sources of personalized transactions, we measure the marginal 
effects of each attribute on the choice of farmers. The MNL revealed that all the 
attributes (price, trust, dependability, reliability, strictness, proximity and social 
relationships) we hypothesize to determine the preference of farmers in their choice of 
traders significant. All, except price and social relationships, can lead to farmers to 
embed their transactions in long-term relations. While price doesn’t lead to personalized 
transactions, the social relationship attribute does. But since the MNL model doesn’t 
capture preference heterogeneity, we use LCM to control for it. This enabled us to 
identify the different classes of farmers that share similar preferences. The result 
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revealed that only a small proportion of farmers value social relationships. This suggests 
that the existing personalized relationship is a strategic response of farmers to market 
constraints and information problems. The detailed examination of the effects of 
personalized relationships on coffee quality suggests that personalized transactions are 
not an efficient institutional arrangement to incentivize quality maintenance. 
To be sure, the issue was also examined from trader’s side. Descriptive analysis of 
survey data collected from trades suggests a similar result. The results indicate not only 
that personalized transactions are pervasive and increasing in recent times, the 
transaction risks faced by traders suggest the inefficiency of the personalized 
institutional arrangements. Given the historical context that forecloses the development 
of impersonalized transactions, we conclude that personalized transactions continue to 
govern coffee and other transactions in the local markets, despite their  inefficiency. 
While in the past such impersonalized transaction was pervasive even in the central 
markets, an institutional intervention was made to create a competitive and 
impersonalized transaction through ECX. To evaluate the efficiency of this institutional 
intervention we analyzed its speed and degree of symmetry of price transmissions 
between pairs of markets along the world-export-auction-local/retail coffee supply chain.  
In most of the cases, the impacts were found to be limited to the upstream end of the 
supply chain. The implication is that institutional reforms at higher levels cannot succeed 
unless comparable reforms are made at each stage of the value chain down to the local 
markets. The result revealed that the speed and symmetry of price transmissions have 
not changed considerably after ECX and the effect also varies between export and 
domestic markets. Specifically, price improvements associated with grading and 
standardization will continue to be captured by traders and exporters as long as the 
transactions in the local markets remain traditional and the level of competitions at 
export markets little. We conclude that as long as the local markets remain traditional 
and personalized and the export market little competitive, farmers will continue to 
receive a small share of the final price for their produce. All the evidence imply that 
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improving the market to benefit farmers requires more than just improving institutions 
governing the central market.  
Descriptive results obtained from survey data of producers and exporters showed that 
the intervention is effective in impersonalizing the transaction at the central markets. 
Most of the traders and exporters recognized the impacts of the intervention in reducing 
transaction problems such as payment failures, delivery, grading and the like. Yet, its 
impacts in improving the overall efficiency of the market were not as ECX claims. Some 
transaction risks are still there and transaction costs have not improved much. 
Moreover, the social landscape seems to have allowed some collusion among traders 
and exporters. 
Given the transaction situations where exporters and trader/suppliers cannot use 
alternative arrangements except ECX auction floor, it is difficult to judge whether the 
observed transaction is efficient or not. Moreover a given institutional arrangement tends 
to be efficient and dynamic when it competes with alternative arrangements. In addition, 
one arrangement could be more suitable than another depending on the attribute of the 
transaction. For instance, the existing transaction through ECX is designed to handle 
commodity-coffee but not brand coffee. It cannot incentivize brand (geographic origin) 
reputation. This is because, while transactions in commodity market are necessarily 
non-traceable, transactions of GI-protected products at least require fully traceable 
transactions.  
The government through the Ethiopian Fine Coffee Trademarking Initiative was able to 
get GI-protection in a number of European countries, USA and Japan. The initiative was 
to improve the bargaining power of exporters in the world markets. But  a couple of 
years after this, the government also introduced a new rule that prohibits coffee 
transaction outside ECX: a rule in full contradiction with the institutional arrangement GI-
protection requires. The two interventions: commoditization through ECX and 
trademarking are to our opinion fully incompatible – in terms of objective and structure of 
the transaction. This may not enable Ethiopia exporters of Ethiopian coffee to take 
advantage of trademark protections of Ethiopian coffee. Given this incompatible 
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institutional interventions, we wanted to analyze the impacts of the trademarking 
initiative on prices of GI-protected Ethiopian coffee. 
We found the impacts of the trademarking on prices was positive and increasing over 
time. But when we analyze the impacts of ECX intervention, controlling other 
parameters, the impacts on prices of GI-protected coffee turns out to be negative.  
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Samenvatting 
De hoofddoelstelling van de thesis was om na te gaan welke rol gepersonaliseerde 
transacties spelen tijdens de ontwikkeling van een samenleving. Deze studie had tot 
doel om de rol van informele instituties (die de gepersonaliseerde transacties bepalen) 
en institutionele interventies  op de werking van markten te onderzoeken. De koffieketen 
in Ethiopië werd gekozen als case studie.  
We kwamen tot de conclusie dat gezien de perceptie van agenten over de 
gedragskenmerken van elkaar en transactie attributen, de lokale institutionele omgeving 
de agenten dwingt te kiezen tussen persoonlijke en onpersoonlijke transacties. Maar het 
voorkomen van persoonlijke of onpersoonlijke transacties in de lokale markten is sterk 
bepalend voor de structuur en dynamiek van de bredere socio-economische, politieke 
en fysische omgeving. 
In het licht van dit kader, begint dit proefschrift met een overzicht van theorieën over 
gepersonaliseerde transacties als een institutionele regeling en hoe het zich ontwikkeld 
heeft over de tijd heen. Vervolgens wordt gekeken naar de historische oorsprong van 
gepersonaliseerde transacties en worden de implicaties daarvan op het 
ontwikkelingstraject van het land beoordeeld. Bovendien worden de belangrijkste 
institutionele elementen geïdentificeerd die de evolutie van gepersonaliseerde transactie 
mede hebben bepaald. Door dit te doen, worden de hoofdelementen die de evolutie van 
persoonlijke transacties bepaald hebben geïdentificeerd en wordt haar impact 
beoordeelt op de bredere socio-economische en politieke omgeving. 
We vonden dat het gemeenschappelijk bezit van belangrijke hulpbronnen zoals land in 
het verleden en beperkte handel met de buitenwereld, de twee belangrijkste 
determinanten waren voor het voorkomen van persoonlijke transacties. We vonden ook 
dat het overmatig ingrijpen van de overheid in de economische sector heeft geleid tot de 
huidige inefficiënte instituties. De analyse suggereert de sterkte van privé-eigendom en 
een vrijere markt op institutionele evolutie. We concluderen dat de huidige 
gemeenschappelijke en staatseigendomsrechten de ontwikkeling van onpersoonlijke 
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transacties zal blijven verhinderen. Deze ontwikkeling is cruciaal is voor de ontwikkeling 
van efficiënte instellingen die overweg kan met complexe uitwisselingen. 
Om in staat te zijn de oorzaken van gepersonaliseerde transacties te identificeren, 
hebben we de marginale effecten van elke eigenschap gemeten op de keuze van 
boeren. De MNL toonde aan dat alle attributen (prijs, vertrouwen, afhankelijkheid, 
betrouwbaarheid, striktheid, nabijheid en sociale relaties) waarvan wij veronderstelden 
dat ze de voorkeur van boeren bepalen voor handelaren, significant zijn. Alle attributen, 
met uitzondering van prijs en sociale relaties, stellen de boeren in staat langdurige 
transacties te creëren. Hoewel prijs niet leidt tot een persoonlijke transactie, doet sociale 
relatie dit wel. Maar omdat het MNL model geen voorkeurheterogeniteit kan vastleggen, 
maken we gebruik van LCM om hiervoor te controleren. Zo konden we verschillende 
klassen van boeren die soortgelijke voorkeuren delen identificeren. Slechts een klein 
deel van de boeren waardeert sociale relaties. Dit suggereert dat de bestaande 
persoonlijke transacties een strategisch antwoord zijn van boeren op beperkingen van 
de markt en informatie problemen. Het gedetailleerde onderzoek naar de effecten van 
persoonlijke relaties op de koffiekwaliteit suggereert dat gepersonaliseerde transacties 
geen efficiënte institutionele regeling is om koffie kwaliteit onderhoud te stimuleren. 
Om zeker te zijn werd de kwestie onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de handelaar. 
Beschrijvende analyse van velddata die verzameld werden van transacties duidt op een 
vergelijkbaar resultaat. Niet alleen zijn persoonlijke transacties alomtegenwoordig en 
nemen ze recent toe in aantal, de transactierisico’s voor de handelaren suggereert de 
inefficiëntie van de gepersonaliseerde institutionele regelingen. Gezien de historische 
context die de ontwikkeling van onpersoonlijke transacties afschermt, kunnen we 
concluderen dat gepersonaliseerde transacties de norm blijven voor koffie en andere 
producten op de lokale markten, ondanks hun inefficiëntie. 
Daar waar in het verleden onpersoonlijke transacties alomtegenwoordig waren zelfs in 
centrale markten, werd een institutionele ingreep gedaan om een competitieve en 
onpersoonlijke transactie te creëren via ECX. Om de efficiëntie van deze institutionele 
interventie te evalueren analyseerden we de snelheid en de mate van symmetrie van 
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prijs transmissies tussen paren van markten over de wereld-export-veiling-
lokale/kleinhandel koffie waardeketen. 
In de meeste gevallen bleken de effecten beperkt tot het stroomopwaartse einde van de 
keten. De implicatie van deze bevinding is dat institutionele hervormingen op hogere 
niveaus niet kunnen slagen behalve wanneer vergelijkbare hervormingen worden 
doorgevoerd op elke trap van de waardeketen met als laatste trap de lokale markten. 
Snelheid en symmetrie van prijs transmissies zijn niet aanzienlijk veranderd na ECX en 
het effect varieert ook tussen export en binnenlandse markten. Concreet zullen prijs 
verbeteringen die geassocieerd zijn met indeling en standaardisatie, blijven plakken bij  
handelaren en exporteurs zolang de transacties in de lokale markt traditioneel blijven en 
de competitie op exportmarkten klein. We concludeerden dat zolang de lokale markten 
traditioneel en gepersonaliseerd blijven en de exportmarkt weinig concurrerend is, 
boeren een klein deel van de uiteindelijke prijs zullen blijven ontvangen voor hun 
producten. Al het bewijs impliceert dat om een verbetering van de markt dat de boeren 
ten goede komt te bewerkstelligen, meer nodig is dan alleen het verbeteren van 
instellingen met betrekking tot de centrale markt. 
Uit de beschrijvende resultaten van velddate verzameld bij producenten en exporteurs 
bleek dat de interventie effectief is om transacties op centrale markten onpersoonlijk te 
maken. Het merendeel van de handelaren en exporteurs erkende de impact van de 
interventie op het verminderen van transactie problemen, zoals uitblijvende betalingen, 
levering, sortering en dergelijke. Maar de impact op het verbeteren van de algehele 
efficiëntie van de markt was niet zoals ECX het stelt. Sommige transactie risico's zijn er 
nog steeds en transactiekosten zijn niet veel verminderd. Bovendien lijkt het dat het 
sociale landschap toegestaan heeft dat collusie is ontstaan onder sommige handelaren 
en exporteurs. 
In de transactie situaties waarbij exporteurs en handelaars/ leveranciers geen 
alternatieve regelingen dan de ECX veiling kunnen gebruiken, is het moeilijk om te 
beoordelen of de waargenomen transactie efficiënt is of niet. Bovendien heeft een 
bepaalde institutionele regeling de neiging efficiënt en dynamisch te zijn wanneer het 
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concurreert met alternatieve regelingen. Eén regeling kan geschikter  zijn dan een 
andere, afhankelijk van de eigenschap van de transactie. Zo is de bestaande transactie 
door ECX ontworpen voor “grondstoffen-koffie”, maar niet voor “merk-koffie”. Het kan 
niet merk (geografische oorsprong) reputatie stimuleren. Dit is omdat transacties van GI-
beschermde producten ten minste volledig traceerbare transacties vereisen daar waar 
transacties in de grondstoffen markt noodzakelijkerwijs niet-traceerbaar zijn. 
De regering was in staat om via de “Ethiopian Fine Coffee Trademarking Initiative” in 
staat een GI-bescherming te krijgen in de VS, Japan en een aantal Europese landen. 
Het initiatief had de bedoeling om de onderhandelingspositie van exporteurs in de 
wereldmarkt te verbeteren. Maar een paar jaar na dit initiatief, introduceerde de overheid 
een nieuwe regel dat koffietransacties buiten ECX verbiedt: een regulering die  in 
volledig in strijd is met het institutionele regeling dat GI-bescherming vereist. De twee 
interventies: “commoditization” door middel van ECX en “trademarking” zijn, naar onze 
mening, onverenigbaar - in termen van doel en de structuur van de transactie. Dit kan 
de exporteurs van Ethiopische koffie niet in staat stellen om mee te profiteren van de 
handelsmerk beschermingen die deze landen aanboden voor Ethiopische koffie. Gezien 
deze onverenigbare institutionele interventies, wilden we de impact van het handelsmerk 
initiatief analyseren op de prijzen van GI beschermde Ethiopische koffie. We vonden dat 
het effect van het handelsmerk op de prijzen positief was en toenam over de tijd heen. 
Maar wanneer we de gevolgen van de ECX interventie analyseerden, controlerend voor 
andere parameters, bleek de impact op de prijzen van GI-beschermde koffie negatief. 
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Appendices 
A. Supplementary information for results  
A. Sample choice set 
No. Attributes Trader A Trader B 
1 Additional price the buyer offered (Birr/kg) 1 3.0 
2 
Strictness of the buyer in quality 
assessment 
Strict Not strict 
3 Trustworthiness of the buyer Trustworthy Not Trustworthy 
5 Buying location Outside village Within village 
7 Dependability during crisis Dependable Not dependable 
6 Reliability  Not reliable Reliable 
4 Social relationship Known Not known 
 
Table A Results of ADF unit root test 
  Test statistics (using 3 lags and trend parameter) 
  
Overall 
(N=221) 
Before ECX 
(n=157) 
After ECX (n=64) 
Producer 
price 
Level -3.42** -2.27 -2.26 
 First difference -7.85*** -6.15*** -4.62*** 
Auction price Level -2.32   -1.86 -1.76 
 First difference -6.59*** -5.59*** -3.77** 
FOB price Level - -2.80 -2.18 -1.89 
 First difference -7.49*** -7.42*** -3.62** 
World price Level -2.95 -6.60 -1.66 
 First difference -7.85*** -8.43*** -3.81** 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6B Results of Granger’s causality test using the actual ECX intervention period of 
December 2008 
 2-stat 
Direction of causality (lag=2a) 
Overall 
(N=213) 
Before ECX 
(n=141) 
After ECX (n=72) 
World  FOB prices 15.58*** 6.78* 13.97*** 
FOB  World prices 31.39*** 17.35*** 13.54*** 
FOB  Auction prices 37.25*** 6.56* 33.19*** 
Auction  FOB prices 8.07** 9.87** 1.51 
Auction  Producer prices 35.05*** 19.76*** 11.00** 
Producer  Auction prices 4.03 9.46** 4.66 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
a lag order was selected using various information criterion (AIC, SBIC and HQIC selection) 
 
Table 8.1a Coffee brand specific seasonal effects of the fixed and random effect 
regressions of FOB prices  (continued from Table 5.1) 
 Fixed Effect (N=41259) Random Effect (N=41259) 
 b t b t 
Harar*Jan. 0.00 0.07 0.04** 2.24 
Sidama*Jan. 0.07*** 5.16 -0.10*** -4.91 
Yirgachefe*Jan. 0.14*** 6.38 0.14*** 6.33 
Wellega*Jan. 0.06*** 4.03 0.06*** 3.99 
Harar*Feb. -0.01 -0.56 0.03 1.53 
Sidama*Feb. 0.09*** 7.31 -0.08*** -4.19 
Yirgachefe*Feb. 0.15*** 7.32 0.15*** 7.31 
Wellega*Feb. - - - - 
Harar*Mar. -0.05* -1.87 -0.01 -0.58 
Sidama*Mar. 0.08*** 6.87 -0.09*** -4.84 
Yirgachefe*Mar. 0.15*** 7.61 0.15*** 7.62 
Wellega*Mar. 0.02* 1.81 0.02* 1.83 
Harar*Apr. -0.04 -1.56 0.00 -0.15 
Sidama*Apr. 0.07*** 5.87 -0.10*** -5.14 
Yirgachefe*Apr. 0.16*** 7.6 0.16*** 7.6 
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Wellega*Apr. 0.03** 2.00 0.03** 1.99 
Harar*May -0.06** -2.00 -0.02 -1.01 
Sidama*May 0.11*** 9.19 -0.06*** -3.19 
Yirgachefe*May 0.15*** 7.41 0.15*** 7.4 
Wellega*May 0.02* 1.76 0.02* 1.73 
Harar*Jun. -0.06** -2.00 -0.02 -1.03 
Sidama*Jun. 0.12*** 9.55 -0.06*** -3.01 
Yirgachefe*Jun. 0.18*** 9.27 0.18*** 9.25 
Wellega*Jun. 0.01 1.21 0.01 1.18 
Harar*Jul. -0.03 -1.09 0.01 0.59 
Sidama*Jul. 0.11*** 8.80 -0.06*** -3.05 
Yirgachefe*Jul. 0.21*** 10.18 0.21*** 10.18 
Wellega*Jul. 0.02 1.23 0.02 1.24 
Harar*Aug. -0.01 -0.42 0.03 1.63 
Sidama*Aug. 0.11*** 9.00 -0.06*** -3.04 
Yirgachefe*Aug. 0.22*** 10.46 0.22*** 10.46 
Wellega*Aug. 0.03** 2.13 0.03** 2.13 
Harar*Sep. -0.04 -1.42 0.00 0.01 
Sidama*Sep. 0.08*** 5.89 -0.09*** -4.38 
Yirgachefe*Sep. 0.14*** 6.26 0.14*** 6.26 
Wellega*Sep. 0.05*** 3.22 0.05*** 3.21 
Harar*Oct. 0.00 -0.18 0.04* 1.93 
Sidama*Oct. 0.08*** 5.96 -0.09*** -4.53 
Yirgachefe*Oct. 0.13*** 6.13 0.13*** 6.14 
Wellega*Oct. 0.05*** 3.81 0.05*** 3.82 
Harar*Nov. -0.04 -1.46 - - 
Sidama*Nov. 0.04*** 2.98 -0.13*** -6.21 
Yirgachefe*Nov. - - - - 
Wellega*Nov. 0.06*** 4.17 0.06*** 4.14 
Harar*Dec. -0.04 -1.51 0 0.1 
Sidama*Dec. - - -0.17*** -7.84 
Yirgachefe*Dec. -0.01 -0.31 -0.01 -0.33 
Wellega*Dec. 0.07*** 4.92 0.07*** 4.92 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
Table 8.2a Coffee origin – Month interaction of producer prices of coffee beans and 
coffee cherries (continued from Table 5.2) 
 
Producer price of coffee cherries 
(N=14503) 
Producer price of coffee beans 
(N=4983) 
 FE RE FE RE 
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 b t b t b t b t 
Harar*Jan. -0.12 -1.1 -0.13 -1.15 0.09 1.54 0.08 1.37 
Sidama*Jan. 0.05 1.22 0.45*** 10.9 0.03 0.35 0.02 0.29 
Wellega*Jan. -0.20*** -5.04 -0.19*** -4.98 -0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.33 
Yirgachefe*Jan. -0.41*** -2.94 -0.24* -1.7 0.22 1.21 -0.04 -0.21 
Harar*Feb. -0.15 -1.33 -0.15 -1.37 0.07 1.12 0.06 0.96 
Sidama*Feb. 0.07* 1.66 0.47*** 11.3 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.69 
Wellega*Feb. -0.19*** -5.03 -0.19*** -4.95 -0.02 -0.33 -0.03 -0.5 
Yirgachefe*Feb. -0.41*** -2.99 -0.23* -1.7 0.21 1.17 -0.05 -0.27 
Harar*Mar. -0.22* -1.93 -0.23* -1.95 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.14 
Sidama*Mar. 0.09** 2.06 0.49*** 11.68 0.11 1.56 0.1 1.44 
Wellega*Mar. -0.22*** -5.94 -0.22*** -5.82 0.06 1.03 0.05 0.79 
Yirgachefe*Mar. -0.40*** -2.91 -0.22 -1.59 0.30* 1.68 0.05 0.25 
Harar*Apr. -0.19 -1.64 -0.20* -1.67 0.18*** 2.97 0.16*** 2.65 
Sidama*Apr. 0.07 1.51 0.47*** 10.74 0.15** 2.06 0.14* 1.87 
Wellega*Apr. -0.19*** -5.03 -0.19*** -4.92 0.1 1.56 0.08 1.25 
Yirgachefe*Apr. -0.42*** -3.04 -0.24* -1.73 0.27 1.51 0.01 0.04 
Harar*May. -0.15 -1.25 -0.15 -1.27 0.08 1.32 0.07 1.12 
Sidama*May. 0.11** 2.34 0.52*** 11.32 0.07 0.8 0.06 0.74 
Wellega*May. -0.22*** -5.45 -0.21*** -5.3 -0.03 -0.51 -0.05 -0.7 
Yirgachefe*May. -0.49*** -3.52 -0.31** -2.2 0.16 0.83 -0.1 -0.51 
Harar*Jun. -0.19 -1.53 -0.19 -1.52 0.01 0.22 0 0.07 
Sidama*Jun. -0.04 -0.76 0.37*** 7.96 0 . -0.06 -0.92 
Wellega*Jun. -0.23*** -5.69 -0.22*** -5.5 -0.05 -0.78 
  Yirgachefe*Jun. -0.48*** -3.46 -0.29** -2.11 0.1 0.47 -0.15 -0.67 
Harar*Jul. -0.19 -1.59 -0.19 -1.58 -0.11 -1.59 -0.11* -1.67 
Sidama*Jul. -0.14*** -2.87 0.26*** 5.4 0.08 0.93 0.08 0.97 
Wellega*Jul. -0.31*** -7.36 -0.30*** -7.17 -0.02 -0.26 -0.02 -0.31 
Yirgachefe*Jul. -0.70*** -5.1 -0.52*** -3.74 0.19 0.85 -0.05 -0.22 
Harar*Aug. 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.35 0 . 
  Sidama*Aug. 0 . 0.41*** 7.69 -0.1 -0.92 -0.1 -0.86 
Wellega*Aug. -0.25*** -5.45 -0.24*** -5.23 0 . 
  Yirgachefe*Aug. -0.57*** -3.9 -0.38*** -2.6 0 . -0.24 -1.05 
Harar*Sep. 0 . 
  
-0.01 -0.17 -0.02 -0.31 
Sidama*Sep. -0.41*** -7.69 
  
-0.11 -1.25 -0.11 -1.28 
Wellega*Sep. -0.20*** -4.36 -0.19*** -4.13 -0.05 -0.68 -0.06 -0.76 
Yirgachefe*Sep. -0.54*** -3.27 -0.35** -2.12 0 . 
  Harar*Oct. -0.32** -2.49 -0.33** -2.54 0.11* 1.7 0.1 1.62 
Sidama*Oct. -0.42*** -8.41 -0.02 -0.43 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.22 
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Wellega*Oct. -0.06 -1.27 -0.05 -1.2 0.08 1.05 0.08 1.01 
Yirgachefe*Oct. -0.18 -0.99 
  
0.25 1.09 
  Harar*Nov. -0.34*** -2.74 -0.34*** -2.8 0 -0.08 -0.01 -0.23 
Sidama*Nov. -0.25*** -5.18 0.15*** 3.26 -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 -0.24 
Wellega*Nov. 0 . 
  
0.08 1.21 0.07 1.08 
Yirgachefe*Nov. 0 . 0.16 0.89 0.24 1.15 -0.02 -0.08 
Harar*Dec. -0.33*** -2.82 -0.33*** -2.87 0 -0.06 -0.01 -0.15 
Sidama*Dec. -0.09* -1.92 0.31*** 7.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 
Wellega*Dec. -0.11** -2.57 -0.11*** -2.6 0 0.05 0 -0.04 
Yirgachefe*Dec. -0.25 -1.36 -0.08 -0.44 0.36* 1.79 0.11 0.54 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 and t-value in parenthesis 
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of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 8(2): 24-68. Special Issue. 
4. Fekadu Gelaw and Million Sileshi, 2013. Impacts of grain price hike on poverty in rural 
Ethiopia. African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, (8)2: 69-89. Special 
Issue.  
5. Fekadu Gelaw and Million Sileshi, 2012. Impacts of grain price hike on poverty in rural 
Ethiopia. Contributed paper presented at the 28th International Conference of Agricultural 
Economists (ICAE) which was held in Foz do Iguaçu, Paraná, Brazil, Aug., 18-24, 2012. 
6. Jema Haji and Fekadu Gelaw, 2012. Determinants of the recent soaring food inflation in 
Ethiopia, Transnational Research Journals, 1(8): 225-233. 
7. Fekadu Gelaw, 2010. The dynamic relationship among poverty, inequality, and growth in 
rural Ethiopia: A micro evidence. Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics, 
2(5):197-208.  
8. Jema Haji and Fekadu Gelaw, 2010.  Do ‘favorable’ terms of trade bear the effect of 
soaring food inflation for pastoralists in Ethiopia? A paper presented at the International 
DCG (Dryland Coodrdination Group/Norway) Workshop held Oct. 11-16, 2010, Addis 
Ababa. 
9. Fekadu Gelaw and Bezabih Emana, 2009. Analysis of Technical Efficiency of Wheat 
Producers in Machakel Woreda, East Gojjam. Ethiopian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 7(2): 1-33. 
10. Fekadu Gelaw, 2008. Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in the Rural Ethiopia: Micro 
Evidence from Ethiopian Rural Household Survey. Contributed paper presented at the 
27th International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE) Conference, Beijing, 
China, Aug., 16-22, 2009. 
4.2. Other Research and Evaluation Reports 
4.2.1. Writing course modules for undergraduate students 
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1. Fekadu G. & K., Dawit, 2007. Microeconomics II: Module I & II. Dep. of Agri. Econ., 
Faculty of Continuing & Distance Education, Haramaya University, pp: 1-340. 
2. Fekadu Gelaw, 2006. Principles of Agricultural Marketing: Module I. Dep. of Agri. 
Econ., Faculty of Continuing & Distance Education, Haramaya University, Pp: 1-162. 
3. Gemoraw Adinew & Fekadu Gelaw, 2008. Mathematics for Economists II: Module II. 
Dep. of Agri. Econ., Faculty of Continuing & Distance Education, Haramaya University, 
pp: 1-160. 
4. Fekadu Gelaw & Yetmwork Hailemariam, 2009a. Development Planning: Module I & 
II. Dep. of Econ., Faculty of Continuing & Distance Education, Haramaya University, 
pp: 1-308. 
5. Fekadu Gelaw & Bekele Kerebih, 2009b. Agricultural Project Planning and Analysis: 
Module I & II. Dep. of Agri. Econ.,  Faculty of Continuing & Distance Education, 
Haramaya University, pp: 1-335. 
6. Fekadu Gelaw, 2010. Project Analysis: Module I & II. Dep. of Econ., Faculty of 
Continuing & Distance Education, Haramaya University, pp: 1-320. 
4.2.2. Writing course modules for postgraduate students 
1. Fekadu Gelaw, 2014. Institutional and Behavioral Economics pp: 1-140. 
2. Jema Haji and Fekadu Gelaw, 2011. Module 1 Agricultural Marketing and Price 
Analysis, pp: 1-55. 
4.2.3. Other research reports 
1. Fekadu Gelaw and Ketemma Bekele, 2013. Indigenous and modern Early Warning 
Systems in the face of climate change. Submitted to Ethiopian Relief Service/ 
Ethiiopian Catholic Church - Social Development Coordnation office of Hararghe 
(ERS/ECC-SDCOH). 
2. Fekadu Gelaw, Dereje Taddesse, and Ketemma Bekele, 2013. Global Climate 
Change, Ethiopian’s Climate Resilient Green Economy and GCC induced Conflict in 
Eastern Ethiopia. A training module to Pastoralist and Agropastoralist Areas of 
Eastern Hararghe. Submitted to USAID – CIAFS.  
3. Fekadu Gelaw, 2012. Inefficiency and incapability gaps as causes of poverty: a 
poverty line-augmented efficiency analysis using stochastic distance function. A 
research report submitted to African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Kenya, 
April 2012. 
4. Fekadu Gelaw. & A., Molla, 2009. Economic Integration between Eastern Regional 
States: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Belay Kassa (Ed). A paper presented at 
Panel Discussion held to commemorate Ethiopian Nations and Nationalities Holiday, 
Harar, Dec. 6-8, 2009. 
5. Fekadu Gelaw., 2009. Handbook of Project Cycle Management. A Training Manual 
for Regional & District Experts, funded by CISP/Ethiopia. 
6. Fekadu Gelaw. & A., Gemoraw, 2008. Impact of Agricultural Livelihood Recovery 
Project in East and West Hararghe. A research report submitted to ERS/ECC-
SDCOH. 
7. Paulos Asrat and Fekadu Gelaw, 2007. Market and Credit Based Livelihood Study in 
Eastern Hararghe. A research report submitted to Oxfam GB, East Hararhe 
Coordination Office. 
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8. Tadele Tefera., Fekadu Gelaw & Paulos Asrat, 2007. Impact Assessment on Safety 
Net Program Interventions of the ECC-SDCOH: The Case of East Hararghe & Dire 
Dawa Agro-pastoral Areas. Belay K., & L., Belaineh (Eds), A research report 
submitted to ERS/ECC-SDCOH. 
5. AWARDS AND RESEARCH PROJECTS 
1. March 2013, I and Bamlaku Taddess won a competitive grant from Africa Peace-building 
Network (APN) for a research entitled: ‘Sources of Resource-Based Conflicts and 
Tensions among Farmers and Pastoralists of Eastern Regions of Ethiopia’  
Amount USD $16,866.00 
2. March 2011, won Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) grant of African 
Economic Research Consortium (AERC)/Collaborative Masters in Agricultural and 
Applied Economics (CMAAE) for a research entitled: ‘Impact of price hike on rural 
poverty in Ethiopia’. 
Amount: US$ 6,000.00  
3. March 2011, won Faculty Research Grant of African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC) to carry out a research entitled ‘Inefficiency and Incapability Gaps as Causes of 
Poverty: a Poverty Line Augmented Efficiency Analysis Using Distance Function’.  
May Amount: US$15,000.00 
4. May 2010, won HU, AgShare, Michigan State University, OER-Africa and HU joint pilot 
project which was funded by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations for improving MSc 
educations by producing Open Education Resources. As a result, Fekadu Gelaw, Jema 
Haji and Belay Kassa, produced a module for Agricultural Economics MSc students on 
the course ‘Agricultural Marketing and Price Analysis’.  
Amount: US$ 74,250.00  
5. February 2009, Jema Haji, Belaineh Legesse & Fekadu Gelaw won a competitive grant 
from Dryland Coordination Group (DCG), TØRRLANDS-KOORDINERINGS GRUPPEN 
for a research entitled, ‘Discovering and Explaining the ‘Black-Box’ of Ethiopian 
Agricultural Produce Price Formation and its Determinants within the Current Liberalized 
Market Policy’.  
Amount: NOK 408,569 (US$ 68,000.00) 
6. July 2008, won a competitive grant for Research Capacity Building grant of Ethiopian 
Development Research Institute (EDRI) for a research entitled “The Dynamic 
Relationship between Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Ethiopia: A Micro Evidence from 
ERHS Panel Data. 
Amount: US$6000.00  
6. MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES 
1. Full Member of the Ethiopian Society of Agricultural Economists (ESAE), Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
2. Full member of the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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7. REVIEWER AND THESIS DEFENSE EXAMINATOR 
1. Reviewer  
Reviewed contributed papers submitted for the 8th Africa Farm Management 
Association (AFMA) held at Sarova Panafric Hotel Nairobi 25-29 November  2012: 
i. Impact of gender socioeconomic characteristics on the rate of adoption of agricultural 
technologies among women in Marakwet East District of Kenya 
ii. What drives commercialization of edible wild fruits in Kenyan Drylands 
iii. Determinants of beef meat supply in Burundi: a vector error correction model 
approach applied to structural Nerlov paradigm. 
Reviewed contributed papers submitted for the 29th International Conference of 
Agricultural Economists (ICAE) held August 8-14, Milan Italy. 
iv. Supplier dynamics in horticultural export chains - evidence from Ecuador 
v. Is Collective Action an Inclusive Strategy in Smallholder Contract Farming? Evidence 
from Sorghum Aggregation in Kenya 
vi. Developing an online market mechanism for trading perishable agricultural 
commodities 
2. MSc thesis defense examination 
Examined the following MSc thesis of the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Haramaya University: 
i. Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Performance of Ethioipa’s Agriculture Versus 
Industry Sector: The Case of Economic Partnership Agreement between European 
Union and Africa- Pacific- Caribbean Countries, Marta Yilma, Internal examiner, Oct 
21-22,  2011. 
ii. The Impact of Savings and Internal Lending Communities Program by Women on 
Households Economy: the case of Dire Dawa Administration, Yewibdar Tasew, 
Chairman, Oct 21, 2011. 
iii. The Impact of Savings and Internal Lending Communities Program by Women on 
Households Economy: the case of Dire Dawa Administration, Deriba Seboka, Internal 
examiner, Oct 21-22,  2011. 
iv. Determinants of Farm Household Poverty: The Case of Lay Gayint District, South 
Gondar Zone, Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia, Eshetu Seid, Internal 
examiner, Oct 21-22,  2011. 
v. Consumer preference and willingness to pay for sheep meat quality and safety in 
Addis Ababa, Aga Neme, Chairman, May 20-21, 2011 Haramaya University. 
vi. Energy, Greenhouse gas and economic assessment of biodiesel production from 
Jatropha: the case of Eastern and Northern Ethiopia, Adem Feto, Internal Examiner, 
May 20-21, 2011 Haramaya University. 
vii. Climate change adaptive measures and household food security under the Semi-arid 
conditions of Centeral Rift Valley of Ethiopia, By Birutawit Ejigu, Internal Examiner, 
May 20-21, 2011 Haramaya University. 
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viii. Technical Efficiency of Eastern and Rift Valley Route Rose (Rosa hybrid) cut flower 
farms in Awash Melkassa, Bishoftu and Zeway District, by Mohammed Aman, Internal 
Examiner, May 20-21, 2011 Haramaya University. 
ix. Economic impact of HIV/AIDS on households of Dire Dawa Administration: the case of 
three urban and nine rural kebeles, by Yohannes Mengesha, Internal Examiner, May 
20-21, 2011 Haramaya University. 
8. REFEREES 
 Prof. Willis Kosura, Director of Collaborative Masters in Applied and Agricultural 
Economics, Nairobi, Kenya, e-mail: Willis.Kosura@aercafrica.org  
 Prof. Belay Kassa, President of Haramaya University, Haramaya, e-mail: 
belayk@hotmail.com Mobile: +251915330337; and 
 Dr. Ayalneh Bogale, Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Haramaya University; e-mail: ayalnehb@yahoo.com , Mobile: +251915740258 
 
  
